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This thesis aims to analyse how the Japanese government supports Southeast 
Asian transport development by allocating assistance through the works of the 
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA), the Institute of 
Developing Economies of Japan External Trade Organisation (IDE-JETRO), and the 
Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI). It questions the process through which 
the ideas and norms of Southeast Asia’s regional transport development were 
constructed, cascaded, and internalised in Southeast Asia. This thesis applies 
Finnemore and Sikkink’s ‘norm life cycle’ framework as an analytical framework. 
It analyses the norm life cycle of regional transport development by integrating 
information and opinions from documentary research and in-depth interviews with 
officials and intellectuals in both Japan and Southeast Asia. 
The arguments of this thesis are threefold. First, the Japanese governmental 
agencies (i.e. MOFA, METI, MOF, JICA, JETRO, ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI) 
work together as a ‘norm entrepreneur’ – or a ‘regional intellectual hegemon’ (RIH) 
– to construct ideas and norms and further cascade them to Southeast Asian 
intellectuals’ and government officials’ professional and institutional connections. 
The governments in Southeast Asia and the ASEAN Secretariat then internalise these 
ideas and norms into their transport development schemes. Second, IROs are 
research organisations that construct ‘practical knowledge’ as recommendations for 
Southeast Asia on how to connect the region by regional transport networks. Third, 
the ideas and norms of regional transport development constructed by the ERIA, 
IDE-JETRO, and ADBI are composed of (1) ideas of infrastructure development, (2) 
spatial and connectivity norms, (3) norms of economic activities, (4) norms of 
knowledge sharing, and (5) ideas and norms of environmental protection and 
sustainable development. These ideas and norms help the region to become 
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Chapter 1:  
Introduction 
 
“In order to fulfil ASEAN’s potential while making use of ‘diversity’ 
and strengthening unity, it is important to enhance ‘connectivity’.” 
H.E. Mr. Kishida Fumio 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA, 2016) 
  
 
1.1 Research Background 
  This section explains how I became interested in this research topic. After 
that, it provides an overview of how Japan’s contributions to Southeast Asian 
transport development have progressed. Then, it elaborates on how these issues 
inform the research questions for this thesis.  
 In 2006, one of my classmates in Bangkok asked me if I had any idea why 
Japan is interested in the development of the East-West Economic Corridor (EWEC), 
a road that links Myanmar-Thailand-Laos-Vietnam, supported by the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB). At the time, I did not have any idea as I was writing a 
paper on the role of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in addressing the issue of 
pirates in the Strait of Malacca. So, I said nothing. After I finished my undergraduate 
studies, I pursued my post-graduate programme and took a module named ‘Thailand 
in Globalisation’, for which I wrote a paper on how Thailand’s economic relations 
with the US and Japan changed during the Cold War, and how such relations shaped 
Thailand’s National Economic and Social Development Plan (NESDP). I further 
studied why and how Thailand commenced planning of the Eastern Seaboard 
development scheme, a plan to develop the Eastern part of Thailand to attract Thai 
and international investors. I developed that paper into my thesis, which aimed to 
analyse how US-Japan relations shaped Southeast Asian regionalism and the Greater 
Mekong Subregion (GMS).1 I found that Thailand shifted its economic and 
 
1 This thesis differentiates the use of the words ‘Northeast Asia’ , ‘Southeast Asia’  and ‘East Asia’ . 
Northeast Asia refers to three sovereign states, including PRC China (hereafter China), Japan, and the 
Republic of Korea (ROK)  (henceforth South Korea) ; Southeast Asia refers to the geographical area 
that covers eleven sovereign states, including, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste (henceforth East Timor), and Vietnam. 
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infrastructure development plan in tandem with the regional and international 
environments, which were dominated by the US. 
 From that thesis, I learned that one of Thailand’s infrastructure development 
plans was to support the EWEC, which also received significant contribution and 
engagement from Japan. I studied the EWEC further by investigating Japan’s foreign 
policy documents, statements, publications, and website. Many of these resources 
were published by the Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade 
Organisation (IDE-JETRO), a research organisation financed by Japan’s Ministry of 
Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI). Upon finishing my thesis, I submitted it to 
my university and in 2010 moved to Chiang Mai to start my career. 
 In Chiang Mai, I taught modules titled ‘GMS Studies’ and ‘Politics of Sub-
Regional Economic Co-operation in Asia-Pacific’ and commenced research on 
Japan’s contribution to the EWEC, and on the US’s role in the formation of Southeast 
Asian regionalism. Throughout this journey, I observed that I was paying too much 
attention to the ‘technical issues’ of the EWEC, such as border trade management, 
financial support, and road construction. Most importantly, I observed that most of 
the resources I was reading were produced by Japanese scholars. Many meetings and 
conferences on the development of GMS transport in Thailand were also organised 
by Japanese organisations, such as the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and 
East Asia (ERIA), the Institute of Developing Economies of Japan External Trade 
Organisation (IDE-JETRO), the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI), and the 
Embassy of Japan in Bangkok. I then realised that maybe I was not looking at the 
right issue, or maybe I should be looking at something else to better understand the 
development of GMS transport. I started to question the impacts and influence of the 
knowledge distributed and communicated through publication and research-related 
activities conducted by Japanese organisations. I asked myself how I, as a Thai 
scholar, and maybe other Thai or Southeast Asian scholars, would utilise those 
research publications and analyses? What are the ideas and norms presented in those 
studies or activities? Why and how were those ideas and norms constructed? How 
 
East Asia refers to the geographical area that includes Northeast and Southeast Asia altogether. 
Moreover, the term ‘ region’  is used to denote the whole geographical area of Southeast Asia which 
comprises eleven countries; whilst ‘ subregion’  signifies just five countries in mainland Southeast 
Asia, including Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam. 
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were the ideas and norms in the research perceived by ‘readers’ or ‘users’ in 
Southeast Asia? How did the academics perceive, interpret, and translate the 
Japanese-constructed research results or analyses to communicate or transfer the 
ideas in their respective national languages? And, how can such contributions 
support the work of their governments? 
 I began to question why the Japanese government has continuously 
mentioned the importance of GMS transport development. I wondered what Japan’s 
economic and political interests are in the Mekong area? Why are the Japanese 
government-funded think tanks, such as IDE-JETRO, interested in the GMS area? 
How have IDE-JETRO and other Japanese research organisations contributed to the 
knowledge of Southeast Asian transport development? What are the important ideas, 
norms, or messages that they are trying to promote to GMS governments? How has 
Japan’s ODA been utilised in tandem with its contribution to the GMS regional 
transport development scheme? I then used all of these questions to frame my PhD 
thesis, focused on comprehending Japan’s intentions and engagement in GMS 
transport development. 
The aims of this thesis, therefore, are to analyse Japan’s contribution to 
Southeast Asian transport development schemes. It seeks to answer the following 
questions: what are the motives of the Japanese government in supporting the 
development of international transport infrastructure in Southeast Asia? How did 
Japan cascade the ideas and norms of regional development in the research 
conducted by ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI to support Southeast Asia’s regional 
transport development schemes? And, how are the norms internalised in domestic 
and regional transport development schemes in Southeast Asia? 
 To answer these questions, I needed a framework to identify the actors 
involved in the construction of ideas and norms, and those involved in the cascade 
process, as well as a framework that could help analyse how such ideas and norms 
are internalised by Southeast Asian scholars, governments, and the ASEAN 
Secretariat. Accordingly, I chose Finnemore and Sikkink’s ‘norm life cycle’ 
framework (1998) as a tool to analyse the process of how the ideas and norms are 
constructed, and further cascaded, by Japanese government agencies and ERIA, IDE-
JETRO, and ADBI.  
 Japan’ s intellectual contributions to Southeast Asia are scarcely stated in 
existing literature. The studies on Japan-Southeast Asia relations generally focus on 
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economic and political relations after 1945.  The existing literature within the 
International Relations ( IR)  discipline on Japan- Southeast Asia relations primarily 
applies the concepts of neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, and social 
constructivism to comprehend the nature and development of such relations. Realists 
focus on Japan’ s material power by stating that its political and economic power 
consequently help the Japanese government to initiate regional co-operation between 
Japan and Southeast Asia (Calder, 2000; Dent, 2008b; Katada, 2002b; García, 2016; 
Melissen & Sohn, 2015; Park, 2012; Soeya, 2015; Son, 2014). They also study how 
the Japanese government utilises official development assistance (ODA) to support 
Southeast Asian infrastructure, economic development, and human development 
while enhancing Japan’s economic interests (Cheow, 2003; Maswood, 1994, 2001a, 
2001b; Rix, 1993b; Shiraishi & Kojima, 2014; Sudo, 2015; Terada, 1998) .  Neo-
liberal institutionalists, on the other hand, focus on Japan’s contributions to regional 
institutions and co- operation in development through the allocation of a significant 
amount of ODA to support regional development ( Tanaka, 2017; Sudo, 2015; 
Verbiest, 2013) .  Furthermore, social constructivists focus on how normative power 
constitutes regional co- operation and Southeast Asian regionalism by emphasising 
the power of ideas and norms (Terada, 2003; Rittberger et al., 1997) (see Chapter 2). 
For the term “ norms” , this thesis adopts the definition used by Finnemore and 
Sikkink (1998) who define a norm as a “standard of appropriate behaviour for actors 
with a given identity” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 891). 
 The mentioned studies have contributed to an understanding of Japan-
Southeast Asia relations from varying theoretical perspectives: realists pay attention 
to material power (Wendt, 1999, p. 19), neo-liberals emphasise co-operation and 
institution (Wendt, 1999, p. 92), and social constructivists stress the importance of 
identities, ideas, and norms (Wendt, 1999). In other words, realists focus on the 
importance of material power, which places Japan in the leading role, whereas neo-
liberals stress the benefits of joining regional co-operation and institutions. However, 
the explanations by realists and neo-liberals do not take the normative aspects into 
account, as they state that the actors are rational. Wendt (1999) states that 
“rationalists are interested in how incentives in the environment affect the price of 
behaviour” (Wendt, 1999, p. 34). In contrast, social constructivists assert that 
identities built on ideas, norms, or beliefs can shape state behaviour as national 
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identities and national interests can be interpreted and translated in different ways 
(Wendt, 1999, pp. 237-238).  
 As can be seen from the discussion so far, social constructivists emphasise 
ideas and norms, while questioning their source. Why does a state or an international 
organisation follow the ideas proposed by an agent in the international system? In 
response, Finnemore and Sikkink’s International Norm Dynamics and Political 
Change (1998) applies social constructivism to analyse how ideas and norms are 
‘constructed’, ‘cascaded’, and ‘internalised’. They call this the ‘norm life cycle’ 
process. They look at the phenomenon of ‘norm emergence’ by analysing how ‘norm 
entrepreneurs’ construct ideas and norms in different ways and cascade them through 
international organisations or official channels, as well as how the norms are 
interpreted and translated into national or regional policies (see Chapter 2). 
 The application of Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm life cycle can be seen in 
Dobson’s work (2003). Dobson seeks to explain the domestic and international 
contexts that construct the norms of Japan’s engagement in a UN peacekeeping 
operation (Dobson, 2003, p. 31) (see Section 2.3.2 of Chapter 2). Dobson 
investigates parliamentary debates, official publications, newspapers and magazines, 
books, articles, and dissertations, both in English and Japanese. He points out that 
the norm entrepreneurs include the UN Secretary-General (Dobson, 2003, p. 51), 
university professors (Dobson, 2003, p. 51), and the Japanese government (Dobson, 
2003, pp. 52-56).  
 Another example of Japan’s contribution to Southeast Asia can be seen in 
Hatakeyama’s work (2008), which states that Japan is an ‘intellectual and economic 
leader’ (Hatakeyama, 2008, p. 364). Hatakeyama studies the Japanese government’s 
endeavours to create the ‘Initiative for Development in East Asia’ (IDEA) as a 
platform for aid donors to discuss the ideas and philosophy of ODA giving (see 
section 2.3.2 of Chapter 2). He, nevertheless, did not conduct an in-depth study on 
how the Japanese officials and intellectuals worked together to construct and 
disseminate the ideas of ODA giving through IDEA’s meetings and conferences.  
 Dobson (2003), Hook et al. (2012) and Maslow (2018) also acknowledge the 
contributions that intellectuals made to Japan’s foreign policy-making process. They 
state that intellectuals (e.g. university professors, researchers) and think tanks are 
additionally important as they help the Japanese government to obtain information, 
research results, and analyses, which are conducted by the intellectuals themselves 
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or research institutions. Although there are many think tanks in Japan, Abb and 
Köellner (2015) state that Japanese think tanks are not influential because the 
Japanese government prefers not to rely on policy recommendations from private 
think tanks, while Maslow (2013) and Ueno (2004) state that the Japanese 
government does not prioritise the policy research industry (see Section 2.4 of 
Chapter 2). Moreover, the studies on intellectuals, either as an individual or as a 
network, have not been elaborated. The connections between intellectuals and 
research organisations that help the Japanese government to establish professional 
and institutional connections have not been meticulously investigated.  
 That being said, the Japanese government still supports the establishment of 
new research institutes, both in Japan and in Southeast Asia. ERIA is a Japanese 
government-funded research organisation, established in 2008. The Japanese 
government anticipated that financial contribution to ERIA’s research activities 
would facilitate economic integration in ASEAN and narrow the development gap. 
Meanwhile, the Japanese government allocated a venue in the Kasumigaseki 
Building – a modern building surrounded by Japanese ministries in the heart of 
Tokyo – to be the headquarters of the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI). At 
the same time, the Japanese government supported the Institute of Developing 
Economies, Japan External Trade Organisation (IDE-JETRO) to look after the 
establishment of ERIA and its functions. Accordingly, the question is if the Japanese 
government does not recognise the works of Japanese think tanks, as stated by Abb 
and Köellner (2015), Maslow (2013), and Ueno (2004), why does the Japanese 
government still support the establishment of new research organisations, both inside 
and outside Japan (see Chapter 5)? 
 Kodera Kiyoshi (2016), Vice-President of Japan International Co-operation 
Agency (JICA), states that the role and intention of the Japanese government to 
facilitate and persuade the international research organisations to base their 
headquarters in Tokyo reflect its attempt to become the centre of knowledge and 
research in Asia. Kodera states that this further reflects the attempts of the Japanese 
government to establish itself as a regional and global knowledge leader (Kodera, 
2016, p. 29). In Kodera’s opinion, the Japanese government tries to utilise its 
financial and intellectual power to play a leading role in East Asia. This thesis, 
accordingly, will attempt to apply the norm life cycle framework to analyse how 
ideas and norms are constructed by Japan so that we can see how Japan has exercised 
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its intellectual contribution to Southeast Asia. This thesis proposes that in order to 
understand the whole process, we should look at how Japan has been exercising its 
status as the ‘regional intellectual hegemon’ (RIH) in Southeast Asia.  
 RIH is a framework that applies the norm life cycle framework to understand 
Japan’s intellectual contributions to East Asia. First, at the norm emergence stage, 
RIH looks at how the norm entrepreneurs in Japan work simultaneously or 
collaboratively to construct certain ideas and norms through connections between 
people (e.g. officials and intellectuals) and governmental agencies. The norm 
entrepreneurs that collaborate can collectively be called ‘RIH’. It also looks at the 
norm cascade process. particularly how RIH cascades ideas and norms through 
publications, meetings, conferences, research results, and capacity-building 
programmes. Finally, it looks at how ideas and norms are interpreted and internalised 
into the development schemes of each country and of various international 
organisations.  
The intellectual contributions require financial support because academic 
research and development utilise financial capital to facilitate their activities. Japan’s 
Ministry of Finance (MOF) allocates a significant amount of financial support 
through ODA, which mainly focuses on Southeast Asian development. This thesis 
will, thereby, utilise RIH to understand how the Japanese government allocates its 
ODA to contribute to Southeast Asian development and how the contributions 
constitute Japan’s position as the intellectual leader in Southeast Asia. To do so, this 
thesis selects ASEAN’s regional transport development as a case study because it is 
one of the top bilateral and multilateral co-operation themes between Japan and 
Southeast Asia. We will see in Chapter 4 that Japan has been helping Southeast Asia 
to construct regional development schemes through use of the research conducted by 
Japanese government-funded think tanks. One of the most dynamic issues of the 
regional development scheme is regional transport development. Japan, China, and 
the U.S. have been supporting the development of regional transport in Southeast 
Asia because it is considered to be one of the critical factors that play a pivotal role 
in the economic regionalisation process in Southeast Asia (Bhattacharyay, 2010a, 
2010b; Nakano, 2015).  
 To summarise, I will analyse why and how the Japanese government 
contributes to and engages in Southeast Asian transport development through 
provision of financial support to ERIA, IDE-JETRO and ADBI. The Japanese 
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government has been allocating its ODA to support the work of these three research 
organisations to intellectually construct a ‘practical knowledge’ embedded with the 
norms of regional transport development, and to cascade it to publications, meetings, 
conferences, research-related activities, and capacity-building programmes. I will 
analyse Japan’s foreign policy toward Southeast Asia (see Chapter 4) while 
scrutinizing the intellectuals’ professional and institutional connections (see Chapter 
5 and 6). 
 
 1.1.1 Regional Connectivity 
 Regional connectivity catalyses inclusive economic activities because it 
generates linkages between terrains by the connection of physical infrastructure 
(JBIC, 2005, p. 2). Along with the improvement of infrastructure, it also conveys 
broader and deeper co-operation among involved actors, for example, the 
enhancement and standardisation of regulations and laws to support economic 
activities along the connections. Nakao Takehiko, President of ADB, states that 
infrastructure investment is one of the most ‘essential conditions’ for economic 
development in Asia (Nakao, 2015). This reflects that ADB recognises the vitality 
of the enhancement of infrastructure development. 
  States, regional co-operations, and organisations expect that regional 
connectivity will bring economic opportunities to the poor, eliminate poverty, 
support private manufacturers, and bring economic prosperity to the region (World 
Bank, 2017, p. 30). Regional connectivity in Southeast Asia is supported politically, 
financially, and/or intellectually not merely by the governments in the region, but 
also by external actors (such as ERIA, IDE-JETRO and ADBI) and the governments 
of external actors (such as Japan, China, the US, South Korea, India).  
The regional transport infrastructure needs ideas to support and sustain it. 
The support must come from the domestic and international authorities that have the 
power and influence to plan, implement, monitor, and control the development. At 
the domestic level, infrastructure-development-related offices exist in every country. 
Moreover, at the international level, international organisations and international co-
operation also have roles to play in this respect.  
  One of the most active and significant contributors to infrastructure 
development is ADBI –  the research arm of the Asia Development Bank ( ADB) . 
ADBI states that the development of infrastructure will foster economic activities by 
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lowering production costs and add more value to the products and services because 
it amalgamates existing networks into comprehensive linkages.  In other words, it 
expands global production networks ( Brooks, 2009) .  This recognition can also be 
seen in the World Bank’ s The Status of Infrastructure Services in East Asia and the 
Pacific ( 2017) , which estimates that a 10 per cent increase in infrastructure 
development would contribute to 1 per cent economic growth in the long run (World 
Bank, 2017, p. 31). ADB and ADBI’s Infrastructure for Seamless Asia (2009) also 
states that while Asia has more than 900 million people, it needs to better develop its 
infrastructure to improve people’ s living standard as 1. 5 billion still cannot access 
basic sanitation, 640 million cannot access clean water, and 930 million still live 
without electricity.  The advancement of people’ s living standard can be achieved 
through the enhancement of regional connectivity to reduce the cost of regional trade, 
promote regional integration, reduce poverty, narrow the development gap, promote 
more efficient use of regional resources, promote sustainable development, and 
create a single Asian market (ADB & ADBI, 2009, pp. 22-23). 
 Japan’s contributions to Southeast Asian connectivity come in two forms. 
The first one is allocation of ODA and other political assistance. The second is from 
the intellectual research contributions via research organisations in Japan and 
Southeast Asia. These intellectual contributions constructed ideas of development 
and knowledge of connectivity. ADB is an example of an international organisation 
that promotes connectivity by providing financial assistance and technical assistance 
to recipient countries. One of the most progressive projects under the supervision of 
ADB is the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Economic Co-operation Programme 
(hereafter ‘the GMS Programme’) which was initiated in 1992. The GMS 
Programme aims to support the construction and the improvement of hard and soft 
infrastructure in the GMS area that comprises Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, 
Vietnam, and two provinces in the southern part of China (Yunnan Province and 
Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region). Since its inauguration, the development of 
hard infrastructure, especially the development of transport networks in the region, 
gained significant attention from the GMS Programme (ADB & ADBI, 2009, p. 35). 
Since 2000, three main economic corridors were proposed and constructed in 
mainland Southeast Asia, including the East-West Economic Corridor (EWEC), the 
North-South Economic Corridor (NSEC) and the Southern Economic Corridor 
(SEC). These corridors are expected by their members to facilitate and accelerate 
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cross-border economic activities in the subregion (ADB & ADBI, 2009, p. 89; 
ADBI, 2015, pp. 56-57; Ishida, 2008, p. 116) (see Chapter 4 and 5). 
Another scheme that was initiated to help the connectivity in the region is 
‘ASEAN Regional Connectivity’. Before 2009, ASEAN had never initiated an 
inclusive and comprehensive plan for the connectivity in the region. However, this 
changed in 2009 during the 15th ASEAN Summit in Hua Hin, Thailand, when the 
Thai government, under the then incumbent Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, 
proposed the idea of constructing regional linkages in the meeting. ASEAN leaders 
agreed to adopt the Statement on ASEAN Connectivity after the 15th ASEAN 
Summit. The ASEAN Connectivity plan was developed into the ‘Master Plan on 
ASEAN Connectivity’ (MPAC), which outlines an inclusive infrastructure 
development plan for transportation and other relevant facilities in the region. Until 
March 2019, there were two MPACs. The first MPAC was officially submitted and 
adopted during the 17th ASEAN Summit in 2010 by ASEAN regional member states, 
anticipating that the MPAC would help to build inclusive regional connectivity 
within the entire region, not only within mainland Southeast Asia (ASEAN, 2011). 
This would also facilitate and strengthen the formation of the ASEAN Economic 
Community (AEC). MPAC intends to build a wide range of networks throughout the 
region, standardise cross-border trade regulations, and facilitate the free flow of 
people (Das, 2013b, pp. 5-6). This project requires comprehensive collaboration 
between regional governments, the business sector, various stakeholders, and local 
communities to join discussions regarding the plan and its potential impacts. Along 
with the planning of regional connectivity programmes, the governments, the private 
sector, and external regional actors are also involved in the planning of physical and 
institutional development in Southeast Asia.  
MPAC 2010’s strategic plans cover three main areas of connectivity, 
including physical connectivity, institutional connectivity, and the connectivity of 
people (see Chapter 5). It seeks to help the region connect, both physically and 
institutionally, while supporting people’s mobilisation throughout the region.  
After the launch of the first MPAC in 2010, the Japanese government 
engaged in cooperative activities and initiated supportive schemes to complement 
the MPAC’s strategic plans (see Chapter 5). The MPAC 2010 was to be implemented 
between 2010 and 2015, and when this phase ended, the ‘Master Plan on ASEAN 
Connectivity 2025’ (hereafter ‘MPAC 2025’) was signed and adopted in 2016 by 
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ASEAN member states in Vientiane, Laos. MPAC 2025 aims to continue the goals 
of MPAC 2010, i.e. to link the region together through physical infrastructure and 
institutional development and to support people-to-people connectivity. However, 
ASEAN was confronted with many challenges that constrained connectivity, such as 
financial support, demography, class, urbanisation, and political issues. International 
and domestic political dynamics have forced ASEAN to integrate multi-dimensional 
concerns regarding ASEAN connectivity (ASEAN, 2016a). Accordingly, MPAC 
2025 outlines broader and deeper resolutions to address such challenges and 
concerns. It seeks to deal with sustainable infrastructure, digital innovation, seamless 
logistics, regulatory excellence, and mobility of people (ASEAN, 2016a; Cheen, 
2018) (see Section 5.2 of Chapter 5). Aiming to address these constraints, the 
ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN member states, and external countries, such as Japan, 
China, the US and India, have proposed to support and assist ASEAN to further 
develop regional transport in line with MPAC 2025.  
 
1.1.2 Japan and Hard and Soft Infrastructure Development in Southeast 
Asia  
As mentioned earlier, the Japanese government has been supporting regional 
transport development by providing financial and technical support for large 
infrastructure projects because the Japanese government is aware that the 
improvement of infrastructure will induce industrialisation and, in turn, improve the 
Japanese economy (Söderberg, 2012) . When we look back to the starting point of the 
Japanese government’s engagement in regional transport development, we can see 
that the Japanese government stepped in around 1945. The post-war US-dominated 
system has triggered Japan-Southeast Asia relations, as the US government aimed to 
contain communism it supported regional economic co-operation in various parts of 
the world (Borden, 1984, pp. 18-21). The US government also wanted to link Japan 
and Southeast Asia together to make Southeast Asia an accessible market for Japan. 
This led to the creation of regional organisations and initiatives, such as the ADB 
(1966), ASEAN (1967), and the GMS Programme (1992) (see Chapter 4). The US 
and Japanese governments anticipated that such programmes would support 
economic development in Southeast Asia through infrastructure development.  
 Ideas and norms of how regional transport should develop come from many 
sources. For example, the ideas and norms of Southeast Asian infrastructure and 
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transport development were created by local communities, universities, research 
institutes, governments, superpowers, and international organisations. Norms of 
regional transport include the ideas of globalisation, free flow of goods and services, 
trade facilitation, and liberalisation. They are constructed, emphasised, cascaded, and 
internalised into various Southeast Asian governments’ transport development 
schemes, and that of the ASEAN Secretariat (see Chapter 3 and 6).  
The development of infrastructure supports economic development as it is 
expected that such development will reduce poverty and improve the living standard 
of local people (Kessides, 1993). The expectations do not, nonetheless, come merely 
from Southeast Asian countries, but also from the ASEAN Secretariat and the 
Japanese government. One of the reflections on this can be seen in Private Sector 
Perspectives in the Greater Mekong Subregion, published by the United Nations 
(UN) in 2000. It states that Japanese businesses and companies recognised the 
importance of the development of hard infrastructure, both in Southeast Asia and the 
GMS area. They proposed that an approachable economic environment was required 
for better business operation, so they placed requests with regional governments and 
asked the Japanese national government to engage with development in the region. 
Companies such as the Honda Motor Co., the Hitachi Ltd., the Itochu Corp., the 
Mitsui & Co., the Electric Power Develop Co., the Federation of Economic 
Organisations (Nippon Keidanren), and the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (JCCI) strongly stress that the improvement of hard infrastructure in the 
region must be supported and improved as fast as possible (UN, 2000, pp. 111-127).  
At present, the Japanese government’s attempts to engage in and contribute 
to infrastructure construction regularly appear in official documents, especially in 
Japan’s ODA White Paper. For example, the 2011 ODA White Paper states that 
following the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, strong economic growth in 
Southeast Asia would help Japanese economic recovery and reconstruction (MOFA, 
2011, p. 18). The revitalisation and construction of regional connectivity in Southeast 
Asia, therefore, are significant factors for the activities of Japanese companies in the 
region (MOFA, 2011, p. 9). In this sense, Southeast Asian economic, political, and 
security issues are closely connected with the Japanese economy. The linkages 
between economic relations and Japan’s foreign policy in Southeast Asia are one of 
the crucial factors that determine official relations between the two regions.  
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Japanese government agencies, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MOFA), METI, the Ministry of Finance (MOF), JICA, and Japan External Trade 
Organisation (JETRO) have contributed significantly to the MPAC. They facilitate 
the meetings, provide financial support, and create mechanisms, such as the Japanese 
Task Force, to support ASEAN Connectivity and to foster collaboration between 
Japan and the ASEAN Connectivity Coordination Committee (ACCC) (see Chapter 
5). 
The endeavours made by Japanese governmental agencies were executed 
through official mechanisms and platforms. Meanwhile, the intellectuals (e.g. 
university professors and researchers) also help the government officials to construct 
and disseminate ideas and knowledge through the work of research organisations in 
order to justify certain ideas and make the most of their expertise. 
 
1. 1. 3 International Research Organisations ( IROs)  and Regional 
Development 
Apart from Japan’s contributions to regional transport development in 
Southeast Asia, research organisations also contribute intellectually to the decision-
making process. Prominent research centres in East Asia that contribute to ASEAN 
Connectivity include ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI. Their research mainly focuses 
on macro-economics and regional economies of Southeast Asia and Asia. They have 
various research topics and themes that are concentrated on spatial economics, 
political issues, development studies, finance, small-medium enterprises (SMEs), 
education development, social aspects of development, and the development of 
infrastructure as a tool to support economic development. They ask questions about 
how to improve the international transportation and logistics networks in the region, 
how to facilitate access to natural resources, and how to create a viable market and 
exterminate obsolete or deficient regulations or laws on cross-border trade. 
 ERIA and IDE-JETRO were inaugurated, financed, and supported by the 
Japanese government. ERIA is an organisation that was established by METI and 
currently works closely with IDE-JETRO. ERIA has been receiving a significant 
number of financial contributions from METI, which receives financial support from 
Japan’s MOF. IDE-JETRO also collaborates with METI, which has been supporting 
IDE-JETRO since its establishment. METI anticipates that IDE-JETRO will conduct 
research that supports understanding and contributes to the knowledge of 
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development studies in Japan and Asia. ADBI is a research body of the ADB, which 
the Japanese and US governments have significantly supported (Dutt, 1977, 2001; 
Krasner, 1982; Yasutomo, 1983) (see Chapter 5).  
 The close relations between the Japanese government and ERIA, IDE-
JETRO, and ADBI provide opportunities for the Japanese government to influence 
these organisations. ‘Influencing’ here refers to the ability to affect the judgements 
made within the organisation and the ability to dominate the direction of its activities 
including research themes or topics of research activities. The need for financial 
support paves the way for the Japanese government to become involved. The 
Japanese government’s support of the establishment and financial matters of these 
organisations controls the research trends and agendas of ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and 
ADBI. In example, one of the agendas studied by the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI 
is Southeast Asian regional connectivity.  
 ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI support the idea of commencing regional 
connectivity. Generally, these three research bodies can be categorised as ‘think 
tanks’. Rich (2004) defines think tanks as “independent, non-interest-based, non-
profit organisations” (Rich, 2004, p. 11 cited in Maslow, 2013, p. 300) that contribute 
to the production and dissemination of knowledge and ideas that are accumulated 
from research and then use them to “influence policy-making process” (Rich, 2004, 
p. 11 cited in Maslow, 2013, p. 300). However, ‘think tank’ is a very ambiguous 
concept. It has been widely used to describe a research entity, or non-partisan, non-
profit organisation and signifies an organisation that aims to propose ideas or 
suggestions to policymakers (Stone, 1996, 2004a, 2004b; Weaver, 1989). Yet, 
knowledge-based and research-based organisations exist in various forms and 
function in different ways. Their legal status can vary from independent research 
organisations (e.g. ERIA, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute), government-related 
organisations (e.g. IDE-JETRO, the Japan International Co-operation Agency 
Research Institute (JICA-RI), or research bodies of international organisations (e.g. 
ADBI). Additionally, the word ‘think tank’ also signifies the institutionalisation of 
the research body. It stresses formality and institutionalisation and together de-
emphasises the fact that they could work collectively as research networks. The 
characteristics of ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI are slightly different from the 
orthodox definition of think tanks.  
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 The orthodox definitions and characteristics of think tanks are dominated by 
the work on Western think tanks, which focus on regime dissemination (Carnoy, 
1984; Domhoff, 1983; Newsom, 1996; Pautz, 2011; Stone, 1996). However, ERIA, 
IDE-JETRO, and ADBI’s works, publications, and research-related activities 
simultaneously generate a practical set of knowledge that supports the economic and 
political objectives of Japan towards Southeast Asia. ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI 
work by forming professional and institutional connections between intellectuals and 
organisations in the region to cascade practical knowledge constructed by 
researchers to the officials in Southeast Asia.  
To understand the characteristics of ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI, I 
propose that we call them ‘international research organisations’ (IROs). The concept 
of IROs here in this research is slightly different from the concept of think tanks, 
which have been elaborated on in existing literature (Stone 1996; Weaver 1989). The 
ultimate objectives of think tanks are to study issues and give policy 
recommendations or influence the decision-making process in the affiliated countries 
or territories. IDE-JETRO is a national think tank in this case, as it is a research body 
that is associated with JETRO, which is also affiliated with METI. However, the 
cases of ADBI and ERIA are different. ADBI is a research body within the ADB, 
whilst ERIA is an international research organisation is not affiliated with any 
particular governmental organisations.   Still, ERIA’s revenue is provided by IDE-
JETRO. The main characteristic that the three research organisations share is their 
institutionalisation, but their objectives and affiliations are different. It is, therefore, 
problematic to generalise what organisations should be called think tanks, 
particularly when some do not consider themselves think tanks. IDE-JETRO firmly 
states that they are not a think tank and that they do not help the Japanese government 
with the policy-making process.  
How were those IROs influenced by the Japanese government? How did 
those influences affect infrastructure development trajectories in Southeast Asia? 
These questions cannot be answered by state-centric theories. Albeit structural 
realists offer us a lens to understand the role of the Japanese government in Southeast 
Asia by focusing on the philanthropist role, structural realism still cannot provide us 
with a lens to further comprehend the role of the Japanese government toward IROs 
that are capable of constructing the norms of development. Social constructivism 
offers a promising tool in the discipline of  IR, as it opens the floor for discussion 
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about the normative roles of superpowers and transformations in certain areas and 
issues. In the case of this thesis, the development of international transport and cross-
border trade regulations in Southeast Asia could gain tremendous benefit from the 
contribution of social constructivism. As what we have seen from the previous 
section, the Japanese government has the structural power to influence IROs, and 
Japanese national interests are translated and interpreted into Southeast Asia’s 
regional objectives. From this perspective, not only is national interest socially 
constructed (Wendt, 1999), but regional interest is as well. Nevertheless, to 
legitimise regional interests, authority is necessary to push them forward and to act 
on their behalf. In this case, knowledge from norms-embedded research gains 
legitimacy.  
To understand the ends and the means of the Japanese government vis-à-vis 
Southeast Asia regarding regional transport development, we need to understand 
Japanese politics and foreign policy (see Section 4.2 of Chapter 4). The domestic 
politics of Japan that we need to comprehend by pluralistic approach. This can be 
done by integrating the understanding of Japanese intellectuals and think tanks that 
also play vital role in helping the Japanese government to think about foreign policy. 
This suggests that Japanese foreign policy is constructed through one main process, 
with many participants including government agencies, the business sector, political 
parties, media, think tanks, and research communities (Hook et al., 2012; Zakowski 
et al., 2018). This thesis pays particular attention to the Japanese government’s role 
in ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI by analysing how the Japanese government 
influences the research conducted by these three IROs and how the research could 
influence the development of international transport in Southeast Asia. 
Furthermore, I seek to analyse the requests from Japanese companies, 
particularly those that have factories in Southeast Asia, because such requests play a 
vital role in the foreign policy-making process. The requests of the Japanese 
Chamber of Commerce (JCC) in Southeast Asia, and of other Japanese companies, 
may be reflected in MOFA or METI, two organisations that implement foreign 
policy. Foreign policy would then be translated into policy recommendations that 
would be given to ERIA, IDE-JETRO and ADBI. 
 This thesis will study the roles of ERIA, IDE-JETRO and ADBI  as norm 
entrepreneurs, along with MOFA, METI, JETRO, and JICA, that construct the norms 
of international transport and attempt to disseminate these norms through research 
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(see Figure 1 in Chapter 3). At the same time, supporting the research and 
simultaneously working closely with the IROs, the Japanese government also 
implements policy through use of its ODA via JICA. The norms, then, are not only 
suggested to Southeast Asian governments, but also to the ASEAN Secretariat.  
To summarise, as we have seen thus far, the ideas of Southeast Asian regional 
transport development were constructed through the work of norm entrepreneurs 
including ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI, which work with MOFA, METI, MOF, 
JICA, JETRO. They constructed ideas and norms pertaining to regional transport in 
order to support regional linkages. The norms support the vista of development in 
the region and give hope to countries that accept these norms. In this respect, I argue 
that Japan is a RIH in Southeast Asia, as it can influence norm construction within 




1.2 Research Questions  
As pointed out above, this thesis endeavours to analyse the relations between 
the Japanese government and ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI. There are three main 
research questions that this thesis aims to answer: 
 
1. Why has the Japanese government been supporting the development of 
regional transport infrastructure in Southeast Asia? 
2. How can we utilise Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm life cycle framework to 
analyse how Japan constructed and cascaded the norms of regional 
development in the research conducted by ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI? 
3. How are these norms internalised in domestic and regional transport 
development schemes in Southeast Asia? 
 
Sub-research questions are: 
 
1. What are the ideas and norms of regional transport development that ERIA, 
IDE-JETRO, and ADBI constructed; and why? 
2. How were the ideas and norms of regional transport development constructed 
and cascaded through professional and institutional connections? 
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1.3 Aims 
 This thesis aims to analyse four areas, including: 
 
1. The understanding of Japan’s intellectual role in Southeast Asia: As this 
thesis seeks to analyse Japan-Southeast Asia relations, it will investigate not 
only the economic and political relations, but also Japan’s intellectual 
contribution, which helped Southeast Asian governments and the ASEAN 
Secretariat to conceive of the idea of regional connectivity. This will provide 
the research with a broader understanding of how the Japanese government 
endeavours to utilise its economic strength to support intellectual 
contributions, which in turn help the Japanese economy (see Chapter 4). 
Moreover, as this thesis seeks to analyse Japan's engagement in Southeast 
Asian transport development, Chapter 6 provides an in-depth look at how the 
Japanese government plans to link Southeast Asia, particularly the GMS area, 
to South Asia; and how these linkages will help Japan to achieve its economic 
and political interests in Asia. 
2. The understanding of how IROs work with Japanese government agencies: 
The work and contributions of ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI are briefly 
mentioned in the existing literature, which states that the Japanese 
government supported their establishment. Nevertheless, intellectual 
contributions of ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI in the existing literature are 
still underexplored. This thesis will study how the intellectuals, including 
university professors and researchers, work with MOFA, METI, other 
government agencies, and researchers in Southeast Asia. This will help us to 
see the linkages between professional and institutional connections that the 
intellectuals have formed, as well as how these connections support Japan’s 
foreign policy (see Chapter 5 and 6). This thesis will obtain the relative 
information from interviews with staff members of MOFA, METI, JICA, 
JETRO, ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI, which will help us to understand 
their opinions and their research experience. 
3. Theoretically: This thesis will apply Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm life cycle 
framework, positing Japan as a norm entrepreneur, by examining the 
relations between intellectuals of ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI and 
officials of MOFA, METI, JETRO, JICA, and researchers in Southeast Asia. 
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This application will show how the norms are constructed, while Chapter 6 
will point out some sui generis issues in the process of norm cascading from 
this thesis’s case study.  
4. Area studies: This thesis will give another example of how the regional 
transport development schemes of Southeast Asia were developed and 
supported by Japan. This will help us to see the dynamics of development in 
Southeast Asia, as well as the role of a superpower such as Japan and how it 
can contribute to regional development.  
 
 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
 This thesis is arranged according to the following structure. Chapter 2 will 
review four sets of existing literature, including Japan’s foreign policy-making 
process, norms and development norms, Japan as norm entrepreneur in Southeast 
Asia, and think tanks and the development of norms. The first set is the review of 
Japan’s foreign policy-making process. It will draw attention to the existing literature 
on how Japan’s foreign policy is formulated by emphasizing Japan’s domestic 
politics. The second set is the review of how the literature on norms has been studied. 
It will start by reviewing the existing literature on norms. Then, it will elaborate 
Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm life cycle (1998) and exemplify the literature that has 
applied the norm life cycle framework. It will point out the main gap in norm life 
cycle literature, which is that the role of think tanks and intellectuals has not been 
studied in-depth. After that, it will review the literature on Japan as a norm 
entrepreneur in Southeast Asia. It will first look at the literature that has applied 
social constructivism to comprehend Japan’s role in Southeast Asia. After that, it 
will elaborate on the existing literature that designates Japan as a norm entrepreneur. 
It will additionally highlight the point at which this thesis can contribute to the 
understanding of Japan’s role as a norm entrepreneur in Southeast Asia. Finally, it 
will review the literature on think tanks. This section will provide explanations of 
the existing definitions and characteristics of think tanks. It will then elaborate on 
how the definitions and characteristics should be expanded to help us understand 
more about ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI.  
Chapter 3 is the thesis’ analytical framework. As we have seen the reviews 
of the existing literature on norm life cycle and Japan’s role in Southeast Asia in 
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Chapter 2, this chapter will explain how this thesis applies the norm life cycle 
framework to analyse norm emergence and the processes of cascading and 
internalisation. This chapter will show a figure, which highlights the norm 
entrepreneurs in the norm emergence process so that we can see which agencies will 
be studied in the thesis. Moreover, it will explain the research methodology, 
elaborating on the documentary research and in-depth interviews that I conducted in 
2016. The chapter will then explain the other two main arguments of the thesis. 
Firstly, it will expand on the definition and characteristics of IROs. I will endeavour 
to show the distinction between ‘think tanks’ and ‘IROs’ and how the IROs construct 
‘practical knowledge’. The next section of this chapter will be about intellectuals and 
foreign-policy making. I will discuss the importance of bringing ‘intellectuals’ into 
the analytical framework and how this thesis is going to integrate intellectuals’ 
contributions to Japan’s foreign policy by utilising the data and opinions from my 
field research to help me in the analytical process.   
Chapter 4 is focused on Japan-ASEAN relations since 1945. This chapter will 
answer the main question of this thesis: what are the motives behind the Japanese 
government’s support of regional transport development in Southeast Asia? This 
chapter is divided into the main three sections. The first section is the international 
background of Japan-ASEAN relations. It will explain the structure of the 
international system since 1945 and how this structure shaped the relations between 
Japan and Southeast Asia. The second section will investigate the dynamics of 
Japan’s domestic politics. It will start with the importance of Southeast Asia to the 
Japanese economy, followed by the role of the business sector in Japan’s foreign 
policy. The third section will be about Japan’s foreign policy towards Southeast Asia. 
It will study the role of Japan’s ODA and the governmental relations between Japan 
and regional organisations, which are ASEAN and the GMS. This chapter will 
provide the background of Japan-ASEAN relations so that we can comprehend how 
and why the Japanese government is interested in Southeast Asian regional transport 
development.  
Chapter 5 is about Japan’s contribution and engagement in ASEAN’s MPAC. 
This chapter will try to answer the second sub-question of this thesis: how have the 
Japanese government and ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI worked together to 
develop regional transport networks in Southeast Asia? This chapter will start with 
the historical background of the development of MPAC by emphasising the role of 
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the ASEAN Secretariat. After that, it will explain how the Japanese government 
contributes to the work of MPAC. Next, it will study the roles of ERIA, IDE-JETRO, 
and ADBI in MPAC. Lastly, it will explain the background of the three institutes and 
their organisational structures so that we can understand the politics behind the work 
of these three IROs.  
Chapter 6 is on Japan’s role in the norm life cycle of Southeast Asian 
transport development. This chapter will answer the remaining three questions of this 
thesis: how Japan, as a RIH, contributes to and shapes certain ‘norms of 
development’ – including the development of transport infrastructure – in the 
research conducted by ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI? To what extent are transport 
networks influenced by norms of development and especially those norms advanced 
by ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI? How have the Japanese government and ERIA, 
IDE-JETRO, and ADBI worked together to develop regional transport networks in 
Southeast Asia? This chapter, thus, is divided into four sections. The first section 
will look at the norm construction process. It will analyse how the professional and 
institutional connections between intellectuals in Japanese government agencies, 
universities, and IROs were formed. It will then analyse the norm cascade process. 
It will additionally analyse the power of publications, research, trainings, and 
capacity-building programmes. After that, it will analyse the norm internalisation 
process by looking at how the ideas and norms of regional transport constructed by 
ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI were translated into ASEAN’s regional transport 
development schemes. 
Chapter 7 is the conclusion of the thesis. It will summarise the research 
findings by presenting the analyses in four main sections. The first is the analyses of 
Japan as a RIH. It will explain how the thesis's analytical framework helps us to 
understand Japan's regional intellectual role and how this understanding helps us to 
further comprehend the role of Japan in Southeast Asia. Next, it will summarise how 
the research findings on ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI help us to comprehend the 
role of research entities in the international system and how this understanding might 
contribute to future research. After that, it will summarise how Japan helps Southeast 
Asia to have a shared understanding and vision of regional transport development, 
which helps not only Southeast Asia to have a common regional transport 
development plan, but also helps Japan to achieve its economic and political interests 
in the region. Finally, I will explain this thesis’s contributions to the IR discipline, 
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then propose the implications for future research development by discussing the 





































To understand the process of how Japan contributes to the ideas and norms 
of regional transport development schemes, this chapter starts by looking at how the 
existing literature in the field of International Relations (IR) has explained the 
importance of ideas and norms. This chapter reviews the relevant literature, which 
can be categorised into four groups. The first group is the literature on Japan’s 
foreign policy making. This part seeks to elaborate the existing literature on Japan’s 
politics and foreign policy, and how IR scholarship explains Japan’s foreign policy. 
It also explores how the existing literature explains Japan’s role in Southeast Asia 
from different theoretical perspectives. The last part of this section will point out 
how the existing studies on Japan’s model of foreign policy making could be 
improved as the existing studies are not pluralistic enough. The second group is the 
literature on the role of norms in international relations. It starts by exploring how 
realism, liberalism, and social constructivism explain Japan’s foreign policy. It 
points out the emphasises of each theory and states why social constructivism can 
help us to comprehend Japan’s role in Southeast Asia. After that, it studies the 
literature on IR theories of Japan-Southeast Asia relations and their contributions to 
the study of norms in IR. This helps us to understand the existing literature that 
explains how norms can influence development, especially how the norms of 
infrastructure development can contribute to regional economic integration. The 
third group is the literature on the role of Japan as a ‘norm entrepreneur’ in the 
international system. This part reviews how the existing literature has applied the 
norm life cycle framework to understand the role of Japan in different contexts, such 
as anti-whaling and UN decisions. However, the existing literature focuses on the 
process of norms creation and has not explained how individuals, such as 
intellectuals and officials, are involved in the norms creation process. The fourth 
group is the literature on the engagement and influence of think tanks in the 
international system. This section studies the definition and characteristics of think 
tanks as explained in the existing literature, pointing out characteristics that have 
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been left unexplained. As a result, the analysis will determine how this thesis expands 
upon the current understanding of ‘think tanks’ in Japan and Southeast Asia.  
 
 
2.2. Japan’s Foreign Policy Making and Its Relations with Southeast Asia 
 This section explores the existing literature focused on Japan’ s foreign 
policy, as explained using different IR theories, including structural realism, neo-
liberal institutionalism, and social constructivism.  It explains how the existing 
studies have applied these theories to explain Japan’ s foreign policy.  After that, it 
elaborates on the strengths and weaknesses of each theory and points out the reasons 
why this thesis decided to use social constructivism in order to explain Japan-
Southeast Asia relations. Finally, it revisits the existing the model of Japan’s foreign 
policy making.  
  
2.2.1 Realism 
 In the study of foreign policymaking processes, realism seems to gain 
attention from scholars as it focuses on materialistic power and national interests, 
which is what practitioners are particularly concerned with. Realism emphasises 
power relations in the international system and how such relations create the 
conditions for power distribution. IR scholarship demonstrates how realism 
dominates the way that the state thinks about its foreign policy, in terms of obtaining 
and exercising power to serve its own interests. For classical realists, human nature 
is the primary source of conflict (Carr, 1939; Morgenthau, 1978), and because 
humans strive for power, this leads to power-seeking behaviour (Elman, 2007, p. 12). 
As every state has its own power and sovereignty, there is no central authority. This 
condition is called ‘anarchy’. Furthermore, classical realism, as described by Jackson 
and Sørensen (2010, p. 59), has four fundamental assumptions: (1) human nature is 
evil, and accordingly, the classical realist is pessimistic; (2) international relations is 
always conflictual because human nature is evil; (3) states always seek power and 
national interests; and (4) there is progress in international politics just like progress 
in domestic politics.  
Expanding upon the argument of classical realists, which is focused on the 
nature of the state and anarchy, structural realists add that the international system is 
the most critical factor for peace and stability ( Jørgensen, 2010, p.  84) .  The 
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international system of anarchy encourages states to pursue power and assert their 
dominance ( Mearsheimer, 2014; Viotti & Kauppi, 2012; Waltz, 1979) .  Various 
assumptions can be made from classical realism and structural realism, as shown by 
Viotti and Kauppi’ s ( 2012, pp.  35- 42)  statement that there are four principle 
assumptions of realism.  First, both classical and structural realism believe that the 
international system is anarchic.  Second, the state is viewed as a unitary actor, just 
as Zakowski (2018, p. 1) explains that the studies of states’ behaviour treats states as 
‘black boxes’, reflecting that their national interests are definable. Third, the state is 
assumed as a rational actor because the state is assumed –  as previously mentioned 
–  to have national interests and objectives, and thus, will act rationally to reach its 
goals.  Finally, as the international system is anarchic, the state will do anything to 
protect its security. Hence, both national and international security is prioritised. 
We have seen from the above how realism perceives the world. In the context 
of Japan’ s foreign policy, Sato and Hirata ( 2018b, p.  3)  point out that structural 
realism has remained a dominant theory because it explains how Japan’ s relations 
with other countries are driven by Japan’ s national interests, which evolved 
particularly from Japan- US relations.  Japan’ s security-  and economic- focused 
relations with the US shaped Japan’ s international engagement after the Second 
World War in various ways.  For example, Dobson ( 2003, p.  9)  points out that 
realists’ explanations of Japan’s foreign policy focus on Japan-US bilateral relations, 
which developed significantly after the Second World War.  Dobson explains how 
the international environment has had the power to influence Japan’ s foreign 
relations since the Meiji Restoration (Dobson, 2003, p. 9). When Japan was defeated 
in 1945, the bilateral relations between Japan and the US developed tremendously, 
which led Japan to depend on the US for its security and protection ( Mochizuki, 
1997, p.  11) .  This dependency established Japan as what Calder ( 1988, p.  518) 
describes as a ‘ reactive state’ , or a condition in which Japan could not maintain an 
‘active role’  in the international arena.  Calder further explains that Japan could not 
aim to be a hegemonic leader due to its dependency on the US security 
system.  Berger (2007, p.  290)  reiterates this argument by stating that Japan ‘ is not 
an independent actor’  and that Japan has its own agenda.  Jain and Inoguchi (1996) 
also metaphorically describe Japan’s foreign policy as ‘karaoke diplomacy’, in which 
the US-dominated international system is the background music and all Japan has to 
do is follow the background music.  Pyle’ s Japan Rising ( 2007)  is also a good 
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example of how structural realists explain how the international system shaped 
Japan’s domestics politics and foreign policy. Pyle pointed out that the perception of 
Japan as a ‘ reactive country’  was based on Japan’ s adaptation to its external 
environment after 1945 (Pyle, 2007, p. 19). 
However, Sudo (2015, p. 13) argues that Japan became more ‘active’ around 
the end of the 1990s when the financial crisis hit East Asia. The Japanese government 
took a leading role in helping East Asia to initiate financial mechanisms, such as the 
New Miyazawa Plan and Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI). Meanwhile, Hagström (2010) 
proposes that Japan is active in the international system by pointing out that Japan 
strives to achieve a leading role in international relations, as witnessed from both its 
active contributions to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in an effort to 
gain a permanent seat and its attempts to revise Article 9 of the national constitution.  
Nonetheless, as the above paragraphs show, there are many debates regarding 
Japan’ s foreign policy engagement in the world.  Potter and Sueo ( 2003, p.  319) 
propose that in order to understand Japan’ s role in the international system, we 
should alter the debate from being focused on Japan’s ‘reactive’ or ‘active’ status to 
instead focus on other theoretical debates.  They propose that as “ Japan was never 
completely reactive or passive” (Potter & Sueo, 2003, p. 320) and we have witnessed 
the growing role of Japan in the world, there are many ways to think of Japan’ s 
foreign policy.  For example, Hook et al.  (2001)  refers to Japan’s diplomacy in the 
world as ‘quiet diplomacy’, or a more low-key diplomacy. Meanwhile, the ‘reluctant 
realism’ perspective proposed by Green (2003) emphasises Japan’s changing role in 
the post- Cold War era, showing that Japan has been seeking a more active role, but 
remains ‘reluctant’ to commit to an independent role. 
The study of Japan’s foreign policy towards Southeast Asia is dominated by 
structural realism. The existing structural realism-influenced literature on Japan-
Southeast Asia shows that the dynamics of the international system have shaped 
Japan’s relations towards Southeast Asia in different ways, including Japan’s 
proactive role within Southeast Asia and Japan’s leading role in Southeast Asian 
regionalisation processes. The former focuses on the more active role of Japan within 
Southeast Asia, including Japan’s official development assistance (ODA) allocation 
to the region. For example, Katada (2002b) and Miyashita (1999) look at how the 
role of Japan in East Asia had decreased significantly before it re-emerged again 
when the Japanese government started giving financial assistance to Southeast Asian 
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countries instead of paying war reparations. For some scholars, the Japanese 
government has supported many economic mechanisms and co-operations at various 
levels throughout the region. In terms of bilateral relations, the Japanese government 
has granted economic assistance to developing and underdeveloped countries via 
official mechanisms, such as ODA (Kato et al., 2016; Rix, 1993a, 1993b; Söderberg, 
2011). Hale (2008, p. 64) states that the Japanese government’s decision to start 
granting ODA to Southeast Asian countries helped Japan to obtain a leading status 
in Southeast Asia. At the regional level, Japan also supports economic 
multilateralism in both Northeast and Southeast Asia by supporting and facilitating 
the establishment of economic co-operation, particularly during the regional 
financial crises of 1997 and 2008 (Otsuji & Shinoda, 2014; Severino, 2014; Thuzar, 
2014). Nonetheless, focusing on economic and political tools and objectives leave 
some questions remaining, such as how and why Southeast Asia and the ASEAN 
Secretariat accepted the ideas and assistance from Japan; and how the Japanese 
government managed to propose solutions to certain issues (e.g. regional financial 
co-operation, infrastructure development through ODA). 
As previously mentioned, structural realism also focuses on Japan’s 
contributions to the Southeast Asian economic regionalisation process after 1945. 
This set of literature emphasises Japan’s materialistic power after the Second World 
War in its observations of Japan’s active role in Southeast Asia. For instance, 
Fukushima (2009) states that Japan tried to re-engage with Asia, particularly 
Southeast Asia, in an effort to revive its image following the Second World War by 
providing ODA and supporting regional economic initiatives. Fukushima (2009, p. 
112) further states that Japan’s intention to support economic regionalisation in 
Southeast Asia was due to economic interest, particularly Japan’s increasing trade 
and investment volume in Southeast Asia. Moreover, Shiraishi (1997) also explains 
Japan’s role using a realism-dominated perspective. Shiraishi states that Japan’s 
relations with Southeast Asia were developed based on US-Japan relations, and that 
Japan’s contribution to Southeast Asian economic regionalisation was aimed at 
helping Japan’s geo-political power relations with the US and to offset China. These 
studies, therefore, propose that the driving force of Japan’s support for Southeast 
Asian regionalisation was its own materialistic interest in the region. 
As these two sets of literature focus on Japan’ s foreign policy under the 
changing international system, they pay attention to material power, or economic and 
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political power, whilst normative factors are put aside. With a lack of understanding 
of the normative approach, structural realism is unable to explain how the Japanese 
government used its power to shape or influence the perspectives of Southeast Asian 
governments in the regional developmental trajectory.  Structural realism pays 
attention to material power, but it does not pay attention to how the country’s leading 
status can shape or influence other actors’  perceptions and understandings. 
Moreover, structural realism tends to downplay the role of other actors in society, 
including think tanks, which have played a significant role in Japan’s foreign policy.  
Thus far in this thesis, we have touched upon the materialistic power of Japan, 
and particularly Japan’ s ODA contributions to Southeast Asia.  I am aware that 
Japan’s ODA is one of its most vital economic and political tools, yet there is a lack 
of theoretical understanding regarding how ODA and the idea of Southeast Asian 
regional development was integrated into Japan’ s ODA.  In other words, how have 
Japan’s governmental agencies integrated the ideas of regional development into its 
ODA allocation scheme? How have Japan’s governmental agencies worked together 
to construct the ideas of how Southeast Asia should develop? Accordingly, although 
structural realism sets a strong foundation acknowledging the importance of Japan’s 
ODA, it does not provide a systematic approach to understand how the ideas of 
Southeast Asian development were determined and later integrated into Japan’ s 
foreign policy.  
 
2.2.2 Liberalism 
  Liberalism, on the other hand, focuses on co-operation. It starts its 
assumptions based on optimistic worldview. Liberalists pay attention to the domestic 
situation and argue that the preferences of domestic actors (e.g. private companies, 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and interest groups) are capable of shaping 
foreign policy (Dobson, 2003, pp. 11-10; Katagiri, 2018, p. 327; Neack, 2018, pp. 
150-149; Zakowski et al., 2018, p.  .(2The idea of liberalism originated in Greece, 
with the belief that humans are rational actors. Liberalism has influenced many 
thinkers, including Immanuel Kant who believed that international anarchy and war 
could be prevented by the formation of collective action bodies, such as federations 
or republics (Mingst, & Arreguín-Toft, 2017, p. .(83 
            Liberalism was adopted into the IR discipline to explain the diverse channels 
by which state and non- state actors engage in foreign policymaking processes.  The 
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government, transnational actors, and domestic actors are all taken into account in 
order to understand how they contribute to the formulation of foreign policy. 
Liberalists also believe in the role of international organisations ( IO)  within the 
international system, as they believe that IOs can help to establish international order 
(Dobson, 2003, p. 11). 
Neo- liberal institutionalism further developed the assumptions that were 
based on liberalism, which believes in co-operation. Neack (2018, p. 149) states that 
liberal institutionalism, is sometimes called ‘ neoliberalism’ , however, McLean 
(2020, p. 67) states that neo-liberalism is the main sub-branch of liberalism. Liberal 
institutionalism also shares the same basic assumption with structural realism that 
the international system is in a state of anarchy.  Yet, liberal institutionalists argue 
that anarchy can also lead to co-operation because actors often establish international 
institutions to manage international co- operation, which guarantees reciprocal 
benefits for everyone (Neack, 2018, p. 149). 
So far, this chapter has looked at the theoretical assumptions of neo- liberal 
institutionalism and will now turn its attention to how the existing literature has 
applied neo- liberal institutionalism in an effort to comprehend Japan- Southeast 
Asian relations.  The studies that utilise neoliberal institutionalism focus on the 
institutions, mechanisms, and non- state actors that contribute to Japan- Southeast 
Asia relations.  These studies look at various issues, such as regional security 
institutions ( Kawasaki, 1997; Yuzawa, 2005)  and regional economic co- operation 
(Tanaka, 2017; Thuzar, 2014; Verbiest, 2013).  
Examples of the studies focused on regional security institutions include the 
works of Yuzawa (2005) and Kawasaki (1997). Yuzawa (2005, p. 466) proposes that 
Japan sought to establish a regional security institution in order to help secure its 
political role in the region and to develop regional co-operation after the Cold War. 
However, as regional political and security issues changed due to the rearrangement 
of regional politics, such as the rise of China and political rivalries between 
superpowers, Japan also changed its political and security approaches to Southeast 
Asia. The Japanese government saw the role of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 
as a mechanism that could “educate Asian neighbours about the importance of 
military transparency for maintaining regional stability” and could help to bring 
“non-like-minded countries to make co-operation” (Yuzawa, 2005, p. 468). Japan 
also saw the potential of the ARF to help constrain China and to foster political co-
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operation in an effort to cope with regional disputes and conflicts (Yuzawa, 2005, p. 
468). This study shows that the Japanese government viewed the ARF as a vital 
regional institution that could contribute to regional security. 
Kawasaki (1997, pp. 485-488) studies Japan’s political and economic 
objectives toward the establishment of the ARF, including the domestic actors that 
contributed to Japan’s foreign policy toward Southeast Asia by categorising them 
into three groups: idealists, realists, and liberals. Kawasaki states that the first is a 
group of people, including lift-wing politicians, progressive academics, and peace 
activists, who recognised the ARF as the first step to free Japan from the US military 
umbrella. Realists see the ARF as a policy mechanism to balance the power between 
Japan and China in Southeast Asia (Kawasaki, 1997, pp. 488-490). Liberals include 
representatives from the MOFA, as well as many academics and analysts who work 
closely with the MOFA. They see the ARF as a platform that can strengthen Japan-
ASEAN relations through co-operation on common political and security interests 
(Kawasaki, 1997, pp. 491-494). 
Studies focused on regional economic co-operation include those of Tanaka 
(2017), Maswood (2004), Thuzar (2014) and Verbiest (2013). These studies pay 
attention to Japan’s endeavours to support Southeast Asian regional financial co-
operation in two different areas. The first area is Japan’s ODA contributions to 
Southeast Asia. For instance, Shida (2017) states that the Japanese government uses 
‘values diplomacy’ to assist other countries, which refers to a values-based approach 
focusing on freedom, democracy, fundamental human rights, the rule of law, and a 
market-oriented economy (Shida, 2017, p. 2). Shida studies Japan’s economic 
contributions to Myanmar through its ODA allocations focused on helping Myanmar 
develop peoples’ livelihoods, initiating capacity building programmes, and 
improving infrastructure. He also studies how Japanese philanthropist organisations, 
such as the Nippon Foundation, have helped improve peoples’ lives in Myanmar. He 
states that liberalism-oriented foreign policy helped Myanmar to develop whilst 
simultaneously helping Japan to play a more active role in the region. Additionally, 
the studies on Japan’s contributions to Southeast Asian economic co-operation also 
pay attention to Japan’s contributions to subregional initiatives through political and 
economic contributions (Lam, 2013b; Ogasawara, 2015; Thuzar, 2014). For 
example, Verbiest (2013, p. 156) states that the Japanese government contributes to 
the development of the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) – a subregional initiative 
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initiated by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 1992 – as it is important to 
Japan's economy due to its geography, natural resources, and the relocation potential 
for Japanese production businesses. Furthermore, these studies focus on Japan's 
government-supported mechanisms that contribute to subregional development by 
elaborating on the financial and political contributions and support of the Japanese 
government whilst also emphasising regional institutions that facilitate co-operation 
(Lam, 2013b; Ogasawara, 2015; Yamamoto, 2006). 
Another field of research on Japan-ASEAN relations, particularly after 1997, 
focuses on regional financial crises. Such crises entailed the emergence of regional 
economic co-operation and relative mechanisms, as Japan saw that these were 
necessary to cope with regional financial issues that the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) did not understand because of the uniqueness of the region (Tanaka, 2017, p. 
188; Maswood, 2004, p. 44). Accordingly, Japan eagerly stepped in to help the 
region to establish regional financial mechanisms in order to further support ASEAN 
economic regionalisation (Rüland, 2000; Sudo, 2015, p. 173; Terada, 2004).  
Apart from the liberal-influenced studies that take domestic actors into 
account, there are some studies that explain Japan’s foreign relations vis-à-vis 
Southeast Asia by focusing on the efforts to establish international co-operation and 
regional initiatives. In the case of Southeast Asian economic regionalisation, Japan 
has contributed to and participated in such efforts quite significantly. Japan’s 
government, and its business community, engage in the economic and political 
development of Southeast Asia in many aspects. One such aspect is the allocation of 
financial and political support for Southeast Asian regional economic co-operation. 
Those contributions have supported the institutionalisation process and helped 
Southeast Asia to establish regional linkages, both structural and physical. This can 
be seen in the studies conducted by Hatch and Yamamura (1996), Kimura and Obashi 
(2011), and Pempel (1997), which detail Japan’s economic and political 
contributions to the development of regional transport networks that assist the 
international production networks (IPNs) within Southeast Asia. These studies look 
at the open market-driven incentives that drove Japan to allocate financial assistance 
and increased ODA to Southeast Asia in order to improve the transport networks and 
increase trade and investment volumes in order to further support economic 
facilitation and open up the business environment. This reflects how the liberal 
approach looks at foreign policymaking in a broader view.  
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In another example, Pempel (1997) looks at the role of domestic actors, such 
as the business sector, and sees their economic and political contributions as a tool 
to expand regional economic connectedness. The structural linkages include co-
operation between economic and political institutions, whilst the physical linkages 
are those of infrastructure throughout the region. The Japanese government has 
played the leading role in allocating financial assistance and facilitating regional 
mechanisms that bring regional members together to discuss infrastructure schemes. 
Moreover, Japan also finances and supports research organisations within Southeast 
Asia to conduct research on international transport development. Hatch and 
Yamamura (1996) propose that Japan’s contributions to Asian production networks 
have helped Japan to take control of IPN development trajectories. They further 
emphasise how non-state actors, such as private companies, also play a role in IPN 
development.  
Nonetheless, neo-liberal institutionalism cannot explain the reason why some 
states share the same ideas of regional development or regional co-operation. In other 
words, it is true that the international system is in an anarchic state, and, thus, that 
states are rational enough to evaluate the costs of co-operation. Yet, states must have 
a basic common understanding of their development trajectories. Therefore, while 
neo-liberal institutionalism can explain the reasons behind co-operation, it cannot 
explain how the ideas of co-operation are constructed. Where does the idea come 
from? 
 
  2.2.3 Social Constructivism 
In the previous sections, we were introduced to studies that 
employed structural realism and neo-liberal institutionalism. For social 
constructivists, however, realism and liberalism have not given adequate 
explanations of ideational power in international politics. They argue that what 
should be taken into account is ideational power (e.g. norms, ideas, beliefs, identity 
formation) because the ideas of national interests are ‘socially constructed’, and 
thereby the understanding of how these ideas are constructed would help us to 
understand their potential implications and significance (Wendt, 1999, p. 5).  
For social constructivism, ideas and norms play an important role in the 
international system. Alexander Wendt – a prominent social constructivist in IR – 
proposes that realism and liberalism take national interests for granted (Wendt, 1999, 
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pp. 233-238); accordingly, they cannot explain the circumstances under which the 
state may change its national interests. How did the ideas of national interests come 
about in the first place? How have national interests changed over time? Social 
constructivism agrees that states are important actors in the international system, but 
that there are also other actors who play significant roles and help to exchange ideas 
within the international system. Accordingly, subjective and intersubjective 
exchanges are emphasised by social constructivists (Viotti & Kauppi, 2012, p. 278). 
They assert that in order to understand how things are in the world – or how the 
‘social facts’ (Fierke, 2010, p. 171) are constructed – we must try to understand 
‘how’ these ideas are constructed and ‘who’ helped to construct them.   
Social constructivism has been emerging in the field of Southeast Asian 
regionalism and Japan-Southeast Asia relations. For example, Acharya (2001, 2004, 
2009) – a prominent social constructivist scholar who studies ASEAN regionalism – 
analyses ASEAN regionalisation by employing social constructivism and paying 
attention to the role of norms and identity in regionalisation process. Yet, Acharya 
has not touched upon the role of external regional powers, including the US, Japan, 
and China, in helping to facilitate the regional identity process or how the US, Japan, 
and China help Southeast Asia to construct its ideas and norms of regional 
development.  
Social constructivists argue that realism and liberalism emphasise the 
importance of Japan’s materialistic power, which helped it to obtain a leading role 
in the international system, and its co-operative approach vis-à-vis Southeast Asia 
relations. For instance, Terada (2003) studies Japan’s role in the 1997 East Asian 
financial crisis and states that this crisis was the vital turning point in bringing the 
region together. When the financial crisis occurred, ASEAN, Japan, China, and 
South Korea recognised the importance of establishing a regional body of countries 
in order to help one another. Accordingly, Southeast Asian countries started to think 
of creating financial mechanisms and other regional projects that would support 
regional economic functionality (Terada, 2003). In this case, Terada’s work shows 
that instead of focusing on Japan’s mechanisms and national interests in helping 
Southeast Asia, we can turn our attention to the ideas of regional co-operation, which 
emerge from the idea of regional identity.  
Lee (2006) studies Japan’s endeavour of establishing the Asian Monetary 
Fund (AMF) and states that Japan aimed to establish the AMF because it sought to 
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“defend the Asian model of economic development against the US-led IMF” (Lee, 
2006, p. 339). Lee analysed Japan’s intentions by developing a social constructivism-
influenced ‘identity-intention analytical framework’ (Lee, 2006, p. 341). This study 
shows that the regional initiative, which was established to tackle the financial crisis, 
was based on regional identity. 
Another example is the work of Terada (2004), who proposes that the leading 
roles of Japan and China in Southeast Asian regionalism could be called ‘directional 
leadership’ (Terada, 2004). Terada asserts that directional leadership is a leading 
style based on the ability of a country to lead “other countries’ behaviour to promote 
collective goals” (Terada, 2004, p. 65). The constructed ideas, then, were either 
created by ASEAN as an international organisation, or by a leader in the region, 
which at the time was Japan (Terada, 2004, p. 65). Japan’s directional leadership 
helped ASEAN regional co-operation to expand, initiating the ASEAN+3 and East 
Asian Community (EAC) bodies. Earlier studies on the role of Japan in East Asian 
regionalism focus on Japan’s contributions to East Asian economic institutions, 
especially during the financial crisis of 1997, as that is considered to be the turning 
point of when Japan eagerly stepped in to ASEAN regionalisation 
(Rüland, 2000; Sudo, 2015, p. 173; Terada, 2004). Japan also contributed financial 
and political support by way of the Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) and Miyazawa 
Plan. Both schemes were later adopted as the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) in 2000.   
Social constructivism also highlights the significance of social construction 
at the regional level. It focuses on the roles of social and cultural movements within 
the region that can unite people in a feeling of regional identity. In this respect, pop 
culture from Japan, China, and Korea, in addition to other cultural exchanges 
between East Asian countries, could help to facilitate that feeling and to form a new 
identity (Pempel, 2005, p. 24).   
As we have seen from above, the studies based in social constructivism 
contend that normative power has had a significant impact on the transformation of 
Southeast Asia. The East Asian financial crisis triggered the feeling of a regional 
identity. It brought East Asian countries together to consider regional solutions and 
mechanisms that would support the regional economy. Albeit the existing studies 
that employed social constructivism have explored the power of Japan as a regional 
leader that helped the region to create a regional identity, they have not studied the 
mechanisms that Japan or ASEAN utilises to create and diffuse the norms. In other 
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words, it is necessary to acknowledge that norms are constructed and cascaded 
through various channels. What we could study more is the role of intellectuals and 
think tanks in Southeast Asia that have helped the region to construct these norms. 
Thus far, we have seen that structural realism focuses on the international 
structure, which has played a significant role in shaping Japan’s foreign policy since 
the end of the Second World War. Structural realism helps us to focus on the 
transformation of the international structure. Nonetheless, the most important point 
that structural realism tends to overlook is that of the domestic dynamic. Neo-liberal 
institutionalism, thus, argues that to understand foreign policy, we need to take the 
role of domestic actors into account. Additionally, neo-liberal institutionalism also 
stresses the importance of the ideas behind development, which Japan has embedded 
since the end of the Second World War. Liberal-influenced studies focus on how the 
Japanese government consistently allocates financial support to Southeast Asia in an 
effort to establish physical and institutional linkages within the region. However, 
liberalism also has its flaws. It cannot explain how the ideas of regional development 
were constructed, disseminated, or embedded into other international organisations 
or countries. Social constructivism, thereby, provides us with a framework to explain 
this phenomenon. It emphasises the role of ideas, norms, and beliefs within the 
international system, further helping us to understand the process of how the 
Japanese government constructed the ideas of regional development and 
disseminated those ideas through international organisations. 
 
2.2.4 Reconsidering Japan’s Foreign Policy Making 
Thus far, we have seen how the existing literature explains Japan’ s foreign 
policy.  If we look at the processes of foreign policymaking, however, we will see 
that the existing literature addressing Japan’s foreign policy has some limits.  
While the existing literature focuses on external factors, such as Japan’ s 
relations with the US, economic interdependence, and military power, structural 
realism turns its focus to the international structure. As we have seen in Section 2.2.1, 
the literature detailing Japan’s foreign policy primarily pays attention to how Japan-
US relations have impacted Japan’ s ‘ active’  or ‘ reactive’  actions within the 
international community.  In contrast, structural realism pays attention to how the 
distribution of power in the international system is managed, but it does not look into 
the ‘ black box’ .  This missing point is crucial because in order to understand how 
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Japan’ s foreign policy is formulated and further integrated with the work of other 
government agencies, we need to find the thinkers and collaborators. In other words, 
the existing literature, which pays attention to how Japan’ s foreign policy is made, 
has not paid enough attention to the ideas underlying Japan’ s foreign policy.  For 
social constructivism, to understand how the ideas behind foreign policy are 
constructed is vital, as it can help us to better explain the dynamics of foreign policy.  
There are various internal factors that impact Japan’ s foreign policy, 
including domestic politics, institutional settings, policy cohesion of the Kantei 
(Prime Minister and his/her colleagues) (Zakowski, 2018, p. 5), and pressure groups, 
such as the Iron Triangle.  It can be said that the existing studies of Japan’ s foreign 
policy have not utilised the pluralism approach effectively. Although there are many 
domestic actors in Japanese society, there remains a significant gap in the literature 
to explain how domestics actors and factors play a role in Japan’ s foreign 
policymaking processes.  For example, the political-economic approach that studies 
Japan’ s economy pays attention to the Iron Triangle, which refers to the relations 
between bureaucrats, politicians, and business elites (Colignon & Usui, 2001, p. 866; 
McCormack.  2002) .  The Iron Triangle reflects how the interests of each group 
overlap, facilitating their negotiation and collaboration. This group was formed after 
the Second World War and has had a significant impact on Japanese economic 
development ( Colignon & Usui, 2001) .  Although these relations play an important 
role in Japan’s economy, their role in shaping Japan’s foreign policy has not yet been 
explained in-depth.  
Furthermore, the role of intellectuals and think tanks is barely touched upon 
by the existing studies of Japan’s foreign policymaking processes. As we have seen 
from above, although there are many studies that explain Japan’ s role within 
Southeast Asia, such studies have not yet touched upon how the role of intellectuals 
and think tanks help Japan to construct and disseminate ideas and norms to the rest 
of the world.  Moreover, although there are many studies on the Iron Triangle, they 
have not explored how it has shaped or influenced Japan’ s foreign policy, resulting 
in a large academic gap.  In the case of this thesis, as Chapter 1 explains, regional 
transport development in Southeast Asia has been significantly supported by Japan 
in various ways.  However, the role of intellectuals and think tanks has not been 
studied, particularly how these intellectuals and think tanks help the Japanese 
government to construct ideas and norms regarding how the region should develop. 
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The importance of ideas and norms is reflected in Bailey's work ( 2008) , which 
studies how the epistemic community can help foreign policy to succeed.  Bailey 
emphasises that the lack of an epistemic community to support norms is likely one 
of the factors that led to the failure of the anti-whaling norm.  Bailey’s work further 
reflects the importance of an epistemic community that can contribute to the 
processes of norm construction and cascading, which can help to establish a common 
ground in the international community. In this regard, the ideational power, material 
power, and power of knowledge should be taken into account together in order to 
understand Japan’s foreign policy from a more pluralistic approach.  
Moreover, the existing studies that have paid attention to the intellectual role 
of Japan within the international system are limited. This can be seen in the seminal 
work of Hook et al. (2012, p. 32) and Zakowski et al. (2018), which touch upon the 
role of think tanks in foreign policymaking processes. However, Hook et al. (2012) 
and Zakowski et al. (2018) have not provided deep detail regarding how intellectuals 
are involved in the policymaking process, or how intellectuals are involved in 
Japan’s foreign relations. A monograph entitled ASEAN-Japan Relations, edited by 
Shiraishi and Kojima (2014), which focuses on Japan-ASEAN relations, is another 
example of how the explanations of Japan-ASEAN relations are primarily dominated 
by realism. This monograph looks at Japan-Southeast Asian economic and political 
relations by emphasising Japan’s foreign policy and its economic and political 
interests. In the monograph, Severino (2014, pp. 27-28) touches upon the role of 
think tanks and intellectuals that have helped further the work of the Japanese 
government. Severino mentions the ERIA as one of the research institutions that 
supports East and Southeast Asian regionalism. The work of Otsuji and Shinoda 
(2014, p. 151) in the same monograph mentions the ERIA as one of the actors that 
has intellectually helped Southeast Asia to develop regional integration. However, 
they have not explained how the ERIA and other Japanese government-funded 
research institutes help to support the Japanese government’s foreign relations. They 
also have not paid attention to the linkages between intellectuals (e.g. professors or 
researchers) in Japan and other countries in Southeast Asia.  
The lack of focus on the roles of intellectuals in Japan’s foreign policymaking 
processes can also be seen in the work of Zakowski et al. (2018), which emphasises 
the role of the prime minister, the MOFA and zoku – parliamentary tribes – in the 
Diet (Zakowski et al., 2018, Ch. 2). Zakowski et al. (2018, p. 7) instead emphasise 
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the relations between Japan’s central government reform and the improvement of the 
prime minister’s relative position vis-à-vis competitive foreign policymaking 
venues. Their study was conducted by examining Japan’s ministerial documents, 
politicians’ and bureaucrat’s memoirs, and research monographs, and by conducting 
interviews with decision-makers (Zakowski et al., 2018, p. 7). Through their 
methodology, we can see that they did not interview intellectuals who might be 
involved in the foreign policymaking process, or who might have the opportunity to 
work directly with Japan’s MOFA. These studies, therefore, reflect that the role of 
intellectuals and think tanks has not been thoroughly considered. Although existing 
studies, such as the work of Hook et al. (2012), briefly acknowledge the role of think 
tanks, they have yet to demonstrate how the think tanks and intellectuals (e.g. 
researchers, professors, or administrative staff) work to help the Japanese 
government form its foreign policy. 
We can see that these studies focus on how Japan's security and economic 
identities were shaped and transformed over a period of time, depending on the 
domestic and international circumstances. These studies provided us with a broad 
understanding regarding the importance of how norms were constructed and how 
they shaped Japan’s engagement in the international system. In this respect, social 
constructivism takes state identity into account by paying attention to the formation 
of identity and norms. Moreover, it helps us to understand and rethink the 
development of norms in international relations (Reus-Smit, 2013, p. 234). 
Nevertheless, these studies have their limitations. First, they have not paid attention 
to the agencies within and outside of Japan that may contribute to the norm 
construction process. Although the international structure, particularly the 
geopolitical superpower rivalries, were taken into account, the studies did not pay 
sufficient attention to other actors that also have power and influence (e.g. think 
tanks). Second, they have not paid attention to the processes of how norms are 
constructed, cascaded, and embedded into other agencies. This thesis, accordingly, 
will take both the international structure and the role of intellectuals and think tanks 
into account in an effort to apply a more pluralistic approach (see Chapter 3 for more 





2.3 Norms and Development Norms 
The existing literature, which applies social constructivism within the IR 
discipline, focuses on the role of norms in the international system. Norms are 
interpreted and translated from ideas. For international organisations such as the 
United Nations (UN), ideas are one of the most vital driving forces in the world 
(Emmerrij et al., 2001, p. xi). Ideas can change the world by offering a new way of 
thinking about issues (Emmerrij et al., 2001, p. 3). Ideas can also be one of the most 
critical factors in the process of development because ideas can frame the 
developmental trajectory. States, international organisations, think tanks, and any 
established public figures can be a source of ideas. In the case of international 
organisations, Bøås and McNeill (2004, p. 1) contend that multilateral institutions 
can play an important role in ‘framing’ and ‘disseminating’ ideas of development in 
two ways. First, they can draw attention to important issues. Second, they can 
‘determine’ how those issues should be viewed by other actors. Bøås and McNeill 
argue, therefore, that multilateral institutions hold the power to frame development 
according to the control of their main financial donors, for example how the US holds 
power over the IMF or World Bank.  
This thesis utilises Finnemore and Sikkink’s definition of norms (1998, p. 
891), which states that norms are a “standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with 
a given identity”. Finnemore and Sikkink argue that “norms do not appear out of thin 
air; they are actively built by agents having strong notions about appropriate or 
desirable behaviour in their community” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 896). 
Another definition provided by Katzenstein (1996b, p. 5) describes norms as 
“collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors with a given identity. In 
some situations, norms operate like rules that define the identity of an actor, thus 
having ‘constitutive effects’ that specify what action will cause relevant others to 
recognise a particular identity”. With these definitions in mind, norms help agents 
within the international system to obtain a set of economic or political ideas, 
practices, and standards to follow, such as economic liberalism, democratisation, or 
the protection of human rights. 
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) propose that in order to understand the 
meanings of objects, norms, and ideas in the international system, one must 
understand the ‘norm life cycle’ which comprises three stages, including norm 
construction, norm cascade, and norm internalisation. They explain that in the first 
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stage, a ‘norm entrepreneur’ will try to propose new norms to other states so that 
those other states can become norm followers. The ‘norm entrepreneur’ is an 
important agent for ‘norm emergence’ as it will persuade other agents within the 
structure to pay attention to certain issues. Norm entrepreneurs will try to advocate 
for certain ideas or issues, often aligned with their own interests. Norms at the 
international level will be promoted through organisational platforms, such as non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) or international organisations (Finnemore & 
Sikkink, 1998, p. 899). Organisations exercise their power to create norms by using 
their ‘expertise and information’ (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 899) in order to 
change other states’ behaviour. Finnemore and Sikkink also contend that norms are 
constructed within ‘organisational platforms’. They argue that “all norm promoters 
at the international level need some organisational platforms from and through which 
they promote their norms” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 899). They state that 
some platforms are specifically established to construct and cascade particular 
norms, such as Greenpeace, the Red Cross, the World Bank, the United Nations 
(Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 899). Organisational platforms serve as channels 
through which the agents can exchange their knowledge about particular issues, as 
the expertise helps the organisation to justify their persuasion of other actors and the 
subsequent changes in behaviour (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 899). 
The second stage of the norm life cycle is the ‘norm cascade’ process in 
which norms are proposed, internalised, and socialised to other states. The norms are 
proposed by norm entrepreneurs (e.g. states and international organisations) during 
and through activities, meetings, or conferences. At this stage, norms will be 
introduced to other states by way of socialisation or pressuring, in hopes that they 
will in turn become norm followers (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 902). Norm 
followers will often adopt newly proposed norms because they perceive their 
identities “as members of international society” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 
902). In this sense, new followers comply with new norms due to peer pressure from 
other countries in the international system (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 903). 
Finnemore and Sikkink add that the motivational factors driving new followers 
include legitimation, conformity, and esteem (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 903). 
Legitimation is important for governments in terms of their perception, as citizens 
will judge their country in comparison to others. If the legitimacy of the government 
of their country is accepted in the international system, the government will also be 
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accepted by and receive legitimacy from its citizens. Thus, it is important for the 
government to comply with international standards in order to maintain its power 
(Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 903). Conformity and esteem are also important 
factors that drive the new follower. These factors are psychological needs of the state 
that relate to its desire to be part of the international community and to establish a 
positive reputation, both with other countries and with itself (Finnemore & Sikkink, 
1998, p. 903). Put differently, state leaders follow norms because they seek to avoid 
“the disapproval aroused by norms violation” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 904).  
At this stage, norms are cascaded to other countries or international 
organisations. As we have seen from the first stage, international organisations are 
platforms or channels that help to cascade the norms that have been constructed. The 
research, publications, and other research-related activities (e.g. seminars, 
workshops, conferences, and training programmes conducted by the international 
organisations) have the power to influence, guide, suggest, or direct other agents to 
follow. People and organisations are also important domains for the norm cascade 
process. In other words, organisations help norms to be accepted and cascaded 
through their authority of expertise and institutional connections, linking institutions 
and researchers together. Officials and intellectuals (i.e. researchers or university 
professors) who are involved in the norm construction process – either in the capacity 
of decision-makers, researchers, or stakeholders – help to disseminate the norms in 
many ways. For example, they might cascade the ideas through mechanisms such as 
academic conferences, research consulting, human capacity-building programmes, 
or professional connections. 
The last stage of the norm life cycle is called ‘internalisation’ (Finnemore & 
Sikkink, 1998, p. 904). In this stage, norms are institutionalised by the states. 
Finnemore and Sikkink argue that once the norms are introduced into a country, they 
will not be questioned (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 904).  
Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm life cycle framework has been applied in 
some IR literature that seeks to understand how norms are constructed and cascaded 
within the international system. For example, Bailey (2008) applies the norm life 
cycle framework to analyse why the norm of anti-whaling has failed. He explains 
that the norm entrepreneurs are animal activists and big states, such as the US, who 
are against whaling and points out that the norm cascade through international co-
operation failed for many reasons. First, some countries, including Iceland, Japan, 
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the Soviet Union, and Norway did not favour the anti-whaling norm because of the 
“lack of clarity and specificity from the outset” (Bailey, 2008, p. 300). Moreover, 
Japan and Norway argued that whaling is part of their cultures. Another important 
factor is the lack of an epistemic community that could support antiwhaling norms 
at international conferences, as most scientists from Norway and Japan believed that 
whaling is not wrong (Bailey, 2008, p. 307). Bailey’s work (2008) points out that the 
lack of common acceptance in terms of cultural relativism and the lack of an 
epistemic community are the main reasons for failure. In this case, Bailey’s work 
(2008) reflects one crucial factor for norm conformity, which is an epistemic 
community. The epistemic community can use their expertise to persuade other 
actors to follow the norms. Accordingly, Bailey’s work reminds us that further study 
regarding the role of the epistemic community, in both the norm construction and 
cascade processes, is necessary.   
Karlsurd (2018, Ch. 4) applies Finnemore and Sikkink's framework to 
understand how the norms of UN peacekeeping are constructed by focusing on 
individuals, officials, academics, researchers, social activities, and think tanks. In his 
work, he asserts the importance of think tanks, research institutes, and academics as 
policy entrepreneurs outside of the UN in that they can highlight and identify specific 
issues to present to the UN.       
To summarise, authorities, such as experts, governments, and think tanks, 
have the power to construct norms. Nevertheless, the existing literature has not paid 
enough attention to the role of individuals or institutions in the norm construction 
process. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) provide us with a framework that focuses on 
how norms are constructed, cascaded, and internalised into a society. Nonetheless, 
although this framework has been applied to analyse the role of international 
organisations, it has not been directly applied to examine the role of think tanks in 
the international system. Furthermore, the literature that applies Finnemore and 
Sikkink’s framework has not focused on the role of think tanks as a case study. As 
current IR literature does not provide detailed explanation of the role of think tanks 
and intellectuals, this thesis will try to fill that methodological gap by bringing think 
tanks and intellectuals into the analysis, allowing us to observe more linkages 
between the actors in the norm life cycle. Accordingly, Chapter 3 will elaborate on 
how this thesis will apply the work of Finnemore and Sikkink to analyse the role of 
Japanese government-funded think tanks in Southeast Asia. It will also detail how 
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we can apply the norm life cycle framework in order to understand the processes of 
norm construction, cascade, and internalisation more thoroughly. 
 
 
2.4 Japan as a Norm Entrepreneur in Southeast Asia  
In the previous section, we touched upon Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm life 
cycle framework, pointing out that ideas can be translated into norms. As a set of 
norms can constitute a regime, the power of ideas and norms in the international 
system are significant. This section will review the existing literature in the field of 
IR that has examined the role and influence of Japan within Southeast Asia.  
 
2.4.1 The Application of Social Constructivism to Japan’s Foreign Policy 
The application of social constructivism to the analysis of Japan’s foreign 
policy can be categorised into two groups. First is the application of social 
constructivism to analyse how Japan’s ‘identity’ and ‘norms’ were shaped. This can 
be seen in some of the previous studies, including the book edited by Sato and Hirata 
(2008a) entitled Norms, Interests, and Power in Japanese Foreign Policy. In this 
book, the contributors provide case studies on how Japan’s foreign policy was shaped 
by identity, which changed over time. This book also provides many case studies on 
how Japan's norms were shaped and constructed on different issues, for example, the 
pacifist foundation (Miyashita, 2008) and Japan's aid policy (Tarte, 2008). In the case 
of Miyashita (2008, p. 23), his study explores the relations between material and 
ideational power that shaped Japan's foreign policy, as well as how public opinion 
shaped Japan's pacifist norm after the Second World War. On the other hand, Tarte 
(2008) focuses on the formation of Japan's aid policy norms, explaining that the 
relations between the domestic and international environments shaped Japan's 
foreign aid engagement.  
Second is the application of social constructivism to analyse how the 
Japanese government uses norms and identities as its foreign policy tools. Berger 
(1996, pp. 318-319) explains the ‘noncultural factors’ (e.g. political-military culture) 
that can shape Japan’s security norm, stating that the ‘cultural-institutional context’ 
triggered the formation of Japan’s security norm (Berger, 1996, p. 318). 
Furthermore, Katzenstein (1996c, p. 18) explores the relations between ‘constitutive 
norms’, which “express actor identities that also define interests and thus shape 
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behaviour”, and Japan’s security culture. He examines why the Japanese government 
was reluctant to abandon its peaceful approach in order to support and engage in 
peace-oriented activities within the international system. 
We have seen thus far that the studies on how Japan proposes ideas and 
identity, and utilises them to forge regional co-operation and establish organisations, 
reflects the power and importance of norms and identities. Yet, the processes by 
which norms are constructed and cascaded to other regional members have not been 
examined, as the existing literature primarily emphasises the institutional aspects. 
Additionally, this literature has not considered how norms are constructed within 
Japanese governmental agencies, nor how they integrate their goals with other 
government-supported research organisations in support of Southeast Asian 
regionalism.  
 
2.4.2 Japan as a Norm Entrepreneur 
In the previous section, we reviewed social constructivist explanations of 
Japan’s foreign policy. However, the existing literature pays more attention to the 
work of Japanese governmental agencies than to the understanding of how these 
agencies work together with intellectuals to develop foreign policy. In other words, 
although the existing literature has taken ideas and norms into account, it has not 
thoroughly explained the process of how the actors – or, to use Finnemore and 
Sikkink’s term, norm entrepreneurs – in the foreign policymaking process work 
together.  
We have seen in Section 2.3 that many case studies have utilised Finnemore 
and Sikkink’s (1998) framework to analyse the norm construction and cascade 
processes. One such study is that of Dobson (2003), who uses the framework to 
analyse the domestic and international contexts in which the norms were constructed 
that in turn impacted Japan’s engagement in a UN peacekeeping operation (Dobson, 
2003, p. 31). He examines parliamentary debates to see how the politicians discussed 
the norms of anti-militarism and UN internationalism, and how these debates change 
over time (Dobson, 2003, p. 50). The debates were observed by way of official 
publications, newspapers and magazines, books, articles, and dissertations, in both 
English and Japanese. Dobson argues that while Japan has does not have a permanent 
seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), it maintains the power to 
contribute “shared values, norms and principles of liberal democracies” (Dobson, 
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2003, p. 41). These norms can be witnessed from Japan’s engagement in the 
establishment of democracy and the market economy throughout the Eurasian 
continent (Dobson, 2003, p. 41). Although Dobson has not explained the application 
of the norm entrepreneur concept in-depth, we can still see that Japan is a norm 
entrepreneur in the sense that it disseminates the norms of democracy and market 
economies into the world.  
Dobson (2003, p. 34) states that the domestically-embedded norms in Japan's 
foreign policy are those of ‘anti-militarism’. These norms were constructed by 
intellectuals, social movements, and political parties after 1945 (Dobson, 2003, p. 
34) and are reflected in the Japanese Constitution, Article 9, which constrains Japan's 
engagement in war or conflict-prone activities. Another norm that affects Japan is 
‘US bilateralism’ (Dobson, 2003, p. 37), as Japan’s security dependency on the US 
is another important characteristic of Japanese security culture. Dobson also argues 
that ‘East Asianism’ is another vital Japanese norm and that accordingly, Japan’s 
active engagements within the region are based on its regional identity (Dobson, 
2003, pp. 38-39). Lastly, Dobson contends that ‘UN internationalism’ is an important 
norm in Japan’s security culture (Dobson, 2003, p. 39). Applying the norm life cycle 
framework, Dobson analyses Japan’s engagement in peacekeeping operations by 
looking into Japanese domestic politics after the war and analysing the relative 
actors. He specifically studies how the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP), UN Secretary-
General, intellectuals (e.g. university professors), MOFA, and other actors reflect 
their thoughts about how Japan’s security issues should be framed (Dobson, 2003, 
Ch. 2).  
Dobson’s analysis focuses on the interactions between domestic and 
international circumstances that shaped Japan's peacekeeping operation. He 
identifies the actors who can be considered as norm entrepreneurs in the norm 
construction process, for example, the UN Secretary-General (Dobson, 2003, p. 51), 
university professors (Dobson, 2003, p. 51), and the Japanese government (Dobson, 
2003, pp. 52-56). His study implicitly suggests that to comprehend Japan as a norm 
entrepreneur, apart from the role of the government, we must take the role of 
international actors and intellectuals into account (Dobson, 2003, p. 51). This notion 
reminds us that academic contributions of intellectuals (e.g. university professors and 
researchers) are a significant method by which norms are cascaded to other actors. It 
also reminds us to integrate the role of intellectuals, such as universities professors, 
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as an element in Japan’s foreign policymaking process. Chapter 3 will identify the 
actors that act as norm entrepreneurs, and it will explain the existing relations 
between those norm entrepreneurs.  
The studies that focus on the role of Japan as a norm entrepreneur justify this 
description based on the country’s intellectual contributions. The role of Japan in 
Southeast Asia was observed by Hatakeyama (2008) and Park (2012), who argue 
that Japan has the capacity to act as an ‘intellectual and economic leader’ 
(Hatakeyama, 2008, p. 364) or to take on the role of ‘intellectual leadership’ (Park 
2012, p. 309). Hatakeyama contends that Japan’s Ministry of Finance (MOF) and 
MOFA are two crucial actors that support intellectual and economic contributions 
within Southeast Asia.  
Hatakeyama (2008) studies the attempts of the Japanese government to 
dominate the debates on development by establishing the ‘Initiative for Development 
in East Asia’ (IDEA), which was proposed by Prime Minister Koizumi in 2002. He 
states that after the 9/11 incident, the ideas and perceptions of the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) regarding aid provision had dramatically 
changed. As Japan’s ODA primarily focused on large infrastructure development, it 
was no longer aligned with the World Bank and IMF focuses on terrorism, human 
security, and other relative issues (Hatakeyama, 2008, pp. 347-348). Japan also 
suffered from financial constraint, which negatively impacted ODA allocation. 
Accordingly, to deal with these challenges, the Japanese government established the 
IDEA and anticipated it to be a platform for Japan to disseminate the ideas of 
economic development to Southeast Asia. As Koizumi stated, the role and objectives 
of the IDEA are: 
 
The first is to disseminate development experiences and 
expertise of the region to the international community for the 
sake of other regions such as Africa where it attracted 
international attention; the second is to shift the ongoing aid 
discussion and the third is to strengthen regional ties. 
(Hatakeyama, 2008, p. 349) 
 
The IDEA focused on three main issues, including (1) building economic 
infrastructure, (2) human resource development, and (3) enhancing institutional 
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capacities (MOFA, 2002). Hatakeyama asserts that Japan endeavoured to be the 
leader of East Asia by extending its experience to the region. However, due to the 
economic crisis in Japan, the IDEA was not successful as Japan lacked financial 
credibility (Hatakeyama, 2008, p. 349). Hatakeyama argues further that “Japan 
created IDEA to market its development approach.” (Hatakeyama, 2008, p. 349). 
This argument seems to focus on the process of how the ideas of development were 
constructed and then cascaded both in and by the IDEA. However, Hatakeyama did 
not identify the officials, intellectuals, or any other actors in the process.  
Hatakeyama observes that when the IDEA failed, the Japanese government 
shifted its endeavours to other countries, such as Vietnam. Hatakeyama points out 
that Japan tried to help Vietnam develop its economy because Japan wanted to 
“manifest intellectual leadership within the trend of global assistance and 
communicate and mainstream Japanese philosophy on development and assistance 
in the international community” (MOFA, 2004, p. 14). Japan did so by providing 
‘intellectual support’ (Hatakeyama, 2008, p. 350), along with financial support, 
through the ‘Ishikawa Project’ in 1995. This project was proposed by Professor 
Shigeru Ishikawa from Hitotsubashi University, and focused on (1) agriculture and 
rural development, (2) trade and industry, (3) fiscal and monetary issues, (4) state-
owned enterprise (SOE) reform, and (5) the development of small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs). Hatakeyama also stresses the role of university intellectuals in 
the economic development of Vietnam by conducting documentary research (both 
official and secondary resources) and interviews (with a secretary of a politician, an 
official of JICA, and a Japanese intellectual) between 2005 and 2006. He concludes 
that Vietnam’s economic development strategy benefitted from contributions by 
both Japanese intellectuals and ODA. This study, therefore, provides us with a good 
example of how Japan has encouraged intellectuals to work on and contribute to the 
economic development of another country. However, as Hatakeyama focuses only 
on the relations between Japan and Vietnam, it is necessary, thus, to explore more 
about the role of Japanese intellectuals in other countries. While Hatakeyama has 
provided us with another lens through which we can see how the Japanese 
government exercises its intellectual power to support national interests, the case 
study focuses on Vietnam only and cannot be applied generally to Southeast Asia as 
a whole. 
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Hatakeyama’s work (2008) also provides us with a methodological 
framework. To understand how Japan is pursuing its intellectual relations with 
Southeast Asia, we can combine documentary research, to understand the official 
position, with information obtained from interviews conducted with various groups 
informants. This allows us to triangulate the information through analysis of in-depth 
opinions and perspectives from various persons who have first-hand experience.  
Another study that touches upon Japan’s intellectual leadership is that of Park 
(2012, pp. 292-293), which contends that regional leadership is one of the most 
significant roles to facilitate and shape regionalism. Park briefly touches upon the 
role of Japan in East Asian regionalism by arguing that the Japanese government 
provided ‘intellectual leadership’ for East Asia through financial allocations to the 
research work of local intellectuals by launching the ‘Issue Paper'. The main 
objective of the Issue Paper was to lead the discussion at the 2004 East Asian Summit 
(EAS) (Park, 2012, p. 310). Although Park has not provided a theoretical debate on 
intellectual leadership, the study provides a notion of the importance of 'intellectuals'. 
To put it another way, Park has not elaborated on how the power of the knowledge 
constructed by Japan was ‘formed’ or ‘constructed’. Thus, this thesis will attempt to 
explore the knowledge construction process by gathering information from officials 
and researchers in both Japan and Southeast Asia. It will analyse how Japanese 
governmental agencies (e.g. MOFA, JICA, and the Ministry of Economy Trade and 
Industry [METI]) support think tanks and academics to construct and disseminate 
ideas of regional transport development within Southeast Asia. 
In summary, this section reviewed existing studies that explain the role of 
Japan as a norm entrepreneur in the international system. They have applied the norm 
life cycle framework to analyse Japan’s foreign policy toward different regional 
issues, particularly the processes of norm construction and cascade. There are also 
studies that detail how Japan’s identities were shaped and how these identities in turn 
shaped Japan’s foreign policy. Dobson’s work (2003) provides the best picture of an 
analytical framework by identifying the actors that are involved in the norm 
construction process and how norms shape Japan's foreign policy. This thesis will, 
accordingly, utilise Dobson’s work, which takes the role of university professors and 
researchers into account. It will further study the role of Japan as a norm entrepreneur 
by looking into the networks between officials and intellectuals. The work of 
Hatakeyama (2008) also touches upon the contributions of Japanese intellectuals to 
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international development, however, it does not elaborate theoretically on the role of 
intellectuals, nor does it explain regional phenomenon. Moreover, Park (2012) has 
pointed out the Japanese government’s endeavour to become an intellectual leader 
within the region. Nevertheless, Park has not elaborated theoretically on the process 
of how the government has progressed thus far. With this in mind, the analytical 
framework of this thesis will be further elaborated in Chapter 3.  
 
 
2.5 Think Tanks and the Development of Norms 
The previous sections have reviewed the literature on the roles of norms and 
development, as well as the role of Japan as a norm entrepreneur in East Asia. They 
have examined Japan’s role in the international system by focusing on the role of the 
government. However, Hook et al. (2012, p. 37) state that if we want to understand 
Japanese politics, we should pay more attention to the dynamics within the country. 
This means that apart from paying attention to the role of the government, we should 
also investigate the role of other actors in the country, such as interest groups and 
pressure groups. They argue that to understand state behaviour, the domestic 
dynamics (e.g. interest groups, pressure groups, and think tanks) should also be taken 
into account, as the international system is not the only decisive factor for state 
behaviour. In the case of Japan-ASEAN relations, Japanese think tanks and Japanese 
government-funded think tanks in East Asia also play an important role.  
Japanese think tanks are those based in Japan, which can be privately funded or 
funded by the government. They help the Japanese government to form foreign 
policy by providing studies and research and are a significant actor in international 
politics. In the past, conventional definitions of think tanks were developed from 
think tanks studies in the 1980s and 1990s (Pautz, 2011, p. 420). These studies 
primarily paid attention to the role of Western think tanks that focused on the 
diffusion of economic doctrines, especially during the Cold War (Stone, 2004a, p. 
2). However, this definition is problematic. 
Before the word think tank was first used in the 1940s, there were studies of 
other research-oriented entities that aimed to propose policy recommendations to the 
government. The studies on think tanks, however, define them differently based on 
cultural variations, as not every think tank is able to contribute to the policymaking 
process (Stone, 2004a, p. 2). The political culture in each country affects the relations 
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between think tanks and the government. Nonetheless, Zimmerman (2016, p. 2) 
contends that although some scholars argue that East Asian think tanks are not 
influential, there have been growing opportunities for them to support and facilitate 
the work of the national governments.  
The existing literature on think tanks use various terms to describe think 
tanks, such as ‘imperial brain trust’ (Shoup & Minter, 1977), ‘public policy research 
institute’ (Polsby, 1983; McGann, 1992; McDowell, 1994), ‘policy discussion 
groups’ and ‘research institute’ (Domhoff, 1983), ‘policy planning organisations’ 
(Peschek, 1987) and ‘independent public policy institute’ (Stone, 1991). Typically, 
a think tank is defined as a non-partisan, non-profit organisation or research entity 
that aims to propose ideas or policy recommendations to policymakers (Abelson et 
al., 2017; Stone, 1996; Shoup, 2015). McGann and Johnson (2005) point out that the 
fundamental problem of studying think tanks is the lack of consensus amongst 
scholars about how to define think tanks (McGann & Johnson, 2005, p. 11). While 
McGann and Weaver (2000, p. 4) define think tanks as “non-governmental, not-for-
profit research organisations with substantial organisational autonomy from 
government and societal interests such as firms, interest groups, and political 
parties”, Abelson and Brooks (2017a, p. 3) have broadened this definition. They 
contend that interest groups, lobbyists, and lobbying activities could also be 
considered as think tanks because lobbying could be considered as an activity that is 
based on research results and aims to push policy recommendations to policymakers.  
 The studies on think tanks are multidimensional. In the past, these studies 
were dominated by three main approaches, including the pluralist approach, elite 
approach, and neo-Marxist approach. Pluralists believe that in a free society, 
independent think tanks can contribute to the policymaking process through the 
competition to influence policy (Gellner, 1995; McGann, 2007; Waterloo, 2014). 
Pluralists maintain an optimistic view of the participation of think tanks in society, 
contending that as society allows think tanks to compete freely, public policy is thus 
a result of this competition. However, the competition is still based on the interests 
of specific interest groups that support the think tanks. Thereby, public policy reflects 
the interests of interest groups (Newsom, 1996; Pautz, 2011, p. 424; Stone, 1996, pp. 
27-29).  
For elite theory adherents, the studies on think tanks focus on the relations 
between think tanks and societal elites. They attempt to analyse the relationships 
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between politicians, academics, researchers, the business sector, and the military 
(Domhoff, 1983, p. 83; Keskin & Halpern, 2005; Savage, 2016; Stone, 1996, pp. 29-
31). Nonetheless, the flaw of the elite approach is that it focuses too much on the 
backgrounds of and connections between elites.  
In contrast to the elite approach, neo-Marxists focus on the ideology behind 
the role of think tanks (Arin, 2014, p. 46; Carnoy, 1984, p. 69; Stone, 1996, pp. 31-
32; Stone & Mark, 1998, pp. 13-14). They state that think tanks can be controlled by 
the incumbent group, as they have to power to set the agenda and attract media 
attention. Neo-Marxist studies emphasise how think tanks are used by powerful 
people to try to cascade ideologies, particularly capitalism. Research that utilises this 
approach is primarily that of American or British think tanks (Levitan & Cooper, 
1984; Smith, 1991), and focuses on how think tanks were inaugurated, supported, 
and used by the US to spread the idea of the liberal economy throughout the world 
(O’neill, 2008; Pirie, 2012; Rich, 2014; Shoup, 2015; Smith, 1991). The studies in 
the neo-Marxist group, therefore, mainly pay attention to the power of the American-
dominated liberal economy. 
Unlike the substantial role of American think tanks, the studies on Japanese 
think tanks and Japanese government-funded think tanks do not utilise these three 
approaches. Ueno (2004) contends that the development of Japanese think tanks can 
be divided into three waves. The first wave was during the 1970s when relations 
between the Japanese government and business sector grew closer in co-operation 
for economic development. Within this decade, the Japanese government established 
various government-affiliated think tanks to conduct research in an effort to improve 
the government’s policymaking process, including the Mitsubishi Research Institute 
(MRI), the Japan Research Institute (JRI), and the Nikko Research Centre, Nomura 
Research Centre (NRI), (Ueno, 2004; Maslow, 2018, p. 102). The second wave was 
between 1985 and 1988. During this period, the think tanks that were established in 
Japan were profit-oriented, such as the Asahi Bank Research Institute, the Sakura 
Institute of Research, and the Sumitomo Trust Bank Research Institute. The third 
wave was after the 1980s, when Japan started to establish non-profit and independent 
think tanks, including the 21st Century Public Policy (which was established by 
Keidanren) and the Tokyo Foundation (which was established by a group of 
researchers who are not affiliated with governmental agencies) (Ueno, 2004, pp. 164-
167).  
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The studies of Japanese think tanks tend to focus on the comparative aspect, 
which contends that Japanese think tanks are not as powerful as those from the West 
(Maslow, 2013; Nippon.com, 2015; McGann & Johnson, 2005; Ueno, 2004). Brown 
et al. (2014, p. 23) argue that many variables affect the potential impacts of think 
tanks’ policy recommendations. The first variable includes the political and 
economic factors, as the environment that permits the engagement of think tanks 
with the government varies in each country. If the political and economic 
environments are open and free, the engagement and expectations of the think tanks 
will be higher. Second, the factor of funding is also important, as the influence of the 
funding organisation also affects both the agenda setting and subsequent research. 
The factor of funding can further affect research trends and the impact of the 
research. Third is the factor of civil society engagement in the work of think tanks, 
as an open society will allow think tanks to engage more with public issues. Fourth, 
the intellectual climate also affects the work of think tanks. Should the society have 
a high level of investment in education and research capacity development, the think 
tanks will have a better chance of acquiring high capacity researchers and a more 
supportive research environment (Brown et al., 2014; Köellner et al., 2018, p. 12). 
In the case of Japan, think tanks do not have strong impacts on policymaking, 
nor does the Japanese government prioritise the policy research industry (Maslow, 
2013; Ueno, 2004, p. 177). Moreover, Abb and Köellner (2015, p. 596) and Köellner 
et al. (2018, p. 17) argue that Japanese think tanks are not influential because the 
Japanese government prefers not to rely on policy recommendations from private 
think tanks. Therefore, both affiliation and regulatory restrictions are significant 
conditions that limit the role of Japanese think tanks. The affiliation of think tanks 
with particular domestic organisations or business groups constrains the role of think 
tanks to a limited number of issues. Furthermore, Japanese law does not facilitate the 
establishment of think tanks, especially compared to that of other countries. The 
think tank processes provided for by the law are confronted by complicated 
regulations on funding and taxation, making it difficult to establish new ones. 
Another challenge for think tanks is the legal regulation hindering them from 
working as independently and freely as other actors in society (Nippon.com, 2015). 
Apart from structural constraints, McGann and Johnson (2005, p. 183) also observe 
that Japanese think tanks often conduct research for specific clients. When think 
 65 
tanks are hired by private companies for private matters, the research results, thereby, 
will be skewed in the interest of the company and cannot be accessed by the public. 
Nonetheless, Maslow (2018, p. 93) asserts that although the previous studies 
suggest that Japanese think tanks are not influential, the importance of Japanese think 
tanks has increased. He contends that when we investigate the database of the 
National Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA), there were 286 policy 
research organisations in Japan in 2014; however, less than ten institutes were 
reported to work on foreign policy (Maslow, 2018, p. 101). The growing demand for 
knowledge of the changing domestic and international environments triggered Japan 
to establish more think tanks. Maslow (2018, p. 106) points out that the "Expert Panel 
on the State of Foreign Policy and Security Think Tanks” was convened to call for 
the establishment of ‘Japanese-style’ think tanks to further increase Japan’s presence 
in the international system. Nevertheless, although Maslow (2018, p. 110) states that 
the increasing number of think tanks in Japan signifies their importance, the 
interviews conducted by Maslow reveal in contrast that Japanese think tanks are still 
not influential, as they cannot make any significant impact on national policy. 
Although the role of Japanese think tanks is debatable, we still see the 
Japanese government supporting, and funding, the establishment of think tanks in 
both Japan and other countries. Meanwhile, the Japanese government also aims to 
establish Japan as a centre for think tanks (Kodera, 2016, p. 29). However, if the 
existing literature argues that the Japanese government does not recognise Japanese 
think tanks, then why does the government still support the establishment of new 
think tanks? Afterall, the Japanese government supported the establishment of the 
Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI), opened a disaster risk management hub 
for the Global Development Learning Network (GDLN) (which was initiated by the 
World Bank to support capacity-building activities in developing countries), and 
allocated a venue at the Kasumigaseki Building to be the headquarters of the ADBI. 
Kodera, the Vice-President of JICA and former Executive Secretary of the 
Development Committees of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), states that the Japanese government supports research institutes to be 
established or based both inside and outside of Japan (Kodera, 2016). Kodera, 
therefore, sees the role of Japan as a ‘regional intellectual and global knowledge 
leader’ (Kodera, 2016, p. 29). 
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There are some think tanks that conduct research and release publications on 
the topic of Japan-Southeast Asia relations in order to support the work of the 
government, such as the Research Institute of Economy, Trade, and Industry 
(RIETI), the Japan International Co-operation Agency Research Institute (JICA-RI), 
and the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA). For example, the RIETI 
conducted a significant amount of research that contributed to regional economic and 
monetary co-operation (Munakata, 2010), as well as the connectivity between 
ASEAN and India, or what is referred to as ASEAN regional integration (Kondo, 
2012; Nishimura, 2013). Meanwhile, the JIIA conducted research on Japan-ASEAN 
co-operation, Japan’s maritime security (Raj, 2009), Japan’s ASEAN policy 
(Shimizu, 2018), and Japanese diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific Age (Easton, 2018). 
 The existing literature on Japan-ASEAN relations emphasises the economic, 
political, and diplomatic aspects, however, they have not used think tanks as the main 
unit of analysis. Although think tanks help the ASEAN Secretariat and governments 
in Southeast Asia to access in-depth information and analyses, they are not typically 
chosen as case studies. We have seen in the previous section that Dobson’s work 
(2003) utilises Finnemore and Sikkink’s framework (1998) to emphasise the role of 
intellectuals (e.g. university professors) in Japan’s foreign policymaking process. 
The gap this thesis seeks to fill, thereby, is how the Japanese intellectuals and 
officials work together to support Japan-ASEAN relations.  
This thesis selects three think tanks that engage in regional development, 
which are the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI. The existing literature on the ERIA 
defines it as a Japanese government-funded think tank that supports the development 
of regionalism within East Asia (Kitano, 2014; Otsuji & Shinoda, 2014; Severino, 
2014; Yoshimatsu, 2012). Yoshimatsu (2012) explains that the reason why the 
Japanese government initiated the ERIA was that Japan wanted to balance its role in 
intellectual contributions with that of the Network of East Asian Think-Tanks 
(NEAT), which was strongly supported by the Chinese government in 2003 
(Yoshimatsu, 2012, p. 370). Yoshimatsu contends that the Japanese government is 
aware that Southeast Asian countries did not welcome the image of Japan during the 
Second World War, but that its economy and knowledge are well-recognised around 
the world. Accordingly, the Japanese government has tried to use the ERIA as a tool 
to spread its ideas regarding the regulation of the liberal economy through the ‘peer-
pressure and benchmarking’ approach (Yoshimatsu, 2012, pp. 369-370). Severino 
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(2014, pp. 27-28) points out the roles of JETRO and the ERIA in Southeast Asian 
regionalisation, explaining that these organisations support economic co-operation, 
particularly within ASEAN+3 countries. However, while Severino explores the 
contributions of JETRO, he does not give any information or analysis of the 
influence of the IDE-JETRO in their work. 
Furthermore, the existing literature studies the ERIA and IDE-JETRO 
utilising documentary research to understand engagement. However, the researchers 
have not conducted in-depth interviews with officials or researchers in either Japan 
or Southeast Asia regarding their contributions to the research or their perceptions of 
the impact. Chapters 5 and 6 seek to fill this gap by integrating documentary research 
with in-depth interviews to better comprehend the engagement of officials and 
researchers in the policymaking process. 
 The ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI should be considered in the analysis of 
Japan’s role in Southeast Asia, as they are funded and supported by the Japanese 
government. Their research results are used to further the work of the ASEAN 
Secretariat, government officials, and scholars in regard to foreign policy and 
regional development. Although these organisations have conducted research that 
helps the Southeast Asian governments and the ASEAN Secretariat to develop a 
common regional development plan, they have yet to be studied in-depth.  
In summary, the existing studies have provided a lens through which to 
analyse the role of think tanks in societies. They employed different approaches in 
an effort to comprehend various case studies. Although they have contributed to the 
understanding of the role of think tanks in economic, political, and social 
development, particularly in specific countries, such theories have not yet provided 
a lens through which to understand the role of think tanks at the regional or 











In this chapter, we have reviewed three relevant issues: the application of IR 
theories to Japan’s foreign policy and its relations with Southeast Asia; the role of 
norms in the international system; and the roles of Japan as a norm entrepreneur and 
of think tanks, both in general and in the case of those that contribute to Japan-
ASEAN relations. We have also seen that the existing literature focused on Japan’s 
foreign policymaking process has three main narratives. The first narrative uses 
realism to explain the ‘black box’ and views Japan as a unitary state in which foreign 
policy takes national interests for granted. It emphasises the role of the government 
and minimizes the role of other actors in society. The second narrative uses liberalism 
to explain the formation of foreign policy by looking at various actors in society and 
focusing on the liberal values embedded in Japan’s foreign policy. However, the 
second narrative cannot explain how the Japanese government persuades, influences, 
or sets the development agenda in the international arena. The third narrative, which 
uses social constructivism, focuses on the power of regional development ideas and 
norms in order to explain how Japan frames regional development in Southeast Asia. 
We have also explored the literature that focuses on the definition of norms 
and how norms are one of the most critical factors in international relations. This 
thesis selects Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm life cycle framework (1998) as its 
analytical framework, anticipating that it will provide a better understanding of how 
norms are constructed, cascaded, and internalised into other countries.  
After detailing the norm life cycle framework, the chapter reviews some of 
the existing literature that focuses on Japan as a norm entrepreneur within the 
international system. We have seen already that ideas and norms help agents in the 
international structure to have a common set of standards to follow. We have also 
seen the application of Finnemore and Sikkink’s framework in Dobson’s work 
(2003), which analyses the domestic and international actors and factors that affect 
the construction of norms in Japan. Dobson further provides us with an example to 
help identify agencies that influence Japan’s foreign policymaking process, 
emphasising individual and collective norm entrepreneurs that are significantly 
involved in the norm construction process. Dobson conducted this research by 
analysing official documents and newspapers, and by conducting some interviews.  
Moreover, the works of Hatakeyama (2008), Park (2012), and Kodera (2016) 
explain Japan’s attempts to establish itself as a regional intellectual leader. While 
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they touch upon the leading intellectual role of Japan, they have yet to elaborate how 
ODA is utilised in support of such effort. Accordingly, this thesis examines Japan as 
an intellectual leader by looking at the roles of its officials, intellectuals, foreign 
policy, and ODA. Thereby, the next chapter will propose a framework to help analyse 
Japan’s role as a regional intellectual leader.  
Another important issue reviewed in this chapter is the role of think tanks in 
the international system. However, the definition of think tanks itself is problematic. 
East Asian think tanks have different characteristics than those from the West, which 
can be seen in their objectives and founding members. Chapter 3 will further explore 
the definition of think tanks and how the studied definition should broaden based on 
our understanding of think tanks within the region. Japan’s leading role in the 
international system, apart from its material power, can be understood through its 
intellectual power, which is exercised through Japanese government-funded think 
tanks. This thesis selects the regional transport development schemes that were 
proposed by the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI and are supported by the Japanese 
government as case studies to examine how the Japanese government exercises its 
economic, political, and intellectual power to support its economic interests. The 
next chapter will synthesise the concept of regional intellectual power while 
operationalising the norm life cycle framework to understand the role of Japan. It 
will also elaborate more on the current characteristics of Japanese government-
funded thinks tanks, as well as how we should broaden the definition and 















3.1  Introduction 
In Chapter 2, we reviewed the existing literature on Japan’s foreign policy 
and IR theories, the role of norms in the international system, the role of Japan as a 
norm entrepreneur, and the role of think tanks. The existing literature has examined 
the role of norms as one of the elements that encourages governments to have a 
common understanding of certain issues, for example, the norms of anti-whaling 
(Bailey, 2008) or peacekeeping operations (Dobson, 2003). Finnemore and Sikkink 
(1998) call the process of norm construction, cascade and internalisation a ‘norm life 
cycle’. After that, we reviewed the literature on the role of Japan as a norm 
entrepreneur. Additionally, we examined Dobson’s work (2003), which applies the 
norm life cycle framework to understand the norm construction process through the 
study of parliamentary meetings, conferences, debates, and newspapers, to further 
understand the norms in Japanese society. 
Also, we have reviewed the definition, characteristics, and importance of 
think tanks in the international system. We have seen in some existing literature that 
the Japanese government does not recognise think tanks’ research results (Maslow, 
2018; Ueno, 2004; Abb & Köellner, 2015). However, the Japanese government still 
supports the establishment of new regional research institutes, such as the Economic 
Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA), and facilitates the venue for 
the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI), based in Tokyo.  
This thesis defines ‘ regional transport development norms’  as a set 
of standard beliefs and ideas that relate to the improvement of hard and soft 
infrastructure, as well as to the improvement of the economy and society. This further 
includes the issue of how to construct physical linkages, and how to synchronise 
existing transport- related schemes and mechanisms together through ideas and 
norms.  By this definition, this thesis seeks to understand how the Japanese 
government constructs and utilises regional transport development norms to 
comprehensively plan the regional transport development scheme.  Such norms 
include the beliefs and ideas of regulatory practices and physical linkages through 
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transport systems. This thesis selects regional transport development as a case study 
because it is one of the issues that the Japanese government supports through its 
bilateral and multilateral co-operations, such as the establishment of the High Level 
Task Force on ASEAN Connectivity (HLTF-AC) , Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund 
(JAIF), and the Mission of Japan to ASEAN, which reflects the close economic and 
political relations between Japan and ASEAN.  Moreover, apart from financial and 
political support, the Japanese government also intellectually supports regional 
transport development by supporting the work of ‘ international research 
organisations’  ( IROs) , which include the ERIA, IDE- JETRO, and ADBI, to 
construct knowledge of regional connectivity, regional transport, and regional 
integration. This thesis refers to these leading intellectual contributions as a ‘regional 
intellectual hegemon’ (RIH).  
This thesis asks three main research questions, including why the Japanese 
government has been supporting the development of regional transport infrastructure 
in Southeast Asia; how we can analyse Japan’s construction and cascading of 
regional development norms in the research conducted by ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and 
ADBI; and how the norms were internalised in domestic and regional transport 
development schemes within Southeast Asia. This chapter will elaborate on how 
Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm life cycle was applied and how the data collected 
from documentary research and interviews was integrated to analyse the role of 
Japan as a RIH in Southeast Asia. Moreover, this chapter will explain the nature and 
characteristics of the IROs involved in Japan’s economic and political strategies in 
the region. 
 The rest of this chapter is divided into two sections. The first section explains 
the norm life cycle framework, which will be applied to this research in order to 
comprehend the process of norm emergence and norm cascade. It also explains the 
application of the norm life cycle to understand the role of Japan in Southeast Asia. 
The second section elaborates on the role of intellectuals in the foreign policy-







3.2 Norm Life Cycle Framework 
This thesis selects Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm life cycle framework (1998) 
to analyse Japan’ s role as a RIH that helps to facilitate the adoption of regional 
transport development ideas and norms within Southeast Asia. To understand Japan 
as a RIH, we will first look at the process of how Japan can be a leading knowledge 
or norm entrepreneur.  This section has two sub-sections.  The first sub-section will 
explain how we can operationalise the norm life cycle to comprehend the role of 
Japan as a RIH.  The second sub- section will deal with the role of RIHs and how a 
RIH can construct practical knowledge of regional transport development.  
 
 3.2.1 Norm Entrepreneur and Regional Intellectual Hegemon (RIH) 
The first issue that needs to be addressed is the definition of norms.  In 
Chapter 2, we were introduced to Finnemore and Sikkink’ s definition of norms as 
ideas that help regional actors to acknowledge and understand common practices. 
Chapter 2 has shown that norms are constructed, cascaded, and embedded through 
the support of norm entrepreneurs.  The first stage is the norm emergence process. 
Finnemore and Sikkink explain that at this stage, a ‘ norm entrepreneur’  plays a 
significant role in the norm emergence procedure by persuading other agents in the 
structure to become interested in certain issues or things.  They explain further that 
norms are first constructed in organisational platforms, e. g.  Greenpeace, the Red 
Cross, World Bank, or the United Nations ( Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p.  899) . 
Then, once the norms are constructed, they will be cascaded to other agents within 
the system. There are many ways by which norms are cascaded, such as through state 
socialisation in the international system, or by drafting laws and treaties.  Still, 
although Finnemore and Sikkink discuss the norm cascade process, they have not 
theoretically elaborated on the methods or agents that play a role in the process, such 
as the role of international organisations, individuals, or activities. The final stage is 
the internalisation process.  Finnemore and Sikkink state that once norms are 
introduced, or cascaded, to other agents, including states and international 
organisations, the norms will be received and internalised into the organisations, or 
into the larger societal context.  
One of the ways the Japanese government has been exercising its leading role 
in Southeast Asia is through the construction of regional transport development 
norms and the promotion of these norms through IROs.  The existing literature on 
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Japan as an intellectual leader has described Japan in many ways, for example, as an 
‘intellectual and economic leader’ (Hatakeyama, 2008), as demonstrating ‘regional 
leadership’  ( Park, 2012) , and as the ‘ regional intellectual and global knowledge 
leader’  ( Kodera, 2016, p.  29) .  While such research has detailed how Japan 
intellectually engages with Southeast Asian countries and regional organisations, 
they have not elaborated on the theoretical frameworks behind their arguments. 
 




 Figure 1 was generated by the application of Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm 
life cycle framework. First, the relations between norm entrepreneurs were analysed, 
including the relations between various Japanese government agencies, namely the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry 
(METI), the Ministry of Finance (MOF), Japan International Co-operation Agency 
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(JICA), and Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO). As I conducted 
documentary research and in-depth interviews with officials and researchers in Japan 
and Southeast Asia, I analysed the relations between Japan’s officials and 
intellectuals with other actors in the region, such as researchers, academics, and 
government agencies. I collected information and data using an inductive approach 
and utilised a grounded method through documentary research and semi-structured 
interviews with researchers and officials of MOFA, METI, JICA, JETRO, ERIA, 
IDE-JETRO, and ADBI.  
I read unpublished official documents, research, surveys, annual reports, 
Japan’s Diplomatic Bluebooks, Japan’s ODA White Papers, and official documents 
from ASEAN, ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI. I also studied interviews published 
online, journal articles, book chapters and monographs, and the official web pages 
of ASEAN, ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI. The documentary research was 
conducted both before and after the field research, which was conducted between 
February and June 2016. I studied various documents to find objectives, goals, and 
information about construction projects that were proposed or supported by the 
MOFA, METI, or MLIT. I also looked at how the norms of regional transport were 
discussed in these documents to further understand how the Japanese government 
agencies use these norms to support their projects and engagement. 
Apart from documentary research, I also integrated in-depth interviews to 
help uncover opinions and information, as Richard (1996) recommends, obtaining 
first-hand experiences, unrecorded information, and personal opinions and 
comments in order to triangulate documentary information. He further explains that 
interviews are an effective way of finding and obtaining information from 
informants. I conducted semi-structured interviews with the government officials, 
researchers, academics, and NGO representatives in five countries, including Japan, 
Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand between February and June 2016. The 
interviews also supported the process of selecting and distinguishing important 
written documents (Seldon & Pappworth, 1983).  
I selected the interviewees through the purposive sampling method. The 
interviews were conducted in a one-on-one setting at the interviewees’ preferred 
venue. The medium of the interviews was English when conducted in Japan, 
Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia, whereas both English and Thai were used when 
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I conducted interviews in Thailand. In some cases, the non-native Thai-speaking 
interviewees in Japan used Thai as a medium. 
The criterion applied in the selection of interviewees is as follows: 
 
1. Their positions as a researcher, CEO, Dean, President, Fellow, Director, 
Manager, or another leading position within the organisation. The 
interviewee should be a person who holds the authority to reflect the 
organisation’s views, objectives, roles, and strategies. 
2. Their responsibilities must pertain to ASEAN Connectivity, international 
transport, or logistics in Southeast Asia. 
3. Their research or academic interests must be focused on ASEAN 
Connectivity, international transport, logistics in Southeast Asia, politics of 
assistance, and Japanese foreign policy. 
 
The interview questions were constructed and based on two topics, which are:  
 
• Professional connections and experience : The interviewees were asked about 
their educational backgrounds and their working experience with researchers 
and officials from different organisations in different countries . Such 
questions were aimed at obtaining information that would help in analysing 
how connections between certain people were formed and how those 
relations facilitate or support the linkage of ideas and norms between IROs . 
These questions helped to analyse how the professional and institutional 
connections between intellectuals and officials formed linkages between 
agencies. The information collected from the responses helped to further 
comprehend how ideas and norms are linked by professional connections. 
 
• Research-related activities: The interviewees were asked about their 
experience that pertains to research activities, such as the dissemination of 
research results and involvement in seminars, conferences, workshops or 
capacity-building programmes.  They were also asked about how the ideas of 
international transport were incorporated into their institutions’ research 
agendas and how these ideas were debated within their organisations. These 
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questions helped in the analysis of how ideas and norms are integrated and 
debated within IROs. The information collected from the responses also 
helped to further understand the process of how ideas and norms are cascaded 
in the region by observing the activities of IROs . 
 
These two sets of interview questions helped to comprehend how 
intellectuals began participating in ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI’s research 
activities. They also helped to answer the first two main research questions, which 
focused on the work and collaboration between the Japanese government agencies 
and ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI. 
The interviewees were approached by either email or phone call. The 
interviewees were then provided a research information sheet, which explained the 
background of the research project, the nature of the interview, their rights and 
confidentiality, and my contact details (address, telephone, email address, and 
website). The provided research information sheet also informed interviewees about 
the recording and transcription method, and that they could ask not to be recorded. 
 The recorded interviews were encrypted and stored in a secure system 
provided by the University of Leeds. I conducted the transcriptions solely by myself, 
as some opinions are personal or confidential. The transcripts were also kept in the 
secured system and once the transcription was finished, the recordings were 
destroyed. 
 
Table 1: A Complete List of Interviewed Government Agencies, Research 
Institutions, Universities and Organisations. 








1. Institute of Developing 













3. Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MOFA) 
 1 
4. Ministry of Economy, Trade, 
and Industry (METI) 
 1 










6. Japan International Co-
operation Agency (JICA) 
 1 







8. Economic Research Institute 






9. University of Indonesia (UI) UI (1) and 
(2) 
2 
10. Habibie Centre  1 
11. ASEAN Secretariat  1 
12. Permanent Mission of 
Thailand to ASEAN 
 1 


















16. Institute of Strategic and 
International Studies (ISIS) 
 1 
5 
17. Malaysian Institute of 
Economic Research (MIER) 
 1 
18. Ministry of International 
Trade & Industry (MITI) 
 1 
19. University of Malaya (UM)  1 













(1) and (2) 
2 
23. Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MOFA) 
 1 
24. Ministry of Commerce   1 
25. Ministry of Transport  1 
26. Thailand Development 




27. ADB, Thailand Resident 
Mission Office 
 1 
28. Mekong Watch  1 
 Total 50 
 
The code column in Table 1 aims to identify the interviewees, as I often 
interviewed more than one person in some organisations in one day, and therefore 
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the reference date in the footnotes might confuse readers as to who the informant 
was. Accordingly, I indicated the interviewees in Chapters 5 and 6 by their code so 
that the reader can easily note that the informants are different persons. The pattern 
that will be used in the footnotes is: “Interview, a staff of ISEAS (1), Jakarta, 
Indonesia, 8 April 2016”. In the case that there is no number identified, it means that 
there was only one interviewee from that organisation.  
In Thailand there were several university scholars that had experience 
working with ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI, but I did not include the provinces 
where these universities are located as it could imply the informants’ identities. The 
pattern used for Thai scholars in the footnotes, thereby, is “Interview, a staff of 
ThUni (1), 3 May 2016”. 
The informants’ information, comments, analyses, and opinions are quoted 
anonymously in this thesis. The management position of the informants was not 
revealed. Additionally, any information that might lead to the informants’ 
identification, such as gender, age, or nationality, was kept unidentifiable, unless 
otherwise indicated specifically to support the argument. 
The information, facts, and relevant opinions regarding the establishment of 
the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI, and the background of Japan-ASEAN’s 
transport-focused relations will be explained in Chapter 5. These facts and opinions 
will help us to understand the reasons why the Japanese government has supported 
the establishment of IROs, both in Japan and in Southeast Asia.  
Next, we will look at norm cascade process. In order to do so, I first analysed 
how Japanese researchers and university professors work together with MOFA, 
METI, and JICA to construct ideas of Southeast Asian transport development. I then 
analysed the mechanisms that ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI utilised to cascade the 
regional transport development norms to Southeast Asian countries and the ASEAN 
Secretariat. I also investigated the professional relationships between intellectuals 
and officials, both in Japan and Southeast Asia. These analyses will help us to 
identify the professional relationships between intellectuals and officials and how 
those relationships influence the work of IROs. 
Chapter 6 looks at meetings, agreements, assistance provided, and 
professional connections. I will explore the meetings and agreements that have 
happened in the past, as well as Japanese ODA as provided through JICA and 
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ministerial assistance. This will help to comprehend how ODA works together with 
Japan’s economic and political strategies.  
Finally, I will analyse the norm internationalisation process. I first looked at 
‘norm receivers’, which are government officials and intellectuals in Southeast Asia 
and the ASEAN Secretariat, to study how they integrated the norms cascaded by 
ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI into their regional transport development schemes. I 
then looked at publications from Southeast Asian governments and the ASEAN 
Secretariat to analyse how the ideas of regional transport development are interpreted 
and how they have influenced regional transport development schemes. 
Additionally, I conducted interviews with researchers, scholars, and officials 
throughout Southeast Asia to analyse their relationships with the relevant 
governments. This helped me to develop an idea of how these relations have shaped 
the development of regional transport systems in Southeast Asia; how scholars and 
officials in Southeast Asia have interpreted the norms; and how their interpretations 
are translated into policies, both in their respective countries and at the regional level. 
 
3.2.2 International Research Organisations (IROs) and Practical 
Knowledge  
The previous section introduced the analytical framework, which will be 
applied to the analysis of Japan’s intellectual contributions to Southeast Asian 
transport development. This framework also acknowledges the role of institutional 
and professional relations. As the introduction to this chapter briefly mentioned the 
influential power of IROs and practical knowledge, this section will elaborate more 
on these issues. As shown in Chapter 2, although Maslow (2018), Ueno (2014), and 
Abb and Köellner (2015) state that Japanese think tanks are not influential and that 
the Japanese government is not interested in their research, the government still 
supports and facilitates the establishment of new think tanks. This signifies that the 
government nonetheless recognises the power of their knowledge creation.  
When we look at the nature and objectives of think tanks, there are some 
differences between the more traditional, orthodox organisations and the newly 
established research organisations. The existing definitions of think tanks are deeply 
influenced by the West (Carnoy, 1984; Domhoff, 1983; Newsom, 1996; Pautz, 2011; 
Stone, 1996). The nature and objectives of the Japanese government-funded think 
tanks, however, are different. Thereby, to understand the role of Japanese 
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government-funded think tanks in Southeast Asia and Japan, we must first expand 
our understanding of think tanks, and then reconceptualise the present phenomenon 
regarding how think tanks are manifesting their role in the current economic and 
political contexts. To do this, I analysed the data collected from MOFA, METI, 
ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI to understand both their perceptions of themselves, 
and how researchers and officials in Southeast Asia view them. 
The concept of think tanks conveys a research entity that is non-partisan, non-
profit, and aims at proposing ideas or suggestions to policymakers (Stone, 1996, 
2004a, 2004b; Weaver, 1989). Stone (2004) states that think tanks’ activities are not 
as diverse as universities’ activities because they are not involved in political 
activities and do not pressure politicians. This definition stresses the formality and 
individual institutionalisation, while at the same time de-emphasising the fact that 
they are working as a research network. Nonetheless, the roles of the ERIA, IDE-
JETRO, and ADBI in the context of Southeast Asian transport development are 
different. They do not try to explicitly convey any economic or political ideas; 
instead, they endeavour to influence other actors within Southeast Asia. I thereby 
tried to analyse their characteristics and objectives by utilising documents and 
information received from the interviews with staff members of MOFA and METI, 
and with researchers of ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI. 
I propose that in order to understand the Japanese government-funded think 
tanks in Japan and Southeast Asia, we can perceive IROs as a tool to comprehend 
the knowledge-based organisations. Accordingly, what should be focused on is not 
the development of the concept of think tanks itself, but rather how the existing 
concept is incapable of explaining the present situation.  
In this thesis, IROs are organisations that conduct research or academic 
activities and contribute to the policy-making processes of countries and 
international organisations. The main research themes or interests of IROs tend to 
focus more on regional and transnational issues. While IROs may not have official 
arrangements or agreements between their organisations, their tasks and research 
reinforce each other’s. Figure 1 shows that there are many norm entrepreneurs that 
work together, both under and for the Japanese government. As ERIA, IDE-JETRO, 
and ADBI are included in this group, they also work in tandem with Japan’s foreign 
policy because they are financed by the Japanese government. To further understand 
how ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI are working for Japan’s foreign policy, I 
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analysed the interviews conducted with researchers of ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and 
ADBI, focusing on their engagement and contributions to research activities and 
triangulated the results with the information I received from researchers and 
government officials in Southeast Asia. I also asked them how they have contributed 
to or engaged in any activities organised by MOFA, METI, or JICA. 
What makes IROs different from think tanks is their objectives. IROs 
endeavour to influence not only the governments, but also researchers and 
international organisations. IROs focus on both domestic affairs and transnational 
issues; on the contrary, think tanks tend to focus on domestic issues. IROs aim to 
influence policymakers at the domestic and regional levels while raising awareness 
in regional countries or international organisations, particularly regarding 
transnational issues; think tanks, on the contrary, expect to influence policymakers 
and gain public attention within their own countries (Selee, 2013, pp. 48-64; Stone, 
1996, pp. 15-16). Some think tanks, nevertheless, also focus on international issues, 
such as the Brookings Institute, Hoover Institution, and RAND Corporation. The 
research that IROs conduct seeks to analyse the regional dynamics (e.g. regional 
economic challenges, Public-Private Partnership (PPP), trans-boundary 
environmental issues) that might affect individual states, or the region as a whole. 
Additionally, IROs make a concentrated effort to disseminate their research results 
to international organisations so that they can be used in policy formulation.  
The power to influence other actors in the region is another significant 
characteristic of IROs. When IROs try to influence or dominate policymakers, they 
utilise practical knowledge embedded with ideas, norms, and values, including 
research results, network-building schemes, and publications. On the other hand, 
think tanks use political tools such as professional connections and business interests 
to promote their agenda (Abelson & Brooks, 2017; Barnett & Finnemore, 2004; 
Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; McGann, 2007, p. 45; Stone, 2000, p .36).  
Language is another important characteristic of IROs. Generally, in non-
English speaking countries, think tanks conduct research and release publications in 
their national language. However, IROs, such as ERIA and ADBI, publish every 
document in English.2 This signifies that the ERIA and ADBI aim to disseminate 
their research results within the larger international arena. Meanwhile, think tanks in 
 
2 IDE-JETRO has both Japanese and English publications. 
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non-English speaking countries often publish most of their research in their national 
language, except for collaborative research projects that involve international 
researchers, or for the sake of international outreach.  
The work of IROs is led by intellectuals. They are typically researchers or 
university academics that have authority in the field of area studies, development 
studies, or international relations. As we will see in Chapter 6, the information 
presented about the roles of intellectuals was derived from in-depth interviews. This 
will help us to comprehend how intellectuals help ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI to 
obtain information and to build research networks throughout the region. They also 
help the Japanese government to construct its foreign policy and support the 
government in achieving Japan’s goals and national interests. 
Most importantly, ‘practical knowledge’ sets IROs apart from think tanks. 
Think tanks tend to support economic or political ideologies. They have spread 
‘knowledge regimes’ (Campbell & Pedersen, 2014, 2015) or economic and political 
regimes (McGann, 2007; Smith, 1991) in many countries. On the contrary, however, 
the recommendations and research from ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI seem to be 
less ideological.  
These features of IROs make them different from think tanks. The objectives, 
target groups, and expected outcomes have given IROs a vital role in the international 
system. To evaluate the objectives, target groups, research contributions, and 
potential impacts of the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI, I studied official documents 
from ASEAN and Southeast Asian governmental agencies (e.g. Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, and Ministry of Transport). I thereby could understand how the research 
results and the research-related activities, such as conferences, meetings, or capacity-
building programmes, contributed to the works of other actors.  
 
 
3.3 Intellectuals and Foreign Policy-Making 
In the previous section, I have elaborated on the RIH concept, emphasising 
the point that existing literature has not paid attention to people in the policy-making 
process (e.g. officials, researchers, or scholars). Although they play a significant role 
as ‘norm entrepreneurs’ in the norm life cycle process, existing literature in the IR 
discipline has not studied their roles in-depth. Accordingly, this thesis will include 
the role of intellectuals in ERIA, IDE-JETRO, ADBI, and Japanese and Southeast 
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Asian universities into the analysis, in order to develop a more comprehensive view 
of the agents involved in the norm construction and cascade processes.   
The first issue that we should study is the role of people in the policy-making 
process and how they contribute to the work of the MOFA, MOF, and METI. To 
understand how foreign policy is formulated, we must first understand Japan's 
foreign policy construction. Foreign policy formulation involves many actors, 
including government officials, the business community, intellectuals, and non-
governmental actors. There are four stages of the decision-making process in foreign 
policy, including (1) intelligence (collect information and identify problems), (2) 
design (identify alternatives and select criteria), (3) choice (use criteria to evaluate 
alternatives and make decisions) and (4) implementation (put decisions into effect 
and allocate resources) (Mintz & Derouen, 2010). There are many actors and 
stakeholders participating in each stage. During the first stage of collecting data, 
policymakers need sufficient information, data, and recommendations from 
supporting organisations, including non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
working groups, think tanks, and research institutes. They can help in the foreign 
policy-making process by setting the agenda, and by manipulating information, as 
well as the flow of information. They can also act as gatekeepers to control what 
information goes into the decision-making process (Mintz & Derouen, 2010). The 
advisory groups – such as university professors, researchers, or NGOs – can, 
explicitly or implicitly and directly or indirectly, influence the agenda in the early 
stages of foreign policy-making by shaping, controlling, and influencing the data and 
information that may have potential impact. 
Green (2003, p. 8), Hook et al. (2012), and Zakowski et al. (2018) explain 
that Japan's foreign policy-making process involves many actors. Government 
agencies, the business community, media, think tanks, and NGOs are all involved in 
policy formulation. Before issuing foreign policy decisions, policymakers propose 
their positions, studies, analyses, and strategies to the central bureaucracy. Many 
ministries such as the MOFA, METI, and MOF engage in the policy-formulation 
process while also competing with each other for the leading role in foreign policy 
(Miyashita, 2003; Sueo, 2015, p. 24). Moreover, the business community, including 
Nippon Keidanren, an economic organisation that is composed of representatives 
from Japanese private companies, is also engaged in the policy-making process. 
Keidanren provides position papers that reflect their needs so that the government 
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can be aware of the needs of the business community (Blechinger & Legewie, 2000b; 
Yoshimatsu, 2017, 2018). Nonetheless, although existing studies have applied social 
constructivism to explain how the actors involved in foreign policy-making have 
contributed to the construction and dissemination of ideas and norms on different 
issues, they have not paid attention to the role of intellectuals. The engagement of 
academics and the research community helps the government to obtain research 
results that support the decision-making process. This thesis, accordingly, expands 
upon the knowledge of Japan’s foreign policy in Southeast Asia by acknowledging 
the role of intellectuals. Haas (1992) contends that the contribution of research and 
the academic community can together be referred to as an ‘epistemic community’. 
Haas defines an epistemic community as “a network of professionals with recognised 
expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-
relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area” (Haas, 1992, p. 3). The 
epistemic community, then, comprises professionals, experts, scholars, and 
researchers, whom can be collectively labelled as ‘intellectuals’. Nevertheless, the 
definition of intellectuals remains broad and is mainly used to identify the role of an 
individual or a group of people in society. For example, Alatas (1997) defines 
‘intellectual’ as a person who thinks about things by reason (Alatas, 1997, p. 8). 
Meanwhile, Mannheim (1991) sees the ‘intellectual’ as a group of people in society 
that can interpret the meaning of the world around them (Mannheim, 1991, p. 9). In 
line with these examples, this thesis refers to ‘intellectuals’ as people who are 
working in universities or research institutes who have expertise and authority in 
certain areas or issues. 
Chapter 2 have pointed out that Hook et al. (2012) and Severino (2014) both 
state that think tanks and the epistemic community help the Japanese government to 
form Japan’s foreign policy, yet studies of Japan’s foreign policy tend to focus on 
the role of the government. However, both Hook et al. (2012) and Severino (2014) 
have not elaborated how the intellectuals and think tanks engage in policy 
formulation. Thereby, to understand the role of intellectuals in foreign policy 
relations, I will analyse both secondary sources (e.g. journal articles, monographs, 
and presentations) and the information that I received from interviews. In Chapter 6, 
we will look at how the researchers and staff members of the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, 




This chapter explains how this thesis will apply Finnemore and Sikkink’s 
norm life cycle framework (1998) to analyse the process of norm construction, 
cascade, and internalisation in Figure 1. It also explains the actors in each process. 
The first process is that of norm construction, and the actors involved include the 
MOFA, METI, MOF, JICA, and JETRO, as will be detailed further in Chapter 5. 
Starting with an investigation of the norm entrepreneurs who comprise Japan’s 
government agencies and ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI, Chapter 5 will also explore 
the background of each IRO and how these IROs engage in Southeast Asian transport 
development. 
The second and third processes are norm cascade and norm internalisation. 
Chapter 6 will look at the process of how norms are cascaded through research 
results, publications, professional networks, and institutional connections, as well as 
how officials and researchers in Southeast Asian countries and the ASEAN 
Secretariat interpret these norms and translate them into transport development plans.  
 The information and opinions that will be used in the analysis are derived 
from both documentary research and in-depth interviews conducted with researchers 
and officials in Japan and Southeast Asia. The analysis seeks to understand Japan’s 
objectives and provided support. It will also reflect the opinions, understandings, and 
perceptions of officials and intellectuals in Southeast Asia regarding the roles of the 
ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI in regional transport development. This will help us 
to see how Japanese government agencies use the intellectual knowledge constructed 
















This chapter aims to provide the background of Japan-ASEAN relations since 
1945 and seeks to analyse how these relations shaped Japan’s foreign policy towards 
the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) area where there are a significant number of 
Japanese factories. The economic and political engagement of Japan vis-à-vis 
Southeast Asia and the ASEAN Secretariat helps the region to develop from both the 
financial and technical assistance provided by Japan's official development 
assistance (ODA) mechanism. Moreover, Japan also contributes knowledge and 
intellect to the region in various ways. 
 The rest of this chapter is divided into two main sections.  The first section 
will outline a brief economic and political background of the relations between the 
two regions that formed in the context of the international environment starting in 
1945, focusing on how the relations developed and their current status.  After that, 
the second section will elaborate on the reasons that Japan is interested in ASEAN 
and the GMS transport development schemes, emphasising the influence of business, 
political, and geographical factors.  
 
 
4.2 Historical Background of Japan-ASEAN Relations since 1945 
Before the establishment of ASEAN in 1967, the relations between Japan and 
Southeast Asia were primarily bilateral.  One of the driving forces that helped Japan 
to construct relations with Southeast Asia was the US- dominated international 
system. Accordingly, to comprehend how Japan-ASEAN relations were formed, we 
should look at the impact of the international structure.  Therefore, this section has 
two sub- sections.  The first focuses on the relations between Japan and Southeast 
Asia in the US-dominated international system and will explain how the international 
system after 1945 has had an impact on Japan- ASEAN relations.  The second is 
regarding the relations between Japan and Southeast Asia, which will further explain 
the development of Japan-ASEAN relations. 
 4.2.1 Japan-Southeast Asia Relations in the International System after 1945 
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Before we analyse the relations between Japan and Southeast Asia, we need 
to acknowledge the factors that impacted such relations.  The US- dominated 
international system that began after 1945 was one of the main factors that gave rise 
to Japan’ s interest in Southeast Asia.  After 1945, the ultimate objective of the US 
government was to contain the spread of communism.  This goal informed the 
relations between the US and other countries around the world.  To ensure that 
communism would not have the opportunity to penetrate other countries, the US 
government supported many schemes and collaborations that would render such a 
scenario infeasible. Accordingly, the US supported strategies to prevent ‘destructive 
nationalistic political conflicts’  ( Borden, 1984, p.  19)  and to create regionalism 
around the world (Borden, 1984, pp. 18-21).  
 After the defeat in the WWII, the US government occupied Japan and 
imposed various plans that would structurally change Japan into a democratic 
country.  However, after communism intensified, the cost of maintaining economic 
and political stability in Japan during the Occupation was too high, so the US 
government altered its policies, which had been imposing upon Japan. It changed the 
policies that supported Japan’ s active and engaged role in Southeast Asia to instead 
support Southeast Asian economic regionalism, ensuring that Japan would have 
access to natural resources and trade markets ( St John, 1995) .  In 1954, Yoshida 
Shigeru, the then incumbent Prime Minister, proposed two important ideas. The first 
was that Japan’s security was reliant on US-Japan collaboration, and the second was 
an emphasis on Japan’ s economic recovery and development.  This is known as the 
‘ Yoshida Doctrine’ , which stressed that if Japan could contribute to the economic 
development of the region, it would in turn support the development of the Japanese 
economy as it would narrow the development gap in Southeast Asia ( Stockwin, 
2008, p. 60; Sudo, 2002, p. 2). The US government welcomed the Yoshida Doctrine, 
as the idea was also aligned with the strategy to contain communism (Dower, 1979, 
p. 477). 
 Meanwhile, during the 1960s, the political and economic situation in 
Southeast Asia was in turmoil due to the Vietnam War. As the US government was 
concerned about the Vietnam War and the spread of communism in Southeast Asia, 
it began to support economic regionalism in Southeast Asia, anticipating that 
economic regionalism would influence Southeast Asian governments to turn away 
from communism (Mendl, 1995, p. 97). Dixon (1991) states that there were three 
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reasons why the US government supported economic regionalism in Southeast Asia. 
First, economic regionalism in Southeast Asia would allow the US government to 
access markets in the region, benefitting industrial and strategic commodities and 
dairy products from the US. Second, Southeast Asia is well known for its abundant 
natural resources, which are useful for production in the US and Japan (Dixon, 1991, 
pp. 9-12). The US support of economic regionalism would help Japan to access 
natural resources, further supporting Japan’s economic development. In turn, Japan’s 
economic dependency on the US would decrease, which would lessen the burden on 
the US government (Shiraishi, 1997, p. 175). Lastly, the US government was seeking 
political and strategic alliances, which was an essential objective as each country in 
Southeast Asia was using different political systems. If the US could establish 
diplomatic and political relations with various countries in Southeast Asia, the 
alliance supporting the spread of democracy and capitalism would also be 
strengthened (Sornsri, 1986, p. 163). 
 In 1963, President Lyndon B.  Johnson demonstrated his concern regarding 
the expansion of communism in Asia.  He initiated a scheme to support economic 
development and regionalism in the lower Mekong River area to further support 
economic growth within the region.  Johnson appointed Eugene Black, the then 
incumbent President of the World Bank, to be the leader of the development project. 
In his book entitled ‘ Alternative in Southeast Asia’  ( 1969) , Black reflects the idea 
that communism was a threat to the US (Black, 1969, pp. 8-12), stating that: 
 
 Regionalism is more important to us in Southeast 
Asia precisely because it does reflect a real national 
interest of ours and because the prosperity exists for 
pursuing that interest in ways compatible with the 
interests of the governments of Southeast Asia as 
those governments see them. (Black, 1969, p. 28) 
 
 The lower Mekong River development scheme highlighted the importance 
of the development of ‘ hard infrastructure’  that would support economic 
regionalism in the other parts of Southeast Asia, such as Malaysia and Singapore. 
Black (Black, 1969, pp. 105-109) stated that the co-operation between the US and 
Southeast Asia should focus on the development of transport and 
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telecommunication systems.  Black also pointed out the significance of the security 
problem in the Strait of Malacca, as it closely impacted Japan’ s economic and 
energy security.  This reflects how the US saw the implication of Southeast Asia as 
a strategic area, in addition to its importance to Japan’s economy.  
 The US government expected that Japan would support and join any 
arrangements and schemes that supported the US.  Black also stated that Japan 
should try to adjust its economic and political objectives to match those of the US 
to enhance their partnership, and that those adjustments should also reflect its 
responsibilities in East Asia.  He stressed that Japan should provide economic 
assistance to Southeast Asian countries in order to support regional development 
(Black, 1969, p.  69) .  Black’ s opinions reflect that the US government recognised 
that the political and economic transformation of Southeast Asia was at risk.  If 
communism were to spread into Southeast Asia, it could be a threat to the 
international system.  Therefore, to prevent Southeast Asia from turning to 
communism, the US government- initiated schemes that would support economic 
development and the creation of economic regionalism in Southeast Asia.  One of 
the most important legacies from such US strategies is the 1966 creation of the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB). The US government expected that the ADB would be a 
mechanism to support economic development in Asia and to re-establish the role of 
Japan in the international community (Black, 1969, p. 101; Yasutomo, 1983, p. 66).  
 In 1967, just one year after the establishment of ADB, the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations ( ASEAN)  was also established.  The first five countries 
that joined ASEAN were Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the 
Philippines.  The US government strongly supported the creation of ASEAN, 
expecting that it would further economic development within the region 
( Mahapatra, 1990) .  The first five ASEAN member states maintained intimate 
relations with the US government.  This demonstrates that ASEAN was initiated 
with the intention of supporting regionalism and strengthening diplomatic relations 
with the US. 
The post-1945 international system, as dominated by the US, was one of the 
main factors that triggered Japan’ s engagement in Southeast Asia.  In the next sub-
section, we will look at how the Japanese government initiated its official relations 
with Southeast Asia and with ASEAN.  
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4.2.2 Japan-Southeast Asia Relations 
 We have seen from the previous section that the US-dominated international 
system provided a supportive economic and political environment for the 
development of Japan-Southeast Asia relations. This section, then, will explore the 
dynamics of Japan’s attempts to reconstruct economic and diplomatic relations with 
Southeast Asian governments.  
A significant milestone that changed Japan-ASEAN relations was after 1945, 
particularly when the Japanese government decided to re-establish its positions in 
the international system and the East Asian region. The Japanese government started 
to utilise war reparations as a diplomatic tool to reconstruct official relations between 
Japan and Southeast Asia (Araki, 2007, pp. 18-20; Hook et al., 2012, p. 184). The 
Japanese government allocated war reparations worth $1.6 billion USD to Burma, 
the Philippines, Indonesia, and (South) Vietnam. After that, a total of 245.27 billion 
yen was provided to Cambodia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand. 
However, while the war reparations seemed to be a significant amount of money, the 
proportion of the reparations was only two per cent of the Japanese annual budget 
(Hellmann, 1972, p. 105). Nevertheless, some scholars attribute the reconstructed 
regional relations to these war reparations, which further facilitated Japan’s regained 
access to economic and political opportunities in the region (Akira, 2007; Katada, 
2002b; Miyashita, 1999; Rix, 1993). 
Japan’s ODA is one of the most significant elements of Japan-ASEAN 
relations. Tanaka Akihiko, President of Japan International Co-operation Agency 
(JICA), points out that Japan’s provision of ODA to Southeast Asia was used as 
‘quasi-reparations’ to reconstruct friendship and trust between the two regions 
(Tanaka, 2014). Kato (2016) states that provision of foreign aid signalled the starting 
point of Japan’s willingness to re-engage in the international community. Many 
scholars analyse war reparations from this period as tools to promote Japanese 
exports (Zhou, 1991; Arase, 1994; Fujisaki et al., 1996; Kim, 2011). 
Southeast Asian countries have continuously been major recipients of 
Japan’s ODA due to its close geographic proximity and significant amount of 
economic and trade relations with Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, although economic 
relations between the two were formed even before the Second World War, the 
hostile atmosphere that was caused by the Second World War led Southeast Asian 
countries to perceive Japan as an unfriendly country. Rix (Rix, 1993, p. 135) states 
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that in response to the hostility between Japan and Southeast Asia, the Japanese 
government utilised ODA as a form of diplomacy to establish its ‘return to Asia’.  
Before Japan’s ODA programme was initiated in the 1960s, financial 
assistance was provided in the form of foreign aid. The Japanese government began 
providing foreign aid in 1945 following its surrender. Foreign aid was used as a tool 
to pay war reparations to Southeast Asia, a task assigned to the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI). Thus, it was considered as economic and 
diplomatic tools that have close relations with the economic aspect of Japan.  hey 
state that reparations were used to support economic recovery in Southeast Asia so 
that it could regain its economic power to purchase Japanese goods. 
Although ODA has been utilised as a main channel of Japan’s foreign policy, 
Arase (1995), Ensign (1992), and Lincoln (1993) propose that ODA is a form of 
support from behind. Unlike economic or political engagement that can be seen more 
obviously, ODA is sometimes considered as ‘faceless’ or ‘quiet’ diplomacy, which 
means that the Japanese government supports the work of international organisations 
or missions without playing an explicitly obvious role. Severino (2014) and 
Söderberg  (2011) observe that the Japanese government allocated a significant 
amount of ODA to Southeast Asia because ODA is closely integrated in Japan’s 
foreign policy. This observation is also made by other scholars who further state that 
ODA helps Japanese firms to access Southeast Asian markets (Fukushima, 2000, p. 
156; Kato, 2016, pp. 1-2).   
 Along with the utilisation of ODA, the Japanese government also attempted 
to re-establish economic and political with Southeast Asia again. In 1954, Yoshida 
Shigeru, former Prime Minister of Japan, stated that Japan must help Southeast Asia 
to fight against communism by supporting the region’s economic development 
(Dower, 1979, pp. 473-280). The US and Japanese governments’ perception of the 
threat of communism also affected the development of Japan-Southeast Asia 
relations, leading to ‘keizai gaiko’ or ‘economic diplomacy’ between Japan and 
Southeast Asia.  
 In 1957, Kishi Nobusuke, former Prime Minister of Japan, emphasised ‘Asia-
Centred Diplomacy’, and in 1958 he initiated a research institute that focuses on Asia 
called the ‘Asia Economic Research Institute’, or ‘Ajia Keizai Kenkyujo’ or ‘Ajiken’. 
The institute, however, conducted an institutional re-organisation in 1960 and moved 
to be under the supervision of MITI (Olson, 1970, pp. 67-68). Ajiken then changed 
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its name to IDE-JETRO in July 1998. During his term, Kishi also visited many 
countries in Southeast Asia, which established him as the first Prime Minister of 
Japan to travel to Southeast Asia after the war. The purpose of the visits was to 
strengthen economic and political relations between Japan and Southeast Asia. Kishi 
also initiated the ‘Southeast Asian Development Fund Plan’, or ‘Tonan Ajia Kaihatsu 
Kyokoku Kika’, to allocate Japan’s financial and human resources to support 
Southeast Asia.  
During the 1960s, both the Japanese and Southeast Asian economies 
gradually recovered from the war. In 1964, Japan was admitted to the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) that was established by the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD). Japan’s position, then, was changed to a 
donor country. Seeking to increase its support for economic development in 
Southeast Asia, Japan initiated an ‘income doubling policy’ to support economic 
growth. The US agreed with and welcomed this policy as a mechanism to support 
economic development, which would in turn constrain the proliferation of 
communism into Southeast Asia. This led to various economic and societal 
development schemes. The relations between Japan and the US during the 1950s 
regarding the development of infrastructure and international transport started to 
emerge. It was anticipated that such relations would facilitate the regional integration 
of mainland Southeast Asia. By the end of the 1960s, Japan had allocated financial 
assistance to Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, South Vietnam, and Indonesia. 
Accordingly, from 1960 to 1970 Japan’s assistance focused on the development of 
large infrastructure and energy projects (Dauvergne, 2001, p. 53). 
 When Ikeda Hayato was prime minister, Japan’s engagement in international 
political issues was quite low compared to previous years due to domestic issues in 
Japan regarding the amendment of the Japan-American security agreement. 
Nevertheless, Japan still helped Southeast Asia to address regional issues, such as 
the conflict between Malaysia and Indonesia over the establishment of the Malaya 
Federation (Nishihara, 1979). 
 Meanwhile, the regional economic and political environment was confronted 
with political transformation. In 1966, the Japanese government attempted to help 
Southeast Asia establish a regional mechanism called the ‘Ministerial Conference 
for Economic Development in Southeast Asia’ (MEDSEA) to support regional 
economic co-operation. One year after that, in 1967, the Southeast Asian 
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governments agreed to establish ASEAN. When ASEAN was established, there were 
only five member countries, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, 
and the Philippines. Sato Eisaku, former Prime Minister of Japan, was interested in 
making Japan a member of ASEAN, yet the request was rejected by ASEAN as Japan 
is not located in Southeast Asia. 
 The US and Japanese governments anticipated that regionalism, or regional 
co-operation, would support economic growth and fight against communism. 
Japan’s MITI and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), however, were 
concerned that ASEAN’s objectives and operations might not support Japan’s 
economic interests. Moreover, ASEAN might become an economic competitor with 
Japan (Hook et al., 2012, p. 186). 
 When ASEAN began functioning as a regional organisation, it changed 
Japan’s approach from focusing on bilateral relations to multilateral relations. In one 
example, Southeast Asian governments requested Japan to decrease its synthetic 
rubber production so that the demand for Southeast Asian rubber would increase. 
The Japanese government agreed to the requests, as the production of synthetic 
rubber was not suitable to the oil crisis of the early 1970s. Originally, after 1945, the 
Japanese government’s attempts to re-establish its economic relations with Southeast 
Asia benefitted the growing number of Japanese products in the region. However, in 
the early 1970s, people in Southeast Asia did not feel comfortable with Japanese 
economic presence in the region, which led to demonstrations against Japanese 
products in both Thailand and Indonesia.  
 Japan’s ODA policy changed in the 1970s for two reasons: first, due to the 
US ban on Japanese soybeans and second, the oil crisis. The Japanese government 
realised that Japan had to diversify its sources of food security and natural resources 
by seeking them in other areas. This led to the 1974 establishment of JICA under the 
supervision of MOFA. JICA commissioned ODA to be allocated to other regions 
apart from Southeast Asia, broadening JICA’s outreach to be more active and 
inclusive. Another incident that changed the Japanese provision of ODA was the visit 
of Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei to Southeast Asia in 1974, triggering protests in 
Bangkok and Jakarta regarding the over-presence of Japanese companies in 
Southeast Asia (Kato, 2016, p. 2). The Japanese government responded to the 
protests with the visit of Fukuda Takeo in 1977, resulting in significant changes to 
Japan’s strategies towards Southeast Asia. Fukuda announced that Japan would not 
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strive for military power and that it would develop positive relations with Southeast 
Asia, pursuing peace and prosperity in the region by supporting the development of 
ASEAN countries (Lam, 2013a; Pressello, 2014; Sudo, 1988, 2015). 
In the mid-1970s, when the communist system ruled Vietnam, Cambodia and 
Laos, the Japanese government started to worry about the region’s economic and 
political situation. Japan began to rethink how to strengthen the relations between 
the two regions so that economic co-operation could fight against communism.  
 Japan-ASEAN relations started to officially formalise in 1977 when the first 
ASEAN-Japan Summit was held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Fukuda Takeo 
participated in the Summit and established Japan-ASEAN relations by announcing 
the following three principles: (1) Japan will not try to become a military power in 
the region and it will not try to produce nuclear weapons, (2) Japan will strengthen 
the relations by focusing on ‘heart-to-heart’ approach with Southeast Asian 
countries, and (3) Japan will treat Southeast Asian countries as an equal partner. 
These three principles are collectively called the ‘Fukuda Doctrine’ (Shiraishi & 
Kojima, 2014b, pp. 2-5). The Fukuda Doctrine also aimed to help the Japanese 
government to fight against communism and to support the economic interests of 
Japan in Southeast Asia (Khamchoo, 1991, pp. 9-10).  
 In the 1980s, as relations between Japan and Southeast Asia developed, the 
international political context that confronted Japan was its economic relations with 
the US. Their relations were primarily shaped by US foreign policy in Asia, 
particularly during the Korean and Vietnam Wars. Borden (1984) states that the wars 
in the Korean peninsula and Vietnam improved the Japanese government and 
businesses. The Korean War triggered the growth of the Japanese economy because 
of the special procurements of strategic commodities from the US military. The 
procurements improved Japanese industries and boosted export volumes. The 
relatively high growth of the Japanese economy and the trade surplus facilitated by 
regional conflicts stimulated dissatisfaction from the US government. The US 
considered Japan as a ‘free-rider’ who benefited from the US-constructed peaceful 
regional order (Borden, 1984). This exasperation from the US government led to the 
commencement of the G5 meeting in 1985, where the Plaza Accord was signed 
between the governments of France, West Germany, Japan, the US, and the UK. The 
Plaza Accord was set to depreciate the US dollar in relation to the Japanese yen and 
German Deutsche marks by intervening in currency markets. The Plaza Accord 
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brought a significant impact on Japanese production. Verbiest (2013) and Severino 
(2014) state that the Plaza Accord triggered the relocation of Japanese manufacturers 
to Southeast Asia because the Accord had appreciated the US dollar, which impacted 
the cost of production in Japan. After the Plaza Accord was signed, due to the 
devaluation of the yen, it structurally forced Japanese companies, which at the time 
based their factories in Japan, to consider moving their factories to Southeast Asia to 
lower production costs. We will see in Chapter 5 that when Japan’s manufacturers 
relocated to Southeast Asia, it also affected the economic development of Southeast 
Asian countries, increased urbanisation, and facilitated the creation of special 
economic zones. This led to the development of both hard and soft infrastructure, 
particularly in the field of regional transport development.  
During the 1980s and 1990s, the situation in Japan and in the international 
environment affected the Japanese economy and its foreign policy towards Southeast 
Asia. It can be contended that the 1980s to the early 1990s were the most important 
period of changes in the relations between Japan and Southeast Asia. There were 
three significant incidents that affected the philosophy and the work of Japan's ODA.  
The first incident was the change in Japan-US relations due to Japan’s 
economic recovery, which led to its trade surplus. We have seen from above that the 
Plaza Accord devalued the yen, triggering the relocation of Japanese factories to 
Southeast Asia. To support Japanese factories abroad, the Japanese government 
started to emphasise the importance of infrastructure development in Southeast Asia 
(Hatch, 2010, pp. 74-85; Kawashima, 2005, p. 123; Yoshimatsu, 2017, p. 495). 
Therefore, the ODA framework and infrastructure development in Southeast Asia 
started to be organised systematically beginning with the relocation of Japanese 
factories after 1985. Furthermore, Japan not only emphasised the importance of hard 
infrastructure development, but also the development of human resources, or ‘soft’ 
infrastructure, in ASEAN countries. This is demonstrated by the Japanese 
government’s announcement in 1981 to allocate $100 million USD to establish a 
human resource development centre in each of the ten ASEAN member states (Kato, 
2016, p. 2; Ohtsu & Imanari, 2001, p. 135). Between 1980 and 1990, MITI strongly 
pushed Japanese firms to go abroad, expecting that the relocation of Japanese firms 
would also help establish and strengthen East Asian regionalisation (Hatakeyama, 
2008, p. 361). Additionally, during 1980 and 1990, the Japanese government started 
to support the construction of the Eastern Seaboard Industrial development project 
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in Thailand – a Thai industrial development project which focused on deep seaport 
in the Eastern part of Thailand which aimed to help attract international investment, 
increase economic development in Thailand. These phenomena illustrate the process 
of forming East Asian regionalism, infrastructure, and human resource development. 
They are all interrelated as they are each an aspect of economic development.   
 Second, the collapse of communism in 1991 was another important milestone 
that triggered changes in Japan’s ODA. The international environment in the early 
1990s facilitated an increase in co-operation amongst Southeast Asian countries. The 
international political rivalries between the US and the Soviet Union also stopped. 
The transformation of the international political and economic environments allowed 
Japan to initiate a more active foreign policy. The political situation in Southeast 
Asia also changed after the collapse of the Soviet Union, shifting to a more amicable 
economic environment.  
Third, Japanese ODA challenged many issues in Japan’s society. For 
example, when the Japanese government wanted to increase the ODA budget, it 
brought the debate to society. ODA was questioned by Japanese people and by 
recipients about its philosophy. It was also criticised by the Japanese community, 
which asserted that ODA lacked philosophical groundings and tended to align with 
US strategic interests (Kato, 2016; Hatakeyama, 2008, p. 357; Jain, 2016, p. 98; 
Trinidad, 2007, p. 96). Japanese people wanted to understand why the government 
had to provide economic assistance to other countries. At the same time, the 
recipients questioned the economic and political agendas that influenced Japanese 
aid. Moreover, the lack of a central authority to manage Japan’s ODA was also 
questioned. The direction of ODA provision was not unified because each ministry 
managed its ODA differently (Dauvergne, 2001, p. 54; Hirata, 1998; Sayuri, 2007, 
pp. 151-156). This reflected the lack of philosophy underpinning ODA, which led to 
the 1992 publishing of the first ODA Charter, outlining its aid philosophy (Potter & 
Belle, 2004, p. 116; Sawamura, 2004, p. 27). Japan's MOFA had to clarify the 
intention that:  
 
This stance towards aid has been criticised as lacking a 
philosophical basis. Yet Japan has also been praised for 
its efforts to respect the autonomy and self-help efforts 
of recipient nations. Many see the Japanese way as the 
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approach that most closely reflects the essential role of 
development assistance. All recipient nations place a 
high value on the fact that Japanese aid does not entail 
political and economic conditions. (MOFA, 1990, p. 
19) 
 
The Japanese government emphasised Japan’s philosophical basis for aid in 
the 1992 Charter, which includes (1) humanitarian considerations, (2) recognition of 
interdependence in the international community, and (3) environmental 
conservations (MOFA, 1992). In the 1992 Charter, the philosophy further stresses 
the importance of ‘self-help’ efforts (Rix, 1993a, pp. 15-16; Sawamura, 2004, p. 29). 
It states that MOFA ‘supports self-help’ efforts, which “reflects the belief in Japan 
that true development, with economic independence, can be achieved only when a 
recipient country promotes development strategies through its own self-help efforts” 
(MOFA, 1996, p. 45). Nevertheless, although the 1992 Charter did not mention the 
development of infrastructure in its philosophy, we can see in the ‘Issues’ section 
that it stresses the importance of infrastructure improvement as “a prerequisite to 
socio-economic development” (MOFA, 1992).  
In the 1990s, although Japan was the biggest donor in the world, domestic 
economic problems caused Japan to slow down its engagement in the international 
system. During this time, the geopolitical situation in the Middle East and Iraq's 
invasion of Kuwait reflected the inability of Japan to contribute to an international 
crisis. Although the Japanese government allocated financial assistance to help 
alleviate the situation, it was not enough, and it was thought to be too late. This 
inadequate response is called ‘chequebook diplomacy’ because the Japanese 
government only allocated financial support without providing sufficient strategic 
and political assistance to mitigate the crisis (Funabashi, 1991; Purrington, 1992). 
Japan’s bubble economy restricted the country from becoming the biggest donor, as 
MOFA states that:  
 
In recent years, however, many Japanese have become 
critical of Japan's ODA due to the severe domestic 
economic and fiscal conditions. According to the 
Public Opinion Survey on Foreign Policy conducted by 
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the Prime Minister's Office, nearly 70 per cent of the 
Japanese public still supports Japanese ODA at least to 
some extent. However, the percentage of respondents 
who believe that ODA expenditures should be reduced 
as much as possible or stopped altogether has increased 
from about 10 per cent a decade ago to about 30 per 
cent today. (MOFA, 2001, Chapter II - Section 3) 
 
Moreover, at the end of the 1980s and in the beginning of the 1990s, the 
regional economic and political environments shifted due to the fall of communism. 
In 1991, Kaifu Toshiki – former Prime Minister of Japan – travelled to Southeast 
Asia to strengthen and reaffirm diplomatic relations between Japan and Southeast 
Asia. Kaifu stressed the strategy of Japan vis-à-vis Southeast Asia. He emphasised 
that Japan would not try to become a militaristic power and that Japan would try to 
strengthen its partnership with Southeast Asia (Feng, 2002, pp. 218-219). In 1992-
1993, another significant event that triggered Japanese engagement was the turmoil 
in Cambodia, which led to Japanese support of the peacekeeping operation (PKO). 
Miyazawa Kiichi travelled to Southeast Asia and announced the ‘Miyazawa 
Doctrine’, which stressed the importance of multilateral security dialogue, economic 
liberalisation in Asia-Pacific, the process of democratisation in the region, and the 
revival of diplomatic relations with Indo-China countries (Brown, 1994; Tanaka, 
2017, pp. 64-81). 
The 1992 issuance of the ODA Charter serves as another significant 
milestone of Japan’s relations with Southeast Asia. Before 1992, the philosophy 
underpinning ODA was not clearly articulated, if it ever existed. At the time the first 
ODA Charter was introduced, Japanese ministries lacked a shared philosophy of 
ODA provision. The 1992 ODA Charter announced that it would focus on recipients’ 
self-help efforts, the promotion of sustainable economic growth, and the 
development of human security (Kishida, 2014). However, the philosophy has 
changed over time. Currently, the philosophy focuses more on an open approach, yet 
emphasises peace and stability of the international community. Japan anticipated that 
through provision of ODA it would lead global issues; support peace, stability, and 
security as sources for development; and strengthen partnerships with different 
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actors around the world (Kishida, 2014). The next part will explore the historical 
development of Japan’s ODA to see how it has changed over time. 
 In 1997, when Southeast Asia was confronted with the financial crisis, the 
Japanese government under Obuchi Keizo stepped in to alleviate the situation by 
allocating financial assistance, totalling $16 million USD, to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). Following this commitment, Mitsuzuka Hiroshi, the then 
incumbent Minister of Finance, proposed to establish the ‘Asian Monetary Fund’ 
(AMF) as a mechanism to deal with Asian financial crises in the future (Tanaka, 
2017, p. 186). However, the US opposed his proposal as the AMF might de-
emphasise the work of the IMF, which is dominated by Western economic order 
(Sudo, 2015, p. 173). When Miyazawa Kiichi took over as Minister of Finance in 
1999, he announced the allocation of $3 billion USD in financial assistance to 
Southeast Asia to further address the financial crisis. The Japanese government then 
announced the ‘New Miyazawa Initiative’, aimed at establishing the Asian Currency 
Crisis Support Facility (ACCSA) at the ADB (Katada, 2002b, p. 97). The New 
Miyazawa Initiative proposed a set of supportive measures totalling $30 billion USD 
to help Southeast Asian countries recover from the financial crisis.  
 Along with the development of Japan-Southeast Asia bilateral relations, 
ASEAN also developed as a regional organisation that aims to support economic 
integration in the region. Following the announcement of the ‘Fukuda Doctrine’ at 
the First ASEAN-Japan Summit in 1977, the two regions organised a Second Summit 
in 1987 and a Third Summit in 1997. Moreover, the First ASEAN Plus Three (Japan, 
China, and Korea) Summit was also held in 1997. The Japanese government 
additionally joined the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in Southeast Asia (TAC) 
in 2004.   
 In 2009, the governments of ASEAN member countries agreed to establish 
the ASEAN Community by 2015 as a regional arrangement that comprises three 
‘pillars’ including the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), the ASEAN 
Economic Community (AEC), and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC). 
This endeavour was welcomed by the Japanese government because there are a 
considerable number of Japanese companies in Southeast Asia, establishing 
Southeast Asia an important trade partner. This is further demonstrated by the fact 
that between 2013 and 2015, $20 billion USD of ASEAN’s inward FDI came from 
Japan (JETRO, 2016). 
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Source: JETRO (2015) 
 
Moreover, US foreign policy towards Southeast Asia after the Cold War 
further influenced Japan’s economic and political strategies in Southeast Asia. 
Japan’s trade surplus with the US during the 1980s led to the Plaza Accord, which 
facilitated relocation of many Japanese manufacturers (Severino, 2014, p. 24). The 
engagement and contribution of the Japanese government and the private sector in 
the development of international transport in Southeast Asia began during the Cold 
War (Hatch, 2010, pp. 74-85; Yoshimatsu, 2017, p. 495). This was particularly 
noticeable after the Plaza Accord was signed, as the Japanese government began their 
support of the relocation of Japanese manufactures to Southeast Asia in an effort to 
help develop both the Japanese and Southeast Asian economies (Yoshimatsu, 2017). 
 
 
4.3 Japan’s Interest in Regional Transport Development in ASEAN and the 
GMS 
 The previous section provided a brief overview of the development of Japan-
ASEAN relations. The first sub-section explained that the international system was 
dominated by the US, which influenced the relations between Japan and Southeast 
Asia. This was primarily due to the US government’s anticipation that Southeast Asia 
would establish economic co-operation to support regional economic activities, 
which would in turn help Japan to access regional markets. The second sub-section 
explained how Japan developed its co-operation with ASEAN.  
While there are some multilateral initiatives between Japan and Southeast 
Asia, it is mostly Southeast Asian regional initiatives between member countries that 
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developed significantly after the Second World War. Furthermore, there are both 
regional and sub-regional initiatives in the region. While the primary regional 
initiative is ASEAN, there are three main sub-regional initiatives in the region, 
including: 
 
Mainland Southeast Asia 
• Greater Mekong Subregion Economic Co-operation Programme (GMS) 
 
Maritime Southeast Asia 
• Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle (IMT-GT) 
• Brunei Darussalam-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN Growth 
Area (BIMP-EAGA) 
 
Why is the Japanese government interested in regional transport – or 
infrastructure as a whole – in Southeast Asia? According to the Japan International 
Co-operation Agency (JICA)’s explanation, the importance of transport 
development is recognised in their statement that access to transport is one of the 
fundamental keys to facilitate the mobility of people and promote economic activities 
(JICA, 2014). Apart from JICA, the ADB also recognises the importance of hard 
infrastructure development. For example, Nakao Takehiko, the President of ADB, 
states that infrastructure is one of the essential conditions for economic development. 
He contends that if a state wants to increase its economic development, it should 
focus on infrastructure investment, education and health, macro-economics, 
liberalisation of trade and investment, public governance, social inclusiveness, vision 
for the future, and political stability and security issues. He also states that sufficient 
infrastructure can attract investors, increasing foreign direct investment (FDI), 
triggering further economic development and improvement of local people’s living 
standards (Nakao, 2015). In this sense, Nakao believes that infrastructure 
development will attract investors to Southeast Asia.  
The Japanese government has continuously supported two main regional 
economic initiatives: ASEAN as a whole, and the GMS Programme. ASEAN’s 
ultimate goal is the creation of the ASEAN Community to comprehensively connect 
the region through political, economic, and social co-operation. On the other hand, 
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the GMS Programme was established in 1992 to respond to economic opportunities. 
The GMS Programme includes six countries: Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, 
Vietnam, and two provinces of China: Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region and 
Yunnan Province. The GMS Programme aims to support subregional co-operation 
and economic development in a specific geographical area. When the GMS was first 
established, it was composed of nine sectors of co-operation, including transport, 
energy, communication, environment, human resources, tourism, trade, public 
investment, and agriculture. However, as of 2019 these nine areas of co-operation 
have changed to include agriculture, energy, environment, health and human 
resource development (HRD), information and communication technology, tourism, 
transport, transport and trade facilitation, and urban development. The changes in the 
areas of co-operation reflect how the economic and political environment has 
changed in the past twenty-seven years. For example, information and 
communication technology and urban development have been added to address the 
challenges that are caused by telecommunication development and urbanisation.  
 The GMS Programme project that has progressed the most is the 
development of economic corridors. From Figure 2, we can see that there are three 
main economic corridors, which are: 
 
1. The East-West Economic Corridor (EWEC): The EWEC links 
Mawlamyine (Myanmar) – Myawaddy (Myanmar) – Mae Sot (Thailand) – 
Phitsanulok (Thailand) – Mukdahan (Thailand) – Kaysone Phomvihane 
(Laos) – Dansavanh (Laos) – Lao Bal (Laos) – Don Ha (Vietnam) – Hue 
(Vietnam) – Da Nang (Vietnam)  
 
2. The North-South Economic Corridor (NSEC): There are three 
subcorridors, including  
 
a. The Western Subcorridor (Kunming–Chiang Rai–Bangkok via the 
Lao PDR or Myanmar) 
b. The Central Subcorridor (Kunming–Ha Noi–Hai Phong)  
c. The Eastern Subcorridor (Nanning–Ha Noi via Pingxiang in the 
PRC and Dong Dang in Viet Nam, or via Fangcheng and Dongxing 
in the PRC and Mon Cai in Viet Nam) 
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3. The Southern Economic Corridor (SEC): There are four subcorridors, 
including  
a. The Central Subcorridor (Bangkok–Phnom Penh–Ho Chi Minh 
City–Vung Tau) 
b. The Northern Subcorridor (Bangkok–Siem Reap–Stung Treng–
Ratanakiri–O Yadav–Pleiku–Quy Nhon) 
c. The Bangkok–Trat–Koh Kong–Kampot–Ha Tien–Ca Mau City–
Nam Can (Southern Coastal Subcorridor)  
d. The Intercorridor Link (Sihanoukville–Phnom Penh–Kratie–Stung 
Treng–Dong Kralor (Tra Pang Kriel)–Pakse–Savannakhet (ADB, 
2018, p. 7) 
  
These economic corridors are financially supported by the ADB, member 
countries, and the Japanese government. Japan’s MOFA states the importance of the 
GMS area is that its potential for economic and business prospects is one of the 
highest in Asia. The Japanese government focuses on two specific economic 
corridors, which are the EWEC and SEC (Ishida, 2007, p. 1; Lauridsen, 2019, p. 229; 
MOFA, 2001a). IDE-JETRO’s Ishida Masami shows that there are many Japanese 
government-supported projects that aim to help the EWEC and SEC, for example: 
 
• The Hai Van Tunnel on National Road No. 1 in Vietnam 
• The Second Mekong International Bridge between Thailand and Laos 
• Road Pavement of No. 9 Road in Laos (Ishida, 2007, p. 1). 
 
Ishida also shows that in 2006 there were more than 1,575 Japanese 
companies in Thailand, which ranks the highest compared to other countries in the 
region (Ishida, 2007, p.2). Even as recently as 2015, as shown in Table 2, Thailand 
still has the number of Japanese investors. The Japanese investors in Thailand are 
mainly parts and components companies located nearby Bangkok and the Eastern 
Seaboard area. Compared to the EWEC and SEC, the Japanese government is less 
interested in the NSEC because the Chinese government pays significant attention to 
the NSEC (Ishida, 2007, p. 1). We can see from Figure 2 that the NSEC links 
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Yunnan, a land-locked province of China, to Thailand, which has deep-sea ports. 
This provides China with more opportunities to export, as well as opening access to 
both the markets and natural resources in Southeast Asia (ADB, 2010; Charoensri, 
2010a; Takao, 2009; Vu, 2014). 
The economic corridors evolved in three stages, with the first stage between 
1992 and 1997. When the GMS Programme was first initiated in 1991, the GMS 
member countries identified the regional transport problems that needed to be 
addressed regionally. In 1994, the research group proposed a study entitled 
‘Subregional Transport Sector Study for the GMS’ to the Third GMS Ministerial 
Conference held in Hanoi. The final report was then endorsed at the Fourth GMS 
Ministerial Conference in 1994. The second stage was between 1998 and 2007, 
during which GMS member countries adopted the economic corridors approach and 
designation of the EWEC, NSEC, and SEC. The third stage began in 2008 after the 
formulation of strategies and action plans (SAPs) for the EWEC, NSEC and SEC 
(ADB, 2018, pp. 4-7). 
 Another important aspect of Japan’s engagement in the development of 
transport infrastructure in Southeast Asia is that the Japanese government seems to 
have a comparatively clearer vision of the development projects in mainland 
Southeast Asia (see Figure 3 and 4) when compared to that of the Chinese 
government (Charoensri, 2016). Japan integrates the work of MOFA, Ministry of 
Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI), METI and ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI 
so that they support each other. The outcome of such integrated work is the focus of 
the Comprehensive Asia Development Plan (CADP) that seeks to link the GMS with 
the rest of South Asia (see Chapter 5 and 6). China’s Belt-Road Initiative (BRI), on 
the contrary, does not focus on land transport in the GMS area, but rather emphasises 
the maritime Silk Road. Furthermore, although the Chinese government initiated the 
Lancang-Mekong Co-operation (LMC) in 2014, a regional initiative between five 
GMS member countries and China, their co-operation is more focused on human 
resource development (HRD), growth economy, agriculture, water resource 






Figure 2: Map of the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) 
 
Source: ADB (2018, p. 8) 
 
Proximity is another factor that plays an important role in Japan’s interest in 
the GMS area. Japan’s location in the Pacific Ocean has consequently led to a 
scarcity of natural resources, particularly petroleum and gas. Almost 80 per cent of 
Japan’s oil, gas, and other products imported from Europe, Africa, or the Middle East 
must be shipped through the Strait of Malacca, which is located between Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Singapore (Raj, 2009). As Japan depends heavily on the import of 
natural resources (e.g. food, petroleum, gas) and other commodities from abroad, the 
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transport route must be secure and protected by the utilisation of various initiatives 
that support mechanisms in international organisations. The Strait of Malacca, which 
links the Indian and the Pacific Oceans, is one of the busiest sea-lanes in the world. 
However, pirates around the strait cause concern for the Japanese economy because 
if the ships were to be pirated, both the imported commodities and Japan’s energy 
security would be threatened (The Nippon Foundation, 2014; Graham 2006). This 
situation led the Japanese government to seek an alternative way to transport goods 
and products from one side of mainland Southeast Asia to the other, resulting in their 
focus on land transport. AS shown in Figure 4, the EWEC on mainland Southeast 
Asia provides an alternative shipping route.  
 
Figure 3: The Linking Passage between the Indian and the Pacific Ocean on 
Mainland Southeast Asia  
 
Source :Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 
(http//:www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/2011 /html/honbun /b1/s3_2 .html) (accessed 2 January 
2018) 
 
Figure 3 was derived from the MOFA’s official website. It shows how the 
Japanese government views the development of international transport in Southeast 
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Asia, particularly how the region can link two oceans by way of mainland and 
maritime transport networks. Japan’s expectation of Southeast Asia, both from the 
government and the business sector, is the creation of extensive transport networks. 
Mainland and maritime Southeast Asia require different strategies that can support 
construction of each network. The primary strategies that the Japanese government 
and business sector have been supporting are the creation of physical infrastructure 
and the standardisation of regulations and laws in Southeast Asia. The Japanese 
government is aware that a gap between countries, in terms of either hard or soft 
infrastructure development, might constrain economic regionalism and the creation 
of IPN in the region. Thus, the financial and technical support provided by Japanese 
governmental agencies has been granted to multiple Southeast Asian countries, 
ASEAN, and the GMS Programme. There are numerous other actors involved in 
providing assistance to Southeast Asia, including Japan’s ministries and research 
organisations, such as the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism 
(MLIT) and Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA). Further elaboration on 
their contributions to Japan’s role in the development of Southeast Asia will be 
detailed in the next section. 
 
Figure 4: Japan’s Vision of ASEAN Connectivity 
 
Source: Website of Mission of Japan to ASEAN,  
http://www.asean.emb-japan.go.jp/asean2025/jpasean-ec03.html (accessed 30 September 2016). 
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The MOFA anticipates that the comprehensive development of land transport 
will link the Indian and the Pacific Oceans so that ships do not have to pass through 
the Strait of Malacca. In this respect, the governments of GMS member countries 
expect the economic corridors of the GMS Programme, particularly the EWEC, to 
help facilitate this cross-continent connectivity (TRF, 2010, p. 3).   Figure 5 also 
emphasises the idea of transportation between East and West mainland Southeast 
Asia, as well as the establishment of maritime networks.  M oreover, these linkages 
require not only the comprehensive construction of physical roads, airports, and 
deep-sea ports, but also the development of regulations and laws. The MOFA has 
allocated ODA to support hard infrastructure development in the GMS based on the 
requests of Japanese companies in the area (MOFA, 2012, p. 29) and anticipates that 
the provision of ODA will encourage Japanese companies to increase their 
investments in ASEAN and the GMS area (MOFA, 2013, p. 13). Examples of such 
hard infrastructure development projects include the Lach Huyen Port Infrastructure 
Construction Project (Vietnam), the Utility Management of Environment-Friendly 
Industrial Parks and Water Supply Project in Long An Province (Vietnam), and the 
survey for the Long Thanh International Airport construction in Viet Nam (MOFA, 
2012, p. 29). 
Geopolitical factors also impact Japan-ASEAN relations. Japan’s MOFA 
recognises the geopolitical importance of the GMS, as it is centrally located and can 
act as the hub of regional initiatives in both East Asia and Southeast Asia (MOFA, 
2016, p. 3). The perspectives through which Japan’s government agencies view 
regional transport development in Southeast Asia are outlined by JETRO, which 
explained that there are two major areas for development: mainland and maritime 
Southeast Asia. On the mainland, regional transport development and the creation of 
an international production network (IPN) in Southeast Asia have been focusing 
Thailand. This is because in the GMS area, the level of competitiveness in each 
country is comparatively low. For instance, in 2014, the competitiveness of Thailand 
was ranked as 35th, whilst Vietnam (48th), Cambodia (83rd), Laos (131st) and 
Myanmar (145th) are ranked even lower (JETRO, 2015a, p. 29). These numbers 
reflect the fact that although the development of hard and soft infrastructure is 
ongoing, the GMS area could still work to advance its competitiveness at the regional 
and global levels in order to enhance its economic prospects. Additionally, the 
prospect of the GMS area as an investment destination for Japanese manufacturers 
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is also reflected by the Federation of Japanese Chambers of Commerce and Industry 
in ASEAN (FJCCIA), which states that the GMS area has business potential, 
particularly Thailand as it has the highest number of FJCCIA members compared to 
other Southeast Asian countries. In 2015, there were 1,624 FJCCIA members in 
Thailand, followed by Vietnam (1,463), Singapore (832), the Philippines (745), 
Indonesia (743), Malaysia (607), Myanmar (239), Cambodia (192), Laos (77), and 
Brunei (3), respectively (JETRO, 2016, p. 5). These numbers reflect the significance 
of Thailand as a hub for Japanese investment in mainland Southeast Asia.  
Moreover, the GMS’s geopolitical factor is also reflected in 2007 when Abe 
Shinzo initiated the ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy’ (FOIPS), which geo-
graphically sought to link the Indian and Pacific Oceans together and to create a free 
and open market, business opportunities, and a socio-political environment that 
would support sustainable development in Southeast Asia, South Asia, Middle Asia, 
and Africa (International Co-operation Bureau, 2017, p. 4). Apart from Southeast 
Asia, South Asia, and Africa, the FOIPS also mentions the GMS as a specific part of 
the strategy. The Japanese government aims to link the EWEC with other regional 
initiatives in Asia, such as the South Asia Subregional Economic Co-operation 
(SASEC), the South Asian Association Regional Co-operation (SAARC), and the 
Central Asia Regional Economic Co-operation (CAREC) (MOFA, 2017a). This 
reflects how Japan is attempting to integrate the GMS area into its comprehensive 
regional connectivity strategy.  
The number of Japanese manufacturers and companies in the region is also a 
factor that influenced Japan’s interest in Southeast Asia. As ASEAN is a large region, 
its significant population of 600 million people and growing economies are two 
important factors that facilitate ASEAN to have promising potential for economic 
opportunities (MOFA, 2016, p. 3). Following China, ASEAN is Japan’s second 
largest trade partner.   In 2014, ASEAN held 14 per cent of trade proportion with 
Japan, whilst China held 20.5 per cent (MOFA, 2016, p. 3). At the same, Southeast 
Asia is Japan’s most significant investment destination within East Asia. In 2015, 
ASEAN held 15 per cent (MOFA, 2016, p. 3) or 2.15 trillion yen (METI, 2016, p. 
3) of the number of Japanese investments. This proportion is higher than in China 
and Hong Kong, which held 7.5 per cent and 1.8 per cent respectively (MOFA, 2016, 
p. 3). Additionally, considering the number of Japanese companies in the region, 
METI states that in 2015 ASEAN was home to 9,071 Japanese companies, and that 
 110 
177,075 Japanese nationals live in ASEAN (METI, 2016, p. 3). The Federation of 
Japanese Chambers of Commerce and Industry in ASEAN (FJCCIA) states that in 
2015 there were approximately 6,543 Japanese companies in Southeast Asia (see 
Table 2)  (JETRO, 2016). This reflects the overall high number of Japanese 
companies in the region, demonstrating that Southeast Asia is an important 
destination for Japanese investors. 
The relocation of Japanese factories brought a significant number of 
companies and personnel to Southeast Asia. When the companies sought to expand 
their factories abroad and endeavoured to link their production bases in other 
countries, they reflected such interests to their local governments, particularly 
regarding the development of infrastructure and the coordination of regulations and 
laws. The relocation of Japanese manufacturers since the mid-1980s brought an 
increasing number of factories to Southeast Asia. Amongst the strategies regarding 
the development of ASEAN and the GMS Programme, the construction and 
development of international transport networks in Southeast Asia gained the most 
attention from both Japan and Southeast Asian countries. Japanese companies took 
this opportunity to reflect on their perceptions of hard and soft infrastructure 
development. Ishida (2007) states that there were growing interests in the Japanese 
media on the development of hard and soft infrastructure in the GMS area. This was 
not because of an increased allocation of Japanese ODA to the subregion, but instead 
“because several logistic companies in Japan have discovered new business 
opportunities” (Ishida, 2007, p.3). We can see the allocation of Japanese ODA in 
support of ASEAN’s MPAC starting in 2010. Beginning in 2011, ODA White Paper 
onwards, MOFA states the close relationship between Japan and the ERIA in an 
effort to initiate the ‘Comprehensive Asian Development Plan’ (CADP) (see Chapter 
5), and to support ASEAN’s MPAC (MOFA, 2011, p. 105; MOFA, 2012, p. 122; 
MOFA, 2013, p. 111; MOFA, 2014a, p. 111). 
However, the 2015 JETRO survey of 116 Japanese companies in the GMS 
area revealed their dissatisfaction with regional soft infrastructure (see Table 5) 
(JETRO, 2016, p. 10). The region’s underdeveloped soft infrastructure constrained 
companies from engaging in free flow transportation of raw materials and goods. 
The survey further revealed that the concerns of Japanese companies in Southeast 
Asia were mainly focused on structural obstacles including unofficial payments at 
the borders, ineffective operation of e-customs, issues regarding FTA utilisation, 
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insufficient capacity of customs officers, lack of and/or ambiguous operation of the 
bond system, time-consuming procedures, cumbersome customs procedures, and the 
existence of back-taxes (JETRO, 2016, p. 11). JETRO (2016) then proposed that 
GMS countries should work to improve soft infrastructure through the clarification 
of rules and regulations on cross-border transactions, establishment of an early 
notification system, disclosure of information, and implementation of the Cross-
Border Transport Agreement (CBTA). An additional issue revealed by the survey 
was the need for improved productivity, as JETRO’s research demonstrated that the 
skills and capacities of human resources in the region should be enhanced 
significantly. Furthermore, regional supply chains needed to be strengthened through 
the development of sophisticated logistics infrastructure and support for the 
manufacturing-related service sector (JETRO, 2016, p. 16). 
 
Table 3: The Opinions of Japanese Companies in Mekong Countries, Japan and 
Singapore on Business Situation in the Mekong Area 
Category Score Classification Score 




Infrastructure (Soft Infrastructure) 76 
Infrastructure (Hard Infrastructure) 7 
Other Issues 3 
Issues on Logistics 150 
Logistics Services 51 
Logistics Infrastructure  
(Hard Infrastructure) 
38 
Logistics Infrastructure  
(Soft Infrastructure) 
23 
Overall / Structural Issues 38 
Issues on Procurement 31 
Local Procurement 20 
Procurement from Foreign Countries 9 
Procurement on Production Materials 2 
Issues on Production 78 
Labour 55 
Utility Infrastructure 14 
Production Cost 6 
Cash Management 3 
Issues on Sales 10 




Other Issues 26 Rules and Regulations  





While it was earlier stated that land transport development seems to receive 
a comparatively higher amount of attention from ASEAN and Japan, a significant 
amount of attention is also given to Southeast Asian maritime transport systems (see 
Figure 8). The Japanese government is interested in the construction of a ‘Maritime 
ASEAN Economic Corridor’, which aims to consolidate maritime connectivity 
between Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei, and the Philippines. There are two 
major projects in which Japan participated, including (1) the development of Roll-
On/Roll-Off (RoRo) Networks and short-sea shipping, and (2) the development of 
the vessel traffic service system (MOFA, 2016, p. 9). Nevertheless, maritime 
economic corridors have received comparatively less attention from ASEAN, 
Southeast Asian countries, and Japan. This might be because the Japanese 
manufacturers are located on different islands and physical linkages between the 
islands are more challenging to establish (Das, 2013, p. 176).  
The importance of hard infrastructure development is also reflected by other 
various actors. For example, Hashima Toshihide, Director of the Japanese Chamber 
of Commerce (JCC), states that the main hindrance of establishing viable markets in 
the subregion is the lack of proper transport. Furthermore, there are still some 
structural obstacles, such as laws and regulations that need to be amended 
(Thansettakij Newspaper, 2008). Jean-Pierre Verbiest, the first country Director of 
Asian Development Bank’s Thailand Resident Mission, states the same concern 
regarding the development of basic infrastructure in Southeast Asia by saying that 
the creation of basic infrastructure in the subregion is key to opening the door to 
neighbouring countries. He further explains that the ADB wanted to support a 
comprehensive road network in the subregion (Logistics Corner, 2008). From these 
statements, we can see that the opinions reflected by JCC and ADB share a similar 
standpoint, which is that hard infrastructure development will help the region to 
integrate more based on connectivity and economic activities.  
Southeast Asia is also important for the Japanese economy because there are 
many Japanese manufacturers in the region. When we look at the number of Japanese 
factories outside of Japan, Southeast Asia is the main destination of Japanese 
manufacturers. This is further demonstrated by the fact that between 2013 and 2015, 




Table 4: Japanese Manufacturing Companies’ Target Countries/Areas  













1 China 62.1 1 Indonesia 44.9 1 India 45.9 1 India 40.4 
2 India 56.4 2 India 43.6 2 Indonesia 45.7 2 Indonesia 38.8 
3 Indonesia 41.8 3 Thailand 38.5 3 China 43.7 3 China 38.8 
4 Thailand 32.1 4 China 37.5 4 Thailand 35.3 4 Thailand 30.7 
5 Vietnam 31.7 5 Vietnam 30.3 5 Vietnam 31.1 5 Vietnam 27.5 
6 Brazil 25.7 6 Brazil 23.4 6 Mexico 20.2 6 Mexico 23.6 
7 Mexico 14.0 7 Mexico 17.2 7 Brazil 16.6 7 USA 16.6 
8 Russia 12.5 8 Myanmar 13.1 8 USA 13.2 8 Philippines 11.5 
9 USA 10.3 9 Russia 12.3 9 Russia 12.0 9 Brazil 11.1 
10 Myanmar 9.9 10 USA 11.1 10 Myanmar 11.0 10 Myanmar 7.9 
11 Malaysia 7.0 11 Philippines 8.0 11 Philippines 10.0 11 Malaysia 6.2 
12 Korea 4.5 12 Malaysia 7.6 12 Malaysia 9.2 12 Russia 5.5 
12 Turkey 4.5 12 Korea 5.7 13 Turkey 5.2 13 Singapore 4.6 
14 Taiwan 4.3 14 Taiwan 4.7 14 Singapore 5.0 14 Turkey 3.9 
15 Philippines 4.1 15 Turkey 4.7 15 Cambodia 4.0 14 Korea 3.9 
16 Singapore 3.1 16 Singapore 3.9 15 Korea 4.0 16 Taiwan 3.7 
17 Cambodia 2.5 17 Cambodia 2.5 17 Taiwan 3.8 17 Cambodia 3.2 
18 Australia 2.1 18 Germany 2.0 18 Germany 1.8 17 Germany 3.2 
19 Bangladesh 1.0 19 
South 
America 




20 Germany 1.2 20 Lao PDR 1.8 19 
Saudi 
Arabia 
1.4 20 Lao PDR 1.4 
      19 
South 
America 
1.4 20 Bangladesh 1.4 
         20 Britain 1.4 
Source: Japan Bank for International Co-operation (JBIC) (cited in METI, 2016, p. 6) 
 
Although there are many Japanese manufacturers throughout Southeast Asia, 
there are some particular countries in which Japanese manufacturers are most 
concentrated. However, as regional and domestic factors change (e.g. political and 
economic environment), Japanese manufacturers may consider relocating from one 
country to another country. Between 2012 and 2015, the top five target countries 
where Japanese manufacturers wanted to ‘expand’ their production bases (see Table 
3), included three Southeast Asian countries: Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam. 
Additionally, a study from the Japanese Chamber of Commerce (JCC), which sought 
to predict the movements of Japanese companies in the region, placed Indonesia as 
having received the most attention, followed by Vietnam and Cambodia respectively 
(JCC, 2015). Vietnam and Cambodia have recently become more attractive because 
the minimum wage requirement for labour-intensive industries is lower than that of 
other countries in Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, the major obstacles of expansion 
remain: limited infrastructure and uncoordinated regulations. These issues can also 
be observed from JETRO’s studies, which show that Japanese companies in the 
region are worried that there are still insufficient, uncoordinated regulations and 
laws, and a lack of comprehensive infrastructure or logistics system in Southeast 
Asia (JETRO, 2016, p. 10).  
 114 
Before ASEAN’s first Masterplan on Connectivity (MPAC) was issued in 
2010, suggestions from Japanese companies in Southeast Asia had increased. For 
example, Toyota Company urged the governments of GMS member countries to 
construct an international logistics system so that the transport system could further 
support economic activities throughout the region (Marumatsu, 2000, pp. 111-127). 
Moreover, when we examine the requests and concerns of Japanese companies in the 
GMS area (see Table 5), they tend to be more worried about the development of soft 
infrastructure than hard infrastructure (JETRO, 2016, p. 10). For example, they 
demonstrated various concerns about the issues of customs and cross-border 
procedures. Additionally, when we look at the scores respondents gave to the 
‘challenges’ in the region, JETRO’s study reflects that the Japanese companies were 
very worried about soft infrastructure (76 points), while the development of hard 
infrastructure was far behind (7 points) (JETRO, 2016, p. 10). This means that the 
development of hard infrastructure has reached an acceptable point, but regional 
coordination and understanding of soft infrastructure and international transport have 
yet to be achieved. Meanwhile, another issue that the companies are concerned with 
is logistics. From Table 4, we can see that the issue of logistics services, in terms of 
both hard and soft infrastructure, was also a significant concern of companies in the 
GMS area. 
 
Table 5 : The Concern of Japanese Companies in the GMS Area  
Category Score Classification Score 
Issues on Customs / 
Cross-Border Procedure 
90 Soft Infrastructure 76 
Hard Infrastructure 7 
Other Issues 7 
Issues on Logistics 150 Logistics Services 51 
Logistics Infrastructure (Hard 
Infrastructure) 
38 
Logistics Infrastructure (Soft 
Infrastructure) 
23 
Overall / Structural Issues 38 
Issues on Procurement 31 Local Procurement 20 
Procurement from Foreign 
Countries 
9 
Procurement on Production 
Materials 
2 
Issues on Production 78 Labour 55 
Utility Infrastructure 14 
Production Cost 6 
 115 
Category Score Classification Score 
Cash Management 3 




Other Issues 26 Rules and Regulations 27 
Source: JETRO (2016, p. 10) 
 
 We have seen thus far why the Japanese government is interested to develop 
economic corridors in ASEAN and the GMS. Within the GMS area, Thailand is one 
of the biggest destinations for Japanese manufacturers to invest.  Looking more 
closely, Thailand also receives so much attention not only because of the significant 
number of Japanese companies, but also because of its valuable location. 
 
Figure 5:  The Location and R&D Centres of Japanese Automobile Industry in 
Thailand 
 
Source: Anuroj (2017, p. 30) 
 
Figure 5 shows that Samutprakarn is the primary area where Japanese 
automobile factories are located.  Moreover, Figure 5 also shows that Japanese 
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manufacturers are mainly located in the East of Thailand. Pathumthani is located in 
the North of Bangkok; Chacheognsao, Prachinburi, Chonburi, and Rayong are 
located in the East of Thailand; Samutprakarn is located in the Southeast of 
Bangkok; and Nakorn Ratchasima is in the Northeast of Thailand.  These 
manufacturing bases have been established since the fifth NESDP. Additionally, 52 
per cent of Japanese manufacturing headquarters are located in Bangkok, while 12 
per cent are in Chonburi and 11 per cent are in Samutprakarn (Anuroj, 2017, p. 33).  
 The eastern part of Thailand is crucial to the GMS economic system 
considering that Japanese companies relocated their factories to Southeast Asia, 
particularly Thailand, after the Plaza Accord.  Thailand’ s National Economic and 
Social Development Plan ( NESDP)  shows that the influx of Japanese companies 
after 1985 has played a role in shaping Thailand’s transportation and urbanisation.  
Prior to the Fifth NESDP 3 , the international economic and political 
environment was never considered as a level of analysis in the development of the 
NESDP.  The international milieu was first explicitly considered as a surrounding 
context that affects the Thai economy and social changes in the fifth NESDP (1982-
1986). The Fifth NESDP states that the 1973 oil crisis impacted both the global and 
domestic Thai economies and trade volumes, leading to a trade deficit in the Thai 
economy. During this period, Thailand also confronted the Indo-China crisis, which 
caused the Thai government to spend a considerable sum of money on national 
security ( NESDB, 1982, pp.  8- 9) .  Additionally, the Fifth NESDP was the first to 
outline the plan to develop an industrial area in the Eastern part of Thailand. It aimed 
to construct a deep seaport in order to support the expansion of international trade 
volumes and to develop the rural area.  In particular, it was anticipated that the 
development of the Eastern part of Thailand would further stimulate economic 
development in the North-Eastern area of Thailand – the poorest region in Thailand 
– as the two regions are located within close proximity to each other (NESDB, 1982, 
 
3 The first plan was called the ‘National Economic Development Plan’  (NEDP)  and was initiated in 
1961 with two phases. The first phase was between 1961 and 1963, and the second phase was between 
1964 and 1966.  After the first plan, the name was changed to the ‘National Economic and Social 
Development Plan (NESDP), adding the word ‘social’. When the Second NESDP (1967-1971) was 
issued, not only the idea of a new airport was proposed, but also the idea of constructing a new deep 
seaport in the East of Thailand that was expected to support the maritime shipping between Thailand 
and Japan (NESDB, 1967, p. 52, 163). 
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p.  127) .  The Eastern region was selected because of its location, which is both not 
too far from Bangkok and next to the Gulf of Thailand, presenting a good opportunity 
to develop maritime trade routes.  Additionally, the abundance of natural resources 
and labourers provided great potential that could support the anticipated 
development (NESDB, 1982, p. 128).  
The Sixth NESDP stated that one of Thailand’s objectives was to become the 
aviation hub of Southeast Asia (NESDB, 1987, pp. 276-277). After that, the Seventh 
NESDP (1992-1996) recognised additional opportunities that Thailand might benefit 
from as the centre of the region.  It explained various international factors that 
affected the Thai economy such as the expansion of the European Community and 
the initiation of the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA). Additionally, it also 
mentioned that the growing markets in Japan and the Asian Newly Industrialised 
Economies (NIEs), the growing markets in the Middle East and South America, and 
re- emerging Indo- China could bring promising economic opportunities to the Thai 
economy ( NESDB, 1992, p.  5) .  As there was a strong possibility that industrial 
production, particularly the petrochemical, engineering, and electronic industries, 
would relocate from Japan to Southeast Asia, Thailand recognised the importance of 
preparing both hard and soft infrastructure (NESDB, 1992, pp. 6-7). 
Moreover, the Eastern Seaboard of Thailand gained further attention from the 
government, as can be seen from the Seventh NESDP in which the Thai government 
established the ‘ Eastern Seaboard Development Zone’  as a major industrial base. 4 
The Eastern Seaboard is located in the East of Thailand, covering the areas of Laem 
Chabang and Map Ta Phut. The Thai government hoped that the development of the 
Eastern Seaboard would help the Northern and North- Eastern areas of Thailand to 
become more integrated in international trade (NESDPB, 1992, pp. 108-109).  
The Eighth NESDP (1997-2001) aimed to help Thailand become a centre of 
finance, tourism, telecommunication and ICT, and transportation.  It focused on the 
development of the EWEC and other land transportation networks.  This plan also 
stressed the vitality of communities at the border as potential areas that could link 
domestic markets with neighbouring countries.  The plan emphasised three 
subregional initiatives, including the IMT- GT, the GMS Economic Co- operation 
 
4 For the details of the Eastern Seaboard, see Eastern Seaboard Development Committee (1987), Intasi 
(1998). 
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Programme, and the Bangladesh-India-Myanmar-Sri Lanka-Thailand Economic Co-
operation ( BIMSTEC) . 5 The IMT- GT was expected to help develop the Southern 
Thai economy, GMS was expected to help the people in the North, North-East, East, 
and West of Thailand, and the BIMSTEC was expected to improve the local 
economies in Southern Thailand and Western Thailand (NESDPB, 1997, p. 80). To 
reach these goals, the NESDP planned to construct hard infrastructure ( i. e.  roads, 
port, telecommunication)  in support of development, in addition to a transport 
network in Myanmar to further develop their domestic energy sector ( NESDPB, 
1997, pp. 82-83). 
 
Figure 6: Eastern Seaboard and EWEC 
 
Source: Charoensri (2010c) 
 
We have seen from above that the relocation of Japanese manufacturers after 
1985 to Southeast Asia was primarily to Thailand. The Thai government adjusted its 
NESDP to support the relocation by initiating various hard infrastructure 
development plans that would support economic activities in the areas that had a high 
concentration of Japanese manufacturers.  Figure 6 shows that the when the Eastern 
 
5 BIMSTEC, however, renamed their organisation to the “Bay of Bengal Initiative Multi-Sectoral 
Technical and Economic Co-operation” to embrace Nepal and Bhutan as members whilst maintaining 
its commitment to regional co-operation. 
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Seaboard was established in Thailand’ s NESDP, the EWEC was proposed and 
advocated for by the Japanese government in an effort to link the East and West parts 
of mainland Southeast Asia, further facilitating cross- border trade ( Charoensri, 
2010c). As mentioned above, pirates in the Strait of Malacca have become a security 
issue in Southeast Asian maritime transport.  Therefore, mainland cross- border 
transport via the EWEC provides an additional, and potenitally more secure, 
logistical option for Japanese companies.  
 
Figure 7: Alternative Routes in Southeast Asia 
 
 Source: Charoensri (2010c) 
 
 Figure 7 shows the routes that Japan’s shipping companies can utilise. Route 
No. 1 is a sea-lane, which requires cargo ships to sail through the Straits of Malacca 
where pirates are still a problem.  Ships may choose to go through other Indonesian 
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sea- lane, however this option would increase the cost and duration of shipping.  As 
further demonstrated in Figure 4, the Japanese government views land transport in 
the GMS area as a viable option for trade.  
 Apart from the MOFA, METI also contributes to the economic and industrial 
development of the GMS area. METI initiated the ‘Mekong Industrial Development 
Vision’  in 2015 to support production and markets in the region by integrating the 
‘ Mekong region’  with China and India through a regionally integrated value chain 
(METI, 2015a). METI acknowledges the ‘unique advantages’ of each country in the 
GMS area, which are: 
 
• Cambodia and Myanmar:  Labour intensive work including agro and cutting 
and making trimming (CMT) 
• Lao PDR: Abundant water resource and fertile soil 
• Thailand: Exiting automotive and electronic industry cluster 
• Vietnam: Good access to the US, EU, and South China (METI, 2016, p. 32) 
 
METI then initiated collaboration with JICA, JETRO, the ASEAN- Japan 
Centre, ADB, and ERIA to work on the specific ways in which Japan could support 
its own investors to make use of the available opportunities in the GMS ( METI, 
2015b, p. 15). The Mekong Industrial Development Vision focuses on many regional 
development issues, including trade structures, Foreign Direct Investment ( FDI) , 
local business collaboration, Research and Development ( R&D)  activities, 
competitive SMEs, regional connectivity, energy supply and environment, and 
Human Resources and Development (HRD) (METI, 2015b). METI recognises that 
the GMS region needs to improve the EWEC and SEC so that the region can link 
and integrate with the Middle East and India ( METI, 2015, p.  13) , a vision that is 
also reflected in ERIA’ s CADP, which seeks to connect the regions both physically 




 This chapter provides elaboration on how regional and international 
environments have influenced Japan-Southeast Asia relations. This chapter set out 
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to answer the question of why the Japanese government has been supporting the 
development of regional transport in Southeast Asia. Two important factors were 
identified: (1) the regional and international structures, and (2) political, economic, 
and geographical factors. Chapter 5 will expand upon these factors through 
































Japan and the Master Plan on  
ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC) 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 Chapter 4 provided a background of the Japan- ASEAN economic and 
diplomatic relations that have developed since the end of the Second World War.  It 
was noted that the Japanese government established relations with ASEAN, through 
utilisation of its official development assistance (ODA), in order to help Japan regain 
its position in the region.  Moreover, the multilateral relations ( e. g.  Japan- ASEAN 
relations and the GMS Programme)  that Japan has pursued focus on supporting 
ASEAN’ s work, which is also one of Japan’ s foreign policy platforms.  Chapter 4 
further explained that Japan’s economic and business interests in the Greater Mekong 
Subregion ( GMS)  area are strongly influenced by the historical relocation of 
Japanese manufacturers after 1985.  
One of Japan’ s most active engagements in ASEAN is its contribution to 
regional transport development, particularly infrastructure development ( e. g. 
transport, telecommunications, and energy) .  When ASEAN developed regional 
transport development plan, called the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 
( MPAC) , in 2010, Japan worked closely to support ASEAN’ s MPAC by initiated 
Japan’ s supportive mechanism.  The MPAC set to prepare and plan a common 
transport development strategy by outlining how each country’ s government could 
incorporate it into their national policy. ASEAN’s MPAC was supported by the work 
of the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia ( ERIA) , the Institute 
of Developing Economies – Japan External Trade Organisation (IDE-JETRO), and 
the Asian Development Bank Institute ( ADBI) .  These three international research 
organisations ( IROs)  helped ASEAN officials and intellectuals, both in individual 
member states and the Secretariat, to obtain information and analyses through their 
research results, meetings, conferences, and capacity-building programmes. As these 
three IROs are supported by the Japanese government, they work closely with Japan 
and help Japan to reflect its opinions and to contribute to MPAC’s works.  
This chapter aims to answer the first sub-question of this thesis: how has the 
Japanese government created mechanisms to support Southeast Asian regional 
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transport development schemes? Accordingly, this chapter is divided into two main 
parts. The first part will give information about Japan’s role in Southeast Asian 
transport development by explaining how the Japanese government has contributed 
to and engaged in ASEAN’s MPAC, as well as other regional transport development 
schemes. The second part will elaborate on the background, structure, and work of 
ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI, as the Japanese government also supports their 
research on Southeast Asian regional connectivity. This section will also explain the 
collaboration of ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI with the governments in Southeast 
Asia, the ASEAN Secretariat, and intellectuals to construct and disseminate practical 
knowledge throughout the region. Together, these two sections will provide an 
overview of how the Japanese government created mechanisms and conducted 
research with the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI. This will further demonstrate how 
they are organically connected.  
The chapter draws on the interviews conducted in Japan, Indonesia, 
Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand in 2016. As shown in Chapter 3, I interviewed 
intellectuals who work with ERIA, IDE-JETRO, ADBI in order to understand their 
contribution to Japan’s engagement in regional transport development in the GMS. I 
also interviewed think tanks, government officials and university scholars in 
Southeast Asia to comprehend their contribution and opinion on IROs’ engagement. 
 
 
5.2 ASEAN Connectivity and the MPAC 
 To understand Japan’ s engagement in ASEAN connectivity, I will first 
provide a brief background of ASEAN’ s MPAC so that we can understand the 
development of the ASEAN Connectivity scheme.  
The MPAC has played an important role in facilitating ASEAN’s 
regionalisation as a scheme that aims to construct and synchronise hard and soft 
infrastructure to support the building of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). 
Since its establishment in 1967, ASEAN has progressively developed its economic 
and political co-operation. In 2003, at the 9th ASEAN Summit in Bali, Indonesia, the 
leaders of ASEAN agreed that ASEAN should expand and deepen its regional co-
operation. After the Summit, the leaders issued the ‘Declaration of ASEAN Concord 
II’ which is also known as the ‘Bali Accord II’. The Bali Accord II states that 
ASEAN would establish an ‘ASEAN Community’ by 2020. However, although the 
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initial plan was to create the community by 2020, the international and regional 
environment catalysed the process because the degree of regional economic 
interdependence had increased and economic competition between various economic 
regions had also intensified globally. This can be seen from the proliferation and the 
deepening of regional initiatives around the world such as the establishment of many 
new regional economic initiatives. Thereby, ASEAN agreed to change its goal from 
establishing the ASEAN Community in 2020 to 2015 so that the region could ensure 
its competitiveness.  
In order to comprehensively develop the region, it is necessary to have 
integrated development plans that consider economic, political, and social 
dimensions together. The ASEAN Community comprises three ‘pillars’, including 
the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), the ASEAN Economic 
Community (AEC) and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC). Each pillar 
has its own individual development projects that focus on different dimensions and 
areas. One of the strategies that the ASEAN Community sees as a mechanism to 
strengthen the ASEAN Community is regional connectivity, which was later 
translated into the ‘ASEAN Connectivity’ scheme. 
Regional connectivity is multi-dimensional. In the past, the ASEAN 
Connectivity scheme was part of the AEC, but later the ASEAN Secretariat decided 
that regional connectivity is not only related to the ‘economic aspects’ of ASEAN. 
Instead, connectivity helps create linkages between communities in various 
countries, which relates to many issues, including political and security issues (e.g. 
border management, migration, drug trafficking, human trafficking) and social issues 
(e.g. transboundary disease, road safety, environmental issues). Accordingly, 
regional comprehensive connectivity needs to integrate political, economic, and 
social dimensions so that it is able to support the region inclusively and effectively. 
Thereby, the ASEAN Secretariat established an individual department to take 
responsibility for this effort in 2011, called ASEAN Connectivity.6  
ASEAN Connectivity serves as both the means and the ends for ASEAN in 
its  attempt to establish a comprehensive regional transport network in the region. 
Since 2010, when ASEAN Connectivity was accepted in the 17th ASEAN Summit, 
each country provides financial support to accomplish this goal. The most significant 
 
6 Interview, a staff of ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, Indonesia, 13 April 2016. 
 125 
projects of the regional connectivity scheme are the economic corridors in mainland 
Southeast Asia. There are three main corridors, namely, the East-West Economic 
Corridor (EWEC), the North-South Economic Corridors (NSEC), and the Southern 
Economic Corridor (SEC). The expected outcomes of establishing comprehensive 
connectivity in Southeast Asia are not only the elimination of poverty and increased 
economic opportunities for local people through the provision of accessible markets, 
but also the advancement of diplomatic relations and political friendships amongst 
member states (Bhattacharyay, 2010). The three economic corridors were first 
developed by the GMS Programme at the 8th GMS Summit in 1998 where ASEAN 
leaders initiated the idea of constructing the EWEC, NSEC, and SEC in hopes that 
the corridors would support increased economic activities in the Greater Mekong 
area.  
The development of the logistic system in Southeast Asia not only decreases 
the costs of cross-border transport, but also facilitates the international division of 
labour in Northeast Asia, which ensures the effective allocation of natural resources 
in the region (Fujita et al., 2008). As was discussed in Chapter 4, the relocation of 
Japanese factories to Southeast Asia resulted in many requests for improved hard 
infrastructure in the region to create more effective networks. Regional transport 
development not only brings the region together physically by providing plans for 
hard and soft infrastructure, but also changes the way member states perceive the 
region’s potential in terms of its location and abundant natural resources. This 
potential, moreover, can be achieved by regional organisations and by constructive 
engagement with wealthier countries or organisations.  
The development of ASEAN Connectivity integrates two parts of Southeast 
Asia: mainland and maritime. Before the ASEAN Development scheme was 
initiated, it seemed as though each department’s regional transport development 
plans were not integrated because each one had different strategies. Overall, when 
we look at the number of regional transport development projects, mainland 
Southeast Asia seems to receive comparatively more attention from both ASEAN 
member states and external actors, as the mainland is a broad geographical area that 
links five countries (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam), and is in 
close proximity to India and China (Charoensri, 2016). While all five countries in 
mainland Southeast Asia are also known for their comparatively cheap labour and 
natural resources, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam – or CLMV countries – 
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are also recognised as least-developed countries (LDCs). Nonetheless, although 
mainland Southeast Asia has great potential for competitiveness, the insufficient 
development of infrastructure remains one of the critical factors obstructing regional 
economic development. Zen, an ERIA researcher, argues that LDCs need structural 
and physical support from other countries in order to develop their basic 
infrastructure, which is an essential condition for national and international investors 
(Zen, 2014, pp. 16-17). 
 In order to create a more comprehensive infrastructure development strategy, 
the ASEAN Secretariat issued the MPAC in 2010 to better coordinate regional 
collaboration and to effectively synchronise the existing plan with its objectives. 
MPAC 2010 has three significant schemes that aim to achieve regional connectivity. 
The first is physical connectivity, which intends to link transport, information and 
communications technology (ICT) infrastructure, and energy infrastructure. The 
second scheme is to build institutional connectivity. The third scheme is to connect 
people, or ‘people-to-people connectivity’ (Das, 2013, pp. 4-6). Moreover, ASEAN 
also established the ‘ASEAN Connectivity Coordination Committee’ (ACCC), 
consisting of representatives from ASEAN countries to look after the coordination 
of the three main MPAC 2010 schemes. The representatives, or national 
coordinators, are appointed individually by each country.  
After ASEAN’s MPAC 2010 had been implemented for five years, the 
ASEAN Secretariat then considered new goals and strategies for ASEAN 
Connectivity and hired the McKinsey Company and the AlphaBeta Company to 
conduct research. The results of the research helped the ASEAN Secretariat to draft 
the ‘MPAC 2025’ that was launched in September 2016 (MFA, 2015). The research 
was funded by the Australian government, which maintains significant interests in 
ASEAN Connectivity and the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) (ASEAN, 
2016b). When I interviewed a staff member of Thailand’s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MFA) about the Australian government’s engagement in the development 
of the MPAC 2025, the interviewee stated that the role of the Australian government 
to financially support the research behind the MPAC 2025 was motivated by its 
interest in gaining access to the raw data and information from the research.7 
Involvement in the drafting of the MPAC 2025 also allowed the Australian 
 
7 Interview, a staff of MFA, Bangkok, Thailand, 2 June 2016. 
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government to learn about the problems in the previous MPAC.8 It also reflects the 
Australian government’s commitment to diplomatic engagement with ASEAN and 
provision of economic assistance. Interestingly, when I interview a staff member of 
Japan’s MOFA about Japan’s contribution to the drafting process of the MPAC 2025, 
the interviewee mentioned that the Japanese government did not take part in the 
process at all.9 This was because the ASEAN Secretariat wanted the draft to not be 
influenced by external regional actors such as Japan or China.10 
 The MPAC 2025 was revised to deal with many of the structural problems 
present in the MPAC 2010. One of the most critical issues was that the MPAC 2010 
was too ambiguous and did not establish a specific administrative body in each 
country that would act as the centre of coordination. Financial capacity was also an 
issue, as the private sector in Southeast Asia wasn’t interested in investing money in 
the project due to the lack of information about the potential returns (ASEAN, 
2016a). The MPAC 2025, accordingly, aims to narrow the institutional and capacity 
gaps. The original three strategic areas of the MPAC 2010 were expanded on in the 
MPAC 2025 to achieve five strategic areas including sustainable infrastructure, 
digital innovation, seamless logistics, regulatory excellence, and people mobility 














8 Interview, a staff of MFA, Bangkok, Thailand, 2 June 2016. 
9 Interview, a staff of MOFA, Tokyo, Japan, 25 March 2016. 
10 Interview, a staff of MOFA, Tokyo, Japan, 25 March 2016. 
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Table 6: ASEAN’s MPAC 2025 and 5 Strategic Areas 
 Initiatives Intended Outcomes in 2025 
Sustainable 
Infrastructure 
• Establishment of 
infrastructure pipeline 
• Framework and strategies on 
infrastructure productivity 
• Development of sustainable 
urbanisation strategies 
• Increase public and private 
infrastructure investment 
across the ASEAN member 
states 
• Enhance infrastructure 
productivity in ASEAN 
through better delivery 
• Increase the deployment of 




• Enhance MSMEs adoption of 
digital technologies 
• Expansion of digital financial 
services 
• Establishment of open data 
network 
• Development of digital data 
governance framework 
• Increase the adoption of 
technology by MSMEs  
• Support access to financial 
services through digital 
technologies 
• Enhance the impact of open 
data across ASEAN 
• Improve data-management 
practices and more cross 




• Development of logistics 
database 
• Enhance supply chain 
efficiencies by addressing 
chokepoints 
• Lower supply-chain costs in 
each ASEAN member 
states 
• Improve the 




• Harmonise or mutually 
recognise the product, 
conformance, and 
technological standards in key 
sectors 
• Enhance transparency and 
streamline non-tariff measures 
• Lower the cost of doing 
business in ASEAN 




• Enhance tourism digital 
platform 
• Ease ASEAN travel by 
facilitating visa processes 
• Establish new convocational 
training programmes and 
common qualification, in 
accordance with national 
circumstances of ASEAN 
member states 
• Support higher education 
across ASEAN member states 
• Support ease of travel 
throughout ASEAN 
• Increase the intra-ASEAN 
mobility of university 
students 
• Reduce the gaps between 
convocational skills 
demand and supply across 
ASEAN 
Source: Cheen (2018, p. 2) 
 
Hitherto, we have seen a brief background of ASEAN’ s MPAC.  It was first 
initiated in 2010, and a new version was launched in 2015.  The ASEAN Secretariat 
expected that the MPACs (both 2010 and 2025) would help the region to establish a 
common regional transport development plan. The Japanese government engages in 
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the drafting of the two MPACs by providing financial assistance and intellectual 
support through the work of the ERIA, IDE- JETRO, and ADBI.  The next section 




5.3  Japan’s Contribution to ASEAN’s MPAC 
The Japanese government initiated two main mechanisms to support the 
MPAC and Japanese investors in the GMS area, including the Mission of Japan to 
ASEAN (hereafter, the Mission) and the Japanese Task Force to Support on ASEAN 
Connectivity (hereafter, the Japanese Task Force). The former is the main body that 
oversees collaboration and facilitation between Japan and ASEAN. The latter 
comprises both committees and the Japanese ministries that are involved in ASEAN 
Connectivity projects and schemes.  
 
5.3.1 The Mission of Japan to ASEAN  
The Mission was established in 2011 – only one year after the launch of 
MPAC 2010 – to work with the ‘ASEAN Committee of Permanent Representative’ 
(ASEAN CPR) that was convened according to the ASEAN Charter. ASEAN CPR 
is a committee that comprises ambassador-level representatives from ASEAN 
member states and dialogue partners. After the establishment of ASEAN CPR, the 
US assigned the first ambassador to ASEAN in 2008 and opened its diplomatic 
relations with ASEAN in 2010. At the same time, Japan also assigned its first 
ambassador to ASEAN in 2010 and established the Mission in 2011. The Mission is 
responsible for a significant number of tasks and arrangements, such as following up 
on the agreements that Japan and ASEAN have signed. The Mission also aims to 
support the ASEAN integration process by providing financial support and 
establishing mechanisms, such as the Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund (JAIF), the 
co-operation in disaster management to support the work of the ASEAN 
Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA Centre), and MPAC 
support. Moreover, another objective of the Mission is to facilitate and oversee 




5.3.2 The Japanese Task Force on ASEAN Connectivity  
The Japanese Task Force is another mechanism that Japan initiated to support 
ASEAN Connectivity. When the MPAC was launched in 2010, the Japanese 
government firmly endorsed the idea of linking Southeast Asia together by initiating 
schemes that would place Japan in a vital role, hoping that their contribution would 
support development and strengthen the MAPC (Ishikane, 2013). Japan had 
originally assigned the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) to act as the main 
coordinating body for Japan’s government agencies. However, only one month after 
the adoption of the MPAC at the 17th ASEAN Summit in Vietnam in October 2010, 
the Japanese government established the Japanese Task Force, comprised of various 
Japanese ministries, including:  
 
• the Ministry of International Affairs and Communications (MIC)  
• the Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
• the Ministry of Economic, Trade and Industry (METI) 
• the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) 
• the Japan International Co-operation Agency (JICA) 
• the Japan Bank for International Co-operation (JBIC) 
• Keidanren  
• the Japanese Chamber of Commerce (JCC).  
 
The Japanese Task Force is chaired by the MOFA and organised its first 
meeting in November 2010 in Tokyo. The second, third, and fourth meetings of the 
Japanese Task Force were held in Dec 2010, March 2011, and June 2011, 
respectively. The first official meeting between the Japanese Task Force and the 
ACCC was organised on 1 July 2011. In the same year at the 14th Japan-ASEAN 
Summit in November 2011, the Japanese government proposed 33 flagship projects 
that aim to support the ASEAN Connectivity scheme. Japan also demonstrated its 
willingness to grant financial assistance of approximately 2 trillion yen (or 




Figure 9: The Collaboration between ASEAN and Other Actors on ASEAN 
Connectivity 
 
Source: Drawn and Revised from Pipoppinyo (2013), p. 168.  
 
As seen in Figure 9, the ACCC acts as a collaborator that receives requests 
from ASEAN member states and other relevant mechanisms. Moreover, the ACCC 
also works with external actors – such as Japan, China, and Korea – that expect to 
support the MPAC by providing financial and technical assistance.  
The role of the Mission is recognised as one of the main factors that facilitated 
Japan’s engagement in ASEAN Connectivity. When I conducted interviews in 2016, 
the staff members of the MOFA and METI stressed the importance of the Mission 
to the Japanese Embassy in Jakarta by stating that the Japanese government has 
allocated almost an equal number of staff members to the Mission as the Embassy.11 
The Mission has 14 full-time officials, whereas the Embassy of Japan in Jakarta has 
13 full-time officials (Mission of Japan to ASEAN, 2015, p. 10). Staff members of 
the Mission come from various governmental ministries, including the MOFA, 
METI, MLIT, MOF, MIC, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and 
Technology (MEXT), the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF), 
 
11 Interview, a staff of MOFA, Tokyo, Japan, 25 March 2016; Interview, a staff of METI, Tokyo, 
Japan, 25 March 2016. 
 132 
the Ministry of Defence (MOD), the National Police Agency (NPA), and the Japan 
Fair Trade Commission (JFTC). 
Apart from the work of the Mission and the Task Force, other Japanese 
government agencies such as the MOFA, METI, MOF, MLIT, JICA, JETRO, and 
the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare (MHLW), are also associated with the 
MPAC. When the MPAC 2010 was issued, the Japanese government assigned 
MOFA to act as a coordinator and to collect proposals from other organisations. The 
MOFA then called for project proposals from other Japanese government agencies 
that may be interested to take part in supporting the MPAC by providing 
development projects based on their expertise. The objective was to provide the 
Japanese government an opportunity to engage with the MPAC by contributing 
financial assistance and transferring knowledge. Additionally, the Japanese 
government could potentially win infrastructure development procurement in 
Southeast Asia.12 Any interested Japanese ministries that were interested in 
becoming involved in the infrastructure projects had to submit project proposals to 
the Japanese government, including an explanation of the proposed project’s 
relevance to the MPAC. After that, the MOFA would propose suitable proposals to 
the ASEAN Secretariat, explaining the recommended projects’ importance and 
relevance, including how the projects would inclusively boost the development of 
ASEAN Connectivity. However, some proposed projects might be rejected if the 
ASEAN Secretariat considered the project to be irrelevant to the MPAC.13 
The projects that were selected by the ASEAN Secretariat were varied in their 
objectives. The projects proposed by the Japanese government ministries included 
the development of both hard infrastructure and soft infrastructure. The scope of the 
projects ranged from concentrating only on one country to including multiple 






12 Interview, a staff of MOFA, Tokyo, Japan, 25 March 2016. 
13 Interview, a staff of MOFA, Tokyo, Japan, 25 March 2016. 
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Table 7: Flagships Programmes Proposed by the Japanese Government to Support 
ASEAN Connectivity at the 14th ASEAN Summit (November 2011) 
Hard Infrastructure 
Vision 1: Formation of the Vital Artery for 
East-West and Southern Economic Corridor 
Vision 2: Maritime ASEAN Economic Corridor 
Mekong Region: 
- Study to Realise New Economic 
Corridor (Land Bridge) 
Indonesia: 
- Cilamaya New Port Development 
- Improvement and Expansion of Tanjung Priok 
Port 
- Jawa-Sumatra Interconnection Transmission 
Line Project 
- Connectivity Development Policy Loan 
Vietnam: 
- Lach Huyen Port Infrastructure 
Construction 
- Terminal 2 Construction Project of 
Noi Bai International Airport 
- Cai Mep-Thi Vai Infrastructure Port 
Construction 
- Project for Disaster and Climate 
Change Counter-Measures Using 
Observation Satellite 
Philippines: 
- Maritime Safety Capacity Improvement for the 
Philippine Coast Guard 
Cambodia: 
- Cambodia National Road No.5 
Rehabilitation 
- Construction of Neak Loeung Bridge 
- Sihanoukville Port Multipurpose 
Terminal Development 
Malaysia: 
- Protect on Enhancing Practical Capacity for 
Maritime Safety and Improving Education and 
Training Education Programme 
 
Lao PDR: 
- Southern Region Power System 
Development 
- Improvement of National Road No.9 
as East-West Economic Corridor of 
the Mekong Region 
Malaysia and Indonesia: 
- Melaka-Pekan Baru Interconnection 
Myanmar: 
- Infrastructure Development in 
Thilawa Area Phase I 
- Yangon-Mandala Railway 
Improvement 
Indonesia, Philippines: 
- F/S on the Roll-on/Roll-off (RORO) Network 
and Short-Sea Shipping 
Soft Infrastructure  
- Assistance for Harmonisation of Automotive Regulations and Mutual Recognition 
- ASEAN Smart Network Initiative 
- Assistance for ASEAN Single Aviation Market 
- Logistics Enhancement Support Project, Sea-Land Intermodal Transport through the Use of 
Express RORO Vessel 
- Supporting Programme for ASEAN Common Skill Standard Initiative for ICT Professionals 
- ASEAN University Network / Southeast Asia Engineering Education Development Network 
- Disaster Management Network for ASEAN Region 
- Trade Facilitation in Asia, Promotion of Port Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) 
- Project for Establishing Food Security Network 
- Project for Strengthening Food Value Chain 
- Establishment of Supply Chain Visibility Platform for ASEAN Countries 
- Project for Capacity Building and Implementation of International SPS Standards in ASEAN 
Countries, as well as Prevention and Control of Major Trans-Boundary Animal Diseases in Asia 





The interviews with the Mission of Japan reveal that despite receiving interest 
from many ministries, not every departments’ expertise could contribute or appeal 
to the ASEAN Secretariat.14 There were some cases in which ministries were able to 
persuade the MOFA that their proposals were relevant to the MPAC, but when it was 
presented to the ASEAN Secretariat, the project did not attract ASEAN member 
states.15 For example, the MHLW proposed a project concerned with health issues 
that might be caused by the development of hard infrastructure in the region, but the 
ASEAN Secretariat determined that the proposal was not directly relevant to the 
MPAC and rejected it.16 Some ministries that have skills and knowledge regarding 
particular issues offered their expertise to ASEAN instead of proposing a specific 
development project, such as the MLIT and MIC. In particular, as the MLIT has 
many professional engineers and construction experts, it was often called on by the 
MOFA and JICA to advise construction projects. Their expertise in road and bridge 
construction was further applied to Southeast Asian development projects.17 For 
example, the MLIT and the Mission both joined the 27th ASEAN Transport 
Facilitation Working Group Meeting in Jakarta, Indonesia in 2014, at which they 
discussed the issues of improving transport development in ASEAN and the 
possibility of linking ASEAN with South Asia (Mission of Japan to ASEAN, 2014). 
The collaboration between the MOFA and JICA is very close. As MOFA was 
designated by the government to act as a coordinator for the ASEAN Secretariat and 
as a collaborator between Japanese ministries, the MOFA was responsible for 
receiving proposals, projects, and comments from other organisations and seeking 
ways to justify the projects’ relevancy to the MPAC. However, the consultation for 
such projects, and their implementation, may be assigned to other agencies such as 
JICA.18 
Hitherto, we have seen the mechanisms that the Japanese government utilises 
to support ASEAN’s MPAC. The previous section explained that the ASEAN 
Secretariat issued the MPAC in 2010 and re-issued the MPAC with a new vision in 
 
14 Interview, a staff of the Mission of Japan to ASEAN, Jakarta, Indonesia, 13 April 2016. 
15 Interview, a staff of the Mission of Japan to ASEAN, Jakarta, Indonesia, 13 April 2016. 
16 Interview, a staff of the Mission of Japan to ASEAN, Jakarta, Indonesia, 13 April 2016. 
17 Interview, a staff of JICA, Tokyo, Japan, 24 March 2016. 
18 Interview, a staff of MOFA, Tokyo, Japan, 25 March 2016. 
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2025. When MPAC 2025 was issued, the Japanese government endorsed the new 
Master Plan, further stating that it would be a sincere partner for ASEAN in terms of 
peace and stability, prosperity, and quality of life (Sunaga, 2016, p. 3). The 
development of economic corridors in the GMS area is one of the most interesting 
issues that the Japanese government has been paying attention to (Sunaga, 2016, p. 
6). The Japanese government has proposed several projects in tandem with the new 
themes present in MPAC 2025. For example, in line with sustainable infrastructure 
development, Japan plans to mobilise its resources to work with the ADB and the 
World Bank to promote infrastructure development, including the development of 
economic corridors in the GMS area and the development of soft infrastructure (e.g. 
the Join Hydrographic Survey of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, the 
Development of Vessel Traffic Service Operator’s Capacity, the Joint Research on 
Road Technologies for ASEAN Cross-Border Corridors) (Sunaga, 2016, p. 7). Japan 
also aims to contribute to MPAC 2025’s digital innovation by working with ASEAN 
to enhance data management through ICT capacity building programmes, technical 
assistance, and infrastructure development (Sunaga, 2016, p. 15). Another new 
theme in MPAC 2025 is seamless logistics, for which Japan hopes to assist ASEAN 
in improving the speed and reliability of logistical services (Sunaga, 2016, p. 17). 
Japan also anticipates working to enhance the capacity of human resources and 
infrastructure (Sunaga, 2016, p. 15). For MPAC 2025’s theme of regulatory 
excellence, Japan expects the legal systems related to economic activities to be 
further developed in order to better support their investors (Sunaga, 2016, p. 20). 
Lastly, Japan plans to provide information for Japanese tourists who want to come 
to ASEAN and help to facilitate their trips. Japan hopes that Japanese tourists will 
start to see ASEAN as one single destination (Sunaga, 2016, p. 22). 
The Japanese Chamber of Commerce (JCC) is also a key player in helping 
the Japanese government to receive requests from Japan’s overseas manufacturers. 
For example, the Japanese Chamber of Commerce  in Bangkok (henceforth ‘JCC 
Bangkok’) plays a substantial role in reflecting the needs of Japanese companies to 
the Thai government. JCC Bangkok conducts a business survey every year, the 
results of which inform their requests of the Thai government. For instance, one 
survey showed that 57 per cent of Japanese companies in Thailand ‘requested’ the 
Thai government to support the “promotion of economic measures (public 
infrastructure development)” (JCC Economic Survey Team, 2015, p. 3). The 
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requests can be seen in Table 8, which shows that the first issue the respondents 
sought to have addressed was not the improvement of the “logistical infrastructure 
development linking Thailand with neighbouring countries (CLMV and India)”, but 
rather the “promotion of economic measures (public infrastructure development)” 
(JCC Economic Survey Team, 2015, p. 3).  
Human resource capacity-building programmes are crucial for economic 
development. For example, when I interviewed a JCC Bangkok staff member and 
asked about the obstacles that might impact the regional integration process, the 
interviewee stated that the most critical factor that would lead Thailand to improved 
economic development is to increase the number of university students studying 
engineering.19 Lacking a sufficient number of engineers causes an enormous delay 
in the development of innovation in Thai society. This reiterated by Table 8, which 
shows that one of the requests from Japanese investors is the improvement of human 
resources and development. 
 
Table 8: Requests of Japanese Manufacturers to the Thai Government  
Ranking 










Promotion of Economic 
Measures (e.g. Public 
Infrastructure Development) 




Stability of the Political 
Situation 





and Their Implementation 
124 (44%) 84 (37%) 
208 
(41%) 




Development of Transport 
Infrastructure in the Bangkok 
Metropolitan Area 




Relaxation of the Foreign 
Business Act 




Stability in Foreign Exchange 
Rates 










Work Permit / Visa-Related 
Systems 




Improvement of Education / 
Human Resource 
Development 










19 Interview, a staff of JCC Bangkok (2), Bangkok, Thailand, 18 May 2016. 
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Ranking 









Thailand with Neighbouring 
Countries (CLMV and India) 
13 12 
Promotion of Economic Ties 
(e.g. FTA, EPA) 




Development of the 
Communication 
Infrastructure 




Prevention of Labour 
Disputes 




Implementation of Flood 
Prevention Measures 




Implementation of Drought 
Control Measures 
34 (12%) 14 (6%) 48 (9%) 
16 17 
Promotion of Regional 
Operating Headquarters 
Function (e.g. IHQ, ITC) 
17 (6%) 27 (12%) 44 (9%) 
15 18 
Promotion of Employment of 
Foreign Labour 
20 (7%) 21 (9%) 41 (8%) 
17 19 
Protection of Intellectual 
Property Rights  
6 (2%) 6 (3%) 12 (2%) 
- - Others 3 (1%) 3 (1%) 6 (1%) 
 Total 1,264 1,034 2,298 
 No. of Firms 281 227 
508 
(100%) 
Source: JCC Economic Survey Team (2015), p. 3. 
 
The interviews with staff members of JICA, METI, and MOFA, reveal that 
ASEAN Connectivity is one of Japan’s national interests because the GMS area is 
recognised by both the Japanese government and Japanese investors as a high 
potential market.20 Nevertheless, one issue that hinders the region from achieving its 
potential is the lack of good quality, comprehensive hard infrastructure (ADB & 
ADBI, 2009, pp. 22-23). Furthermore, the region is also confronted with inadequate 
standardisation of laws and regulations between countries, which obstructs the free 
flow of goods and regional transport, and maintains the gap in living standards 
(ADB, 2017; Bhattacharyay, 2010a, 2010b; Kessides, 1993; Nakao, 2015). A JICA 
staff member also stated that the improvement of ASEAN’s hard and soft 
infrastructure would promote FDI and would facilitate an increase in the region’s 
trade volume.21 It is, then, vital for the GMS area to emphasise soft and hard 
infrastructure development in order to support economic activities.  
 
20 Interview, a staff of JICA, Tokyo, Japan, 24 March 2016; Interview, a staff of METI, Tokyo, Japan, 
25 March 2016; Interview, a staff of MOFA, Tokyo, Japan, 25 March 2016. 
21 Interview, a staff of JICA, Tokyo, Japan, 24 March 2016. 
 138 
The notion of the economic and political benefits that would come from 
connecting Southeast Asia through the improvement of hard infrastructure, along 
with the enhancement of soft infrastructure, was mentioned in interviews with staff 
members of the MOFA, METI, JICA, and JETRO. They are aware that transport 
development will not only directly impact the level of development in Southeast 
Asia, but will also have a positive impact on Japan’s economy.22 In order to assist 
with the development of hard and soft infrastructure in ASEAN, the Japanese 
government acts as a coordinator that collaborates with other relevant Japanese 
governmental agencies to support the MPAC. There are two groups of actors from 
Japan that have been involved in the MPAC, including governmental organisations 
and international research organisations (IROs). In the following sections, we will 
look at how Japan’s governmental organisations and IROs work to help the Japanese 
government support ASEAN’s MPAC.  
 
 
5.4 ASEAN Connectivity and ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI 
 The previous section discussed the role of the Japanese government as a norm 
entrepreneur that supports ASEAN Connectivity and provides financial support to 
research organisations to help frame ASEAN’ s development scheme.  This section 
will provide the background of the three main IROs with which the Japanese 
government works.  
 
  5.4.1 ERIA 
The first conceptualisation of the ERIA appears in METI’s ‘Global Economic 
Strategy’ (2006), which sought to determine the strategic approaches that Japan 
should use in order to advance its national interests in the age of globalisation (METI, 
2006, p.3). The document stated that the international political and economic systems 
were changing rapidly; accordingly, in order to benefit from the international 
environment, Japan should endeavour to utilise its power in three dimensions. First, 
Japan should try to support and promote the “free and open economic area in Asia” 
 
22 Interview, a staff of JICA, Tokyo, Japan, 24 March 2016; Interview, a staff of METI, Tokyo, Japan, 
25 March 2016; Interview, a staff of MOFA, Tokyo, Japan, 25 March 2016; Interview, a staff of 
JETRO, Tokyo, Japan, 28 March 2016; Interview, a staff of JETRO, 29 March 2016.  
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(METI, 2006, p. 4). Second, Japan should use its soft power by allocating 
scholarships and intellectual creativity to people from abroad to come to Japan. This 
would help Japan to benefit from exchange students who may come to Japan and 
create new outputs (METI, 2006, pp. 4-5). Third, Japan should try to play a leading 
role in bridging the international and regional systems. As the international system 
was confronting political, economic, and societal transformation, there were many 
challenges to overcome. Japan should, therefore, attempt to be a linchpin to help the 
world confront those challenges by providing experience and expertise (METI, 2006, 
pp. 5-6). In the document, METI proposed that Japan should promote the economic 
integration of ASEAN by providing intellectual inputs to the region (METI, 2006, p. 
16). It also proposed that Japan should create a research institute that would 
contribute to research and activities that aim to promote such regional economic 
integration (METI, 2006, p. 16).  
Following the Global Economic Strategy, the idea to establish the ERIA was 
first proposed by Nikai Toshihiro, Minister of METI, in 2006 during the 13th 
Consultation held between the ASEAN Economic Ministers and METI (AEM-
METI) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The ERIA working group was formed, 
comprising of specialists from 16 member states of the East Asia Summit (EAS) and 
representatives from the ASEAN Secretariat. The working group discussed the 
organisational structure, research themes, and potential activities of ERIA (Oba, 
2014, p. 63). In 2007, during the Second EAS held in the Philippines, the idea of the 
ERIA was proposed again by Abe Shinzo. The working group’s discussion was 
presented and helped other member states to better understand the role of the ERIA. 
The ASEAN Secretary, Surin Pitsuwan, endorsed the ERIA prior to its official 2008 
establishment by calling it the ‘Fukuda-Two Doctrine’ (BBC Monitoring Asia 
Pacific, 2008). He stated that Fukuda Takeo, a former Prime Minister and father of 
Fukuda Yasuo, had once initiated the framework that would strengthen relations 
between Japan and Southeast Asia. The establishment of the ERIA, in Surin’s 
opinion, would be another milestone through which Japan, under Fukuda Yasuo, 
would strengthen relations with Southeast Asia (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 
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2008). The first official inaugural meeting of the ERIA was held the following year 
at the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta.23 
The ERIA's Governing Board is composed of seventeen members, including 
representatives of EAS member states and the ASEAN Secretary General.  
 
Figure 10: ERIA’s Organisational Structure (2016) 
 













23 In 2017, the member states of the ERIA included ASEAN member states and Japan.  China and 
South Korea, however, were not yet the members of the ERIA.  
 141 
Figure 11: ERIA’s Organisational Structure (2019) 
 
Source: Website of ERIA, http://www.eria.org/about-us/organisational-structure (accessed 9 
February 2019) 
 
 Figure 11 shows that as of 2019, the ERIA has four main departments, 
namely (1) General Affairs and Personnel Department, (2) Outreach Department, (3) 
Research Department, and (4) Policy Design Department.24 The primary changes in 
the organisational structure of the ERIA are within the departments. Comparing 
Figures 10 and 11, we can see that there was no Policy Design Department in 2016. 
Moreover, a Research Department was added the East Asian Industrial Corridor 
Team (EAIC), incorporating the Agriculture Unit and the Health Unit into its areas 
 
24 When I conducted field research in 2016, the ERIA’s organisational structure was different. There 
was no Policy Design department in 2016. 
 142 
of research. The emergence of the EAIC within the ERIA reflects the significance of 
economic corridors and regional transport development in Asia and Southeast Asia.25  
The location of the ERIA headquarters was debated both before and after its 
official establishment. It was anticipated that the headquarters would be based in one 
of three nominated countries, which were Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand (Jiji 
Press English News Service, 2007, 2009). However, even after the official 
inauguration in 2008, the issue remained unsettled. At present, the headquarters of 
the ERIA is located at the Sentral Senayan Building in the heart of Jakarta, Indonesia. 
My interview with Thailand’s TDRI staff member, who helped Thailand to 
collaborate with the ERIA at the time, revealed that the ERIA’s Japanese staff 
members were interested in establishing the headquarters in Bangkok. However, the 
ERIA committee was not impressed by Thailand’s offer for various reasons. Firstly, 
the Thai coordinator proposed the headquarters to be based in an office at the 
National Institute of Development Administration (NIDA), which is not in the centre 
of Bangkok and would likely be inconvenient for international staff members to 
commute every day.26 Next, the ongoing political instability in Bangkok led to a 
number of safety concerns.27 
Furthermore, public transportation in Bangkok is not well connected. The 
Thai official who proposed to establish the ERIA headquarters at NIDA reasoned 
that it is not far from Suvarnabhumi Airport – the main international airport of 
Thailand. However, a possible underlying motivation was that the official was 
serving in an administrative position at NIDA at the time and may have wanted to 
persuade the ERIA in a politic dimension. The ERIA finally decided to establish its 
headquarters in Jakarta, Indonesia instead.28 Furthermore, hosting the ERIA 
headquarters in Jakarta could better facilitate the ERIA’s work, which is closely tied 
with that of the ASEAN Secretariat, because the two organisations would be in close 
proximity.29 
 
25 However, as this field research was conducted in 2016, this research will not focus on the role of 
EAIC. 
26 Interview, a staff of TDRI (2), Bangkok, Thailand, 16 June 2016. 
27 Interview, a staff of TDRI (2), Bangkok, Thailand, 16 June 2016. 
28 Interview, a staff of TDRI (2), Bangkok, Thailand, 16 June 2016. 
29 Interview, a staff of TDRI (2), Bangkok, Thailand, 16 June 2016. 
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There are many reasons why the ERIA was established. First, the ERIA was 
expected to promote a “more rational form of economic integration in Asia” (Oxford 
Analytica Daily Brief Service, 2008b). This is a good reflection of Japan’s economic 
strategy as evidenced by the Global Economic Strategy (2006), which states that 
Japan endeavours to play a leading role in East Asian regional economic integration 
(METI, 2006, p. 11). The creation of the ERIA, then, would promote regional 
economic integration by facilitating the opportunity for Japan to provide expertise in 
Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. Second, the ERIA was expected to also act as a 
think tank that would conduct research in support of ASEAN’s “regional public 
goods”. 
Furthermore, Fukuda Yasuo anticipated that the ERIA would eventually 
evolve into the “OECD of Asia” (Jiji Press English News Service, 2009; Otsuji & 
Shinoda, 2014; p. 151); the OECD being the organisation that helped European 
countries to fortify their economies and address social issues (Asia News Monitor, 
2009). Apart from the listed reasons, the establishment of the ERIA was also 
influenced by a political agenda – Japan’s role in the international system. Before 
the establishment of the ERIA, Japan had significant influence in the ADB’s work, 
which has been criticised by major, non-regional shareholders and scholars (Dutt, 
1977, 2001; Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service, 2008a; Yatsutomo, 1983). 
Through the establishment of the ERIA, Japan was attempting to create a new 
channel by which it could support regional economic integration (Oxford Analytica 
Daily Brief Service, 2008b). Additionally, Oba Mie reiterates that Japan supported 
the establishment of the ERIA because it was seeking to simultaneously promote 
economic integration in East Asia and further expand its role in the region (Oba, 
2014, p. 63).  
Both government officials and the business community welcomed the 
establishment of the ERIA. For example, Surin emphasised that the intellectual role 
of the ERIA would contribute to regional co-operation with organisations and 
sustainable development in ASEAN, as well as Asia as a whole (BBC Monitoring 
Asia Pacific, 2008). It was also welcomed by the Japanese business community, 
which was evident in the meeting between Surin and Edano Yukio, Japan’s minister 
of METI, in September 2011. Surin praised the ERIA as an organisation that has 
helped ASEAN to conduct critical research, which informs new strategies for East 
Asian co-operation, facilitation, and liberalisation (Asia News Monitor, 2011). 
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Amari Akira, Minister of METI, Mitarai Fujio, Chairman of Japan Business 
Federation, and other political and business leaders stated that the ERIA would help 
the region to create the ‘world largest business space’ (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 
2008).  
One of the main supporters of the ERIA is Japan’s IDE-JETRO, which assists 
in the research activities of the ERIA, particularly those concerned with economic 
development in Asia and the development of the Japanese economy, by promoting 
strong collaboration between relevant organisations, including the METI. The ERIA 
aims to assist in the promotion of East Asia’s economic integration through survey 
analyses and policy proposals that target specific research areas such as deepening 
economic integration, narrowing development gaps, and sustainable development. 
However, since the ERIA was established under Japan’s initiative and has been 
managed with funds mostly provided by the Japanese government, its activities have 
been focused on enhancing the functionality of the EAS.  
The ERIA also has another advisory board called the ‘ Research Institute 
Network’  ( RIN) , which was established in 2010.  The RIN acts as a central 
mechanism that facilitates research networks and research institutes in the East Asian 
region.30 It aims to support the research activities of the ERIA by providing research 
findings on individual countries, consultations regarding ERIA's research themes, 
and policy recommendations.  Additionally, the RIN also helps to disseminate the 
ERIA’ s research findings to policymakers, opinion leaders, and politicians who 
might, to some extent, be associated with or involved in policy implementation. 
The ERIA has published many articles, research papers, and books on 
ASEAN’ s transport development, for example, The Comprehensive Asian 
 
30 The Australian National University (ANU), the Brunei Darussalam Institute of Policy and Strategic 
Studies (BDIPSS), the Cambodian Institute for Co-operation and Peace (CICP), the Chinese Academy 
of Social Science (CASS) , the Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS, 
India) , the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS, Indonesia) , IDE- JETRO, the Korea 
Institute for International Economic Policy ( KIEP) , the National Institute of Economic Research 
( NIER, Laos PDR) , the Institute Strategic International Studies ( ISIS, Malaysia) , the Yangon 
University of Economic (YUE) , the New Zealand Institute of Economic Research (NZIER) , the 
Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS) , the Singapore Institute of International Affairs 
(SIIA), the Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI) and the Central Institute for Economic 
Management (CIEM). 
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Development Plan ( CADP)  ( ERIA, 2010a) , and the Comprehensive Asia 
Development Plan 2.0 (CADP 2.0): Infrastructure for Connectivity and Innovation 
( ERIA, 2015a) .  The ERIA proposed the CADPs to the ASEAN Secretariat and 
anticipated that these plans would help the Secretariat and Southeast Asian 
governments to establish a common strategy for development of transport networks. 
ERIA staff members also worked with IDE- JETRO to develop an economic model 
to analyse the impact of transport development in Asia.  This economic simulation 
model is called ‘ IDE/ ERIA- Geographical Simulation Model ( GSM) ’  ( Kumagai, 
2010; Kumagai & Isono, 2011; Kumagai et al. , 2013)  and is utilised by the 
researchers who conducted research for, and implemented, the CADP.  
Nishimura Hidetoshi, the Executive Director of the ERIA, explained that 
ASEAN’ s ACCC had commissioned the ERIA to be a ‘ perennial supporter’ 
( Nishimura, 2014, p.  xii) , which is why the ERIA is engaged in ASEAN’ s MPAC 
and with regional connectivity.  Chapter 6 will provide further explanation and 
analysis of how ERIA intellectuals collaborate with intellectuals in IDE- JETRO, 
other research institutes, and international organisations in an effort to construct 
practical knowledge and cascade the ideas and norms of regional transport 
development to Southeast Asia.  
 
  5.4.2 IDE-JETRO 
IDE-JETRO is a Japanese research institute that emphasises area studies. The 
organisation has long been focused on conducting research in order to provide 
academic contributions to society. IDE-JETRO is located in Chiba prefecture, which 
is approximately 45 minutes away from Tokyo by train. The headquarters of IDE-
JETRO used to be in Tokyo, but due to governmental reformation, the IDE-JETRO 
headquarters moved to Chiba as part of the government’s 1988 plan to promote 
‘Multi-Polar National Land Reformation’.  
The fact that IDE-JETRO perceives itself as an academic-oriented institution 
was reiterated by other organisations. A JETRO staff member stated that the way 
IDE-JETRO works is much more academically-oriented compared to the JETRO 
research department itself, as JETRO is more business-oriented.31 A JETRO staff 
member additionally revealed that JETRO does not use IDE-JETRO’s research 
 
31 Interview, a staff of JETRO, Tokyo, Japan, 28 March 2016. 
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findings to support their work, as it is focused on very specific issues and does not 
reflect the needs of the business sector.32 A JETRO research department staff 
member explained that IDE-JETRO might contribute their research to the Japanese 
government, but not directly to JETRO for the above listed reasons.33 
The history of IDE-JETRO can be traced back to the 1960s. In the late 1950s, 
a semi-governmental body was established, called the ‘Institute of Developing 
Economies’ (IDE), which, during that period, focused on the economies of 
developing countries and contributed considerably to the development of area studies 
in Japan. In 1955, the Japanese cabinet decided to merge IDE with JETRO to better 
align with the government’s administrative reform programme. Since merging, IDE-
JETRO has conducted research based on both specific issues and broader 
development studies, meaning that the new reincarnation of IDE as IDE-JETRO has 
not changed its work or direction. IDE-JETRO also constructs linkages with many 
overseas institutions34 and, as a member of ERIA’s RIN, shares the same institutional 
connections with RIN’s research network. 
The research that IDE-JETRO conducts is divided into three main categories: 
(1) policy proposal research, (2) analytical research that contributes to policy 
proposals, and (3) basic, comprehensive research that informs the policy proposal 
research (IDE-JETRO, 2014). In comparison, the overall objective of JETRO is to 
help promote mutual trade and investment between Japan and the rest of the world. 
When field research was conducted in 2016, the president of IDE-JETRO was 
Shiraishi Takashi, who was also holding a position as Professor and President of the 
 
32 Interview, a staff of JETRO, Tokyo, Japan, 28 March 2016. 
33 Interview, a staff of JETRO, Tokyo, Japan, 29 March 2016. 
34 The Indonesian Institute of Science (LIPI) , the National Institute of Economic Research (NIER, 
Laos PDR) , the Research and Information System for Developing Countries ( RIS, India) , SOAS 
University, the Commerce Development Research Institute ( CDRI, Taiwan) , the University of 
International Business and Economics ( China) , the Institute of Agricultural Economics and 
Development (CASS, China), the Shanghai Academy of Social Science (SASS, China), the Institute 
of Sociology, Academia Sinica ( Taiwan) , the Centre of Excellence in Management, College of 
Business Administration ( Kuwait) , the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation 
(UNIDO, Austria) , the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies ( ISEAS, Singapore) , the El Colegio de 
Mexico (El Colegio, Mexico) , the Trade Research Institute, Korea International Trade Association 
(TRI-KITA, Korea). The Centre for International Forestry Research (CIFOR, Indonesia), the Korea 
Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP, Korea). 
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National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Japan. Now (2019), however, the 
president of IDE-JETRO is Fukao Kyoji, a professor in economics from Hitotsubashi 
University.  
 
Figure 12: IDE-JETRO’s Organisational Structure (2016) 
 









Figure 13: IDE-JETRO’s Organisational Structure (2019) 
 
Source: Website of IDE-JETRO, https://www.ide.go.jp/English/Info/Profile/chart.html (accessed 9 
February 2019) 
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 When we compare the organisational structures of IDE-JETRO from 2016 
(Figure 12) and 2019 (Figure 13), we can see that the research interests were changed 
in the Development Studies Centre and the Inter-Disciplinary Studies Centre. The 
former focuses on economic models and regional integration, while the latter added 
gender analysis and value chains to its themes. These changes reflect the institute’s 
research dynamics in which the research themes change according to regional and 
international trends.  
When I conducted field research in 2016, the research being conducted by 
IDE-JETRO at the time covered a wide range of geographical areas and topics. The 
institute divides area studies into four main areas, including Asia, the Middle East 
and Central Asia, Africa, and Latin America. IDE-JETRO categorises its research 
into four main topics, which are economics, society, politics, and law. The economics 
topic includes five subtopics, which are (1) intellectual property rights, (2) public 
finance, (3) microfinance, (4) international input-output analysis, and (5) spatial 
economics. The topic of society includes six subtopics, which are (1) education and 
human resources, (2) gender, (3) globalisation: culture and society, (4) social 
security, (5) poverty and inequality, and (6) health. The politics topic emphasises 
five subtopics, which are (1) African politics, (2) social movement, (3) political 
parties and elections, (4) conflict and peace building, and (5) democratisation. The 
last topic is law, which has only one subtopic: ‘law and institutions’. The research 
carried out by IDE-JETRO, then, likely has some overlap in themes and topics. 
IDE-JETRO also has platforms that facilitate research mobility, activities, 
and increase interaction between researchers and practitioners around the region. The 
first is the ‘Research Fellows’ programme that accepts researchers in area studies 
and development studies. The second channel is the ‘visiting research fellows’ 
(VRF) programme through IDEAS. Under the VRF programme, there are two groups 
of research. The first is the ‘IDE-Supported Fellowship Programme’ and the other is 
the ‘Self-Supporting Fellows Programme’ (IDE-JETRO, 2016). To be eligible for 
the VRF programme, applicants should have expertise in economics, law, and 
political and social issues that relate to developing countries or regions (IDE-JETRO, 
2016). The first important criterion for application is to be employed by a university, 
research institute, or the government in the applicant’s country (IDE-JETRO, 2016). 
Additionally, the applicant must also hold a PhD in a relevant filed, reflecting how 
IDE-JETRO endeavours to build a network with the applicants. This further implies 
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the high possibility that the applicant is associated with at least one academic 
institution in their home country. Through these programmes, IDE-JETRO not only 
diversifies their research, but also builds a network with different institutions in 
various countries. The VRF programme is an effective channel to bring newcomers 
into the research circle, also helping intellectuals to construct new connections or 
brush up on existing relations. The VRF programme additionally helps scholars to 
sustain these professional and institutional connections as the eligibility criteria are 
more suited to established intellectuals who already have strong research experience 
and connections with people or organisations in their home countries.  
IDE-JETRO’s method of developing its researchers is referred to as『三現主
義』or ‘sangenshugi’, literally translated as the ‘three existing doctrines’. However, 
‘sangenshugi’ is not a working style unique to IDE-JETRO. Rather, it is a philosophy 
of work that was developed by the Toyota Company. Other Japanese companies, 
including Honda, have also applied this philosophy. Sangenshugi stresses the 
importance of ‘genba’ (the actual place or frontline), ‘genbatsu’ (the actual elements 
and situation), and ‘genjitsu-teki’ (realistic) (Nonaka & Toyama, 2007, p. 385). This 
doctrine is the method by which IDE-JETRO prepares  its researchers’ career 
prospects and expertise through provision of at least two research experiences during 
their time at the institute.  
The first period begins when a new researcher – typically with a political 
science or area studies background – joins the Institute. In the case that the new 
researcher specialises in a particular country or area, the researcher would be sent to 
that country for two years, expecting that the researcher would obtain three important 
things: (1) local language skills, (2) local connections, and (3) local experiences. 
These elements cannot be achieved in the library or by conducting documentary 
research. These first-hand experiences can only be acquired in country, through real 
experiences and with local people. One IDE-JETRO staff member states that IDE 
emphasises ‘localism’ as a means by which the researcher is able to obtain in-depth 
knowledge by acquiring both the local language and local connections.35 IDE-
JETRO expects this first-hand experience to provide the researcher a comprehensive 
understanding of the local context and to establish informal and formal professional 
 
35 Interview, a staff of IDE-JETRO, Chiba, Japan, 29 March 2016 
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connections with local people. The second period begins when the researcher 
becomes a senior researcher. They are sent back to the country of study again for two 
years in order to maintain their connections and to expand their research 
opportunities. This allows researchers to maintain their official and professional 
connections, whilst also expanding upon them, and to maintain their local 
knowledge. This thesis mentioned that the research culture of IDE-JETRO is 
different from that of the ERIA and ADBI. However, this difference is 
understandable as the ERIA and ADBI employ a wide range of international 
intellectuals from around the world.  
Unlike the ERIA, IDE-JETRO is not directly involved in the work of the 
ASEAN Secretariat. As mentioned earlier, Kumagai Satoru, a staff member of IDE-
JETRO, worked with the ERIA to develop an economic simulation model called 
‘IDE/ERIA-GSM’. Meanwhile, Ishida Masami leads IDE-JETRO’s contributions to 
the development of transport networks in the GMS area. His works include 
Evaluating the Effectiveness of GMS Economic Corridors: Why is There More Focus 
on the Bangkok-Hanoi Road than the East-West Corridors (Ishida, 2007), GMS 
Economic Co-operation and Its Impact on CLMV Development (Ishida, 2008), Intra- 
and Inter-City Connectivity in the Mekong Region (Ishida, 2011), Emerging 
Economic Corridors in the Mekong Region (Ishida, 2012), Five Triangle Areas in 
the Greater Mekong Subregion (Ishida, 2013a), Border Economies in the Greater 
Mekong Subregion (Ishida, 2013b), and Economic Effects of Road Development and 
Its Challenges (Ishida, 2017).  
IDE-JETRO’s institutional network helps the institute to strengthen its 
connections with other regional institutes, as well as the professional connections 
between its researchers, Japanese officials, and Southeast Asian intellectuals. These 
connections help to disseminate IDE-JETRO’s ideas about regional transport 
development (e.g. research training and capacity-building programmes) to other 
regional actors.  
 
  5.4.3 ADBI 
The ADBI is a research institute affiliated with the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB). The history of the ADB can be traced back to the period of the Cold War 
when the US strongly supported the establishment of multilateral development banks 
(MDBs). Previous understandings of the ADB, then, have focused on the influence 
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of the US and the Japanese government (Dutt, 1977, 2001; Krasner, 1981; Yasutomo, 
1983). The relationship between the Japanese government and the ADB raises the 
question of Japan’s power to influence the ADB, as the two most significant financial 
contributors to the ADB have been Japan and the US, which gives them the most 
substantial voting powers in the organisation.  Moreover, the presidents of the ADB 
have only been Japanese since its establishment. These factors have raised the 
question of Japan’s influence in the organisation as both the financial and 
administrative powers are under the Japanese authority (Dutt, 1977, 2001; Krasner, 
1981; Yasutomo, 1983). 
The ADB was originally established in 1966, whereas the ADBI was founded 
in 1997. The objectives of the ADBI are to build capacity, skills, and knowledge 
related to poverty reduction and to conduct other supporting activities that will help 
enhance long-term growth and competitiveness in the Asia-Pacific region.  
The relations between the Japanese government and the ADB are still strong. 
Japan’s MOFA highlights the importance this relationship as a contribution to Asia’s 
sustainable development by prioritising the development of basic infrastructure, 
facilitation of investment in environmental policies, and capacity-building 
programmes. It is also stresses that such development could bring more international 
investors to Asia. Moreover, the national border should not be an obstacle for 
international trade anymore. Instead, ‘infrastructure beyond borders' should be 
constructed to facilitate regional co-operation and integration (MOFA, 2007). 
Another area that the Japanese government prioritises in their contribution to the 
ADB is energy efficiency. The Japanese government recognises the importance of 
supporting Southeast Asian countries to access and develop technologies that could 
help to reduce their CO2 emissions (MOFA, 2007).  
The ADBI organises annual meetings between various think tanks in Asia to 
share ideas regarding Asian development with its 26 member institutes.36 
 
36 ADBI, the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (BIDS) , the Brookings India, the Centre 
for Economic and Social Development (CESD, Azerbaijan) , the Centre for International Relations 
and Strategic Studies (CIRSS, the Philippines) , the Centre for Policy Dialogue ( CPD, Bangladesh) , 
the CFA Institute (Hong Kong), the Economic Policy and Competitiveness Research Centre (EPCRC, 
Mongolia), the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey, ERIA, the Foreign Service Institute 
for International Relations and Strategic Studies (FSICIRSS, the Philippines), the Indian Council for 
Research on International Economic Relations, the Institute for Integrated Development Studies 
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Nevertheless, only four Southeast Asian countries are members of this network, 
which are the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. While there are not 
many researchers in the organisation, the diversity of their nationalities is one of the 
ADBI’s strengths. The ADBI is composed of three main departments: (1) the 
research department, (2) the capacity-building programmes, and (3) the 
administration. The research department houses approximately 4-5 researchers who 
come from various countries. Their first contract is for three years and after that, the 
researcher can sign a second contract for two additional years. All researchers have 
academic backgrounds in economics. They are hired to conduct research on the 
year’s relevant themes and topics and are expected to take part in the capacity-
building programmes. 
 The ADBI contributes to the understanding of ASEAN’s regional 
connectivity through its research, publications, and capacity-building programmes. 
Its seminal works on Southeast Asian regional transport development include 
Infrastructure for Seamless Asia (ADB & ADBI, 2009), Connecting East Asia: A 
New Framework for Infrastructure (ADBI & JBIC, 2005), and Connecting South 
Asia and Southeast Asia (ADBI, 2015). These publications discuss why and how 
regional transport is important. For example, for the ADB, ADBI, and JBIC, regional 
transport development is one of the major determinants of economic integration 
(ADB & ADBI, 2009; ADB & JBIC, 2005; Vickerman, 2002b). 
 The ADBI’ s work is not only focused on hard infrastructure, but also pays 
attention to finance.  This could be because the Dean of the ADBI is a professor in 
economics; thereby, its research trends have been more focused on economic and 
financial issues.  For example, ADBI’ s Infrastructure Investment, Private Finance, 
and Institutional Investors:  Asia from a Global Perspective ( Inderst, 2016)  was 
utilised by ASEAN in the development of MPAC 2025 (ASEAN, 2016a, p. 47). 
 
(IIDS, Nepal), the Institute of Policy Studies of Sri Lanka, the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, the Korea 
Institute for International Economic Policy, the Lowy Institute for International Policy ( LIIP, 
Australia) , the National Centre for Socio-Economic Information and Forecast (NCIF, Vietnam) , the 
New Zealand Institute of Economic Research, the Philippine Institute for Development Studies, the 
Policy and Management Consulting Group (PMC, Georgia) , S.  Rajaratnam School of International 
Studies ( RSIS, Singapore) , the Sustainable Development Policy Institute ( SDPI, Pakistan) , the 
Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI), the Asian Foundation, and the TTCSP. 
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 Unlike the ERIA and IDE-JETRO’s research that contributed directly to the 
development of ASEAN’s MPAC, ADBI’s work focuses more on the vision of how 
Southeast Asian can physically link with South Asia, as seen in Connecting South 
Asia and Southeast Asia ( ADBI, 2015) .  Moreover, while the ADBI seeks to 
recommend ways in which Southeast Asia can make physical linkages with South 
Asia, it has not yet published any research that focuses on the linkages between 
Southeast and Northeast Asia.  This might be because in order to link Southeast and 
Northeast Asia, the route must physically pass through China.  That being said, the 
ADBI has likely focused its research on helping Southeast Asia to link with South 




 This chapter has explained the background of ASEAN’s MPAC, first 
initiated in 2010 and revised again in 2025. When the MPAC was being drafted, the 
Japanese government was eager to support ASEAN’s projects to physically link the 
region through construction of hard infrastructure. After MPAC 2010 was issued, the 
Japanese government established two main mechanisms, the Japanese Task Force 
and the Mission of Japan to ASEAN, to support ASEAN Connectivity. These 
engagements reflect the importance of Southeast Asia as a region where Japanese 
businesses have been based since the mid-1980s. Apart from their official 
contributions, the Japanese government also supports the work of the ERIA, IDE-
JETRO, and ADBI to construct knowledge of regional transport development and to 
disseminate it within Southeast Asian countries and the ASEAN Secretariat.  
 Chapter 3 discussed how business interests are one of the driving factors 
influencing the Japanese government position itself as a regional leader. Japan’s 
intellectual contributions are another example of how the Japanese government 
exercises its academic and financial powers in order to achieve this leading position. 
Chapter 6 will explain further how the norm entrepreneurs, including the MOFA, 
METI, JICA, ERIA, IDE-JETRO, ADBI, construct the knowledge of Southeast 










While Chapter 4 explored the post-World War II international environment 
that shaped relations between Japan and Southeast Asia, Chapter 5 focused on the 
history of the regional transport system networks in Southeast Asia within the scope 
of the ASEAN Secretariat’s work and Japan’s contributions. We have seen that since 
1945, official development assistance (ODA) was utilised by the Japanese 
government as a primary mechanism to reconcile economic and diplomatic relations 
with Southeast Asia. This is further reiterated by the fact that between 1960 and 2011, 
39.4 per cent of Japanese ODA was allocated to ASEAN member countries (JICA, 
2013, p. 11). Moreover, Japan-ASEAN economic and political relations have also 
been strengthened by the intellectual contributions of ‘international research 
organisations’ (IROs), including the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and 
East Asia (ERIA); the Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade 
Organisation (IDE-JETRO), and the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI). 
The Japanese government initiated and supported these organisations in order to 
promote economic development and regionalism in Northeast and Southeast 
Asia. This chapter will detail further how the IROs serve as channels for the Japanese 
government to spread ideas about Southeast Asian regional transport development 
and economic integration. Such IROs work with Japanese ministries and agencies to 
construct particular connectivity ideas (e.g. globalisation, free trade, mobilisation, 
trade liberalisation, and seamless logistics) and to disseminate this discourse through 
publication and research-related activities including seminars, meetings, 
conferences, and capacity-building programmes.  
This chapter will examine the process by which the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MOFA), the Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry (METI), the Ministry 
of Finance (MOF), the Japan International Co-operation Agency (JICA), the Japan 
External Trade Organisation (JETRO) work with the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI 
to construct norms and ideas. Therefore, this chapter aims to address the remaining 
three research questions, which are listed as follows: 
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4. What norms and ideas have the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI constructed 
about regional transport development and why? 
5. How were the norms and ideas about regional transport development 
constructed and how were they cascaded through professional and 
institutional connections? 
6. How were these norms and ideas internalised within domestic and regional 
transport development schemes in Southeast Asia? 
 
Utilising Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm lifecycle framework (1998) shown 
previously (see Chapter 3), this chapter will analyse how norms are constructed by 
examining the professional and institutional connections that help Japanese 
intellectuals and officials to form relationships. This analysis will also help to 
demonstrate how Japanese government agencies work with the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, 
and ADBI, and will reflect their perceptions of Southeast Asian transport 
development. An explanation will then be provided of norm entrepreneurs, including 
Japanese governmental agencies and IROs, their opinions regarding how the region 
should be developed, and how professional and institutional connections help to 
cascade the norms of Southeast Asian transport development.  
 The remainder of this chapter is divided into four sections. The first section 
will analyse the norm construction process, further investigating professional 
connections between intellectuals who work for the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI, 
as well as the linkages that strengthen their academic affiliations. This section will 
provide an overview of what norms the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI have 
constructed and why. In the second section, we will look at the norm cascade process 
by analysing the power of publication, research, training, and capacity-building 
programmes. Third, we will analyse the norm internalisation process by examining 
which norms and ideas as proposed by the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI are also 
stated in policy documents of ASEAN member countries or the ASEAN Secretariat. 






6.2 Norms Construction 
This section will begin by looking at the first stage of the framework — the 
norms construction process. We will look at how norm entrepreneurs, including the 
MOFA, METI, MOF, JICA, JETRO, ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI, interact with 
each other. An analysis will also be provided regarding what type of norms and ideas 
have been constructed about regional transport development.  
To support the full establishment of a regional transport system, Japan needs 
not only a plan that will create a common understanding of how regional 
infrastructure should be developed, but also the norms that will support the notion of 
such development. This section will look at how Japanese governmental agencies 
work to construct those norms. Chapters 2 and 3 have already reviewed the roles of 
actors that are involved in Japan’s foreign policy-making process, including 
governmental agencies, mass media, think tanks, the academic community, sub-state 
political authorities, pressure groups, NGOs, and social movements. These actors all 
reflect their perceptions, ideas, and policy-recommendations to the cabinet in order 
to participate in the formation of foreign policy.  
On the other hand, intellectual contributions come as the result of connections 
between individuals and institutions, as Haas (1992, p.3) proposes that intellectuals 
and epistemic communities are those that contribute their expertise to the public. 
However, as discussed in Chapter 2, the existing literature on Japan’s intellectuals 
does not provide much elaboration. Moreover, the literature on Japanese think tanks 
does not detail the relationships between intellectuals, researchers, and officials in 
Japan or their relationships with intellectuals outside Japan. The lack of 
understanding about the relationships between intellectuals and institutions is one 
gap that should be studied further. This section will, thereby, analyse how 
professional and institutional connections facilitate the emergence of norms and how 
such norms are embedded into ‘practical knowledge’. It will focus on two major 
platforms that are involved in the emergence of norms: (1) professional connections 
and (2) institutional connections.         
 
6.2.1 Professional Connections  
 The development of Southeast Asian transport system was due, in part, to the 
collaboration between many actors in various countries, including officials, 
intellectuals, JETRO, Japanese Chamber of Commerce (JCC), and NGOs. The 
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relationships between the Japanese officials and the intellectuals in IROs facilitate 
norm emergence as the involved intellectuals contribute their expertise and 
perspectives to the government officials. This section, then, will analyse how 
professional connections between officials and intellectuals support the construction 
of norms that become embedded in practical knowledge. 
The data obtained from field research shows that professional connections 
are mainly formed in four ways: (1) selection, (2) invitation, (3) recommendation, 
and (4) application. 
 
1. Selection:    The most common way that intellectuals join research activities 
is through selection.  Often, they are selected based on their position in their 
organisation, for example their status as a researcher, Director, or Dean of an 
institution . Their position justifies their engagement due to the requirements 
of the position itself; before they gained this position, they likely had to meet 
eligibility criteria, such as academic background or work experience. 
2. Invitation:  A group of people or individuals are invited to join the meetings 
based on their expertise and professional connections . They are also invited 
to join research projects and activities.  This helps not only to construct a 
network, but also to expand the connections between intellectuals and 
organisations. 
3. Recommendation : Recommendation is another unofficial channel to help 
introduce new intellectuals to one another. The newcomers are introduced by 
way of professional connections between intellectuals and officials.  
4. Application: Calls for applications can also be a channel that newcomers use . 
A new scholar can apply to join the team as a researcher, providing the 
newcomer with the opportunity to form professional connections with other 
experts and organisations. 
 
Out of these four methods of bringing like-minded intellectuals to join the 
research programmes, the most common are selection, invitation, and 
recommendation.37 Intellectuals are then accepted to the research programmes as 
they have personal connections or recommendations from colleagues in the team. 
 
37 Interview, ISEAS (1), Singapore, 18 April 2016; Interview, a staff of ThUni, 3 May 2016. 
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For example, IDE-JETRO established research networks with professors from 
Thammasat University’s business school38, ABAC University’s business school39, 
and with researchers from the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS)-Yusof 
Ishak Institute40. The application channel, nonetheless, is slightly different because 
the applicants likely have their own personal academic interests. The objective of 
accepting applicants, then, is the expectation of broadening their research networks. 
 
6.2.1.1 ERIA 
In the case of the ERIA, research staff members are selected, invited, and 
recommended. The organisational structure of the ERIA is divided into three main 
departments, which are (1) communication, publication, and outreach department, 
(2) research department, and (3) administration and personnel department. Every 
researcher in the ERIA’s research department is an economist. Under the research 
department, there is an energy research unit, which consists of four researchers 
whose expertise is energy economics. The research themes of the ERIA change 
almost every year.41  
The researchers who are involved in setting the research theme are three 
Japanese professors: Nishimura Hidetoshi, Kimura Fukunari, and Urata Shujiro. To 
analyse how intellectuals have influenced the research, we should examine the 
personal backgrounds of the Japanese researchers who determine the research 
agenda of the ERIA. When the field research for this study was conducted in 2016, 
the president (Nishimura Hidetoshi) and the leading researchers (Kimura Fukunari, 
and Urata Shujiro) of the ERIA were Japanese.42 They have strong academic 
backgrounds, experience of working in universities, and professional connections 
with many international organisations.  
Nishimura graduated from the Faculty of Law at the University of Tokyo and 
is now a Professor of Law. Before his assignment as president of the ERIA in 2008, 
he had served in many roles in various Japanese governmental agencies. The close 
 
38 Interview, a staff of ThUni, 9 May 2016. 
39 Interview, a staff of ThUni, 3 May 2016. 
40 Interview, a staff of ISEAS (1), Singapore, 18 April 2016. 
41 Interview, a staff of ERIA, Tokyo, Japan, 18 March 2016. 
42 He is still the President up until the present (February 2019). 
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connections between his professional background and his various official positions, 
led ASEAN member states to believe that his experience and connections would 
contribute to the work of the ERIA.  
Kimura is the Chief Economist at the ERIA. He received his PhD in 
economics from the University of Wisconsin-Madison, USA and is now a Professor 
of Economics at Keio University, Japan. His expertise covers a wide range of 
economic areas, such as international trade, development economics, economic 
growth theory, applied microeconomics, and Japan and Asian economies. Before 
joining the ERIA in 2008, he had worked with many organisations, including the 
Malaysian Institute of Economic Research (MIER), the Academia Sinica (Taiwan), 
and the World Bank.  
Urata is a Senior Research Advisor to the Present of the ERIA. He received 
his PhD in Economics from Stanford University, USA and is now a Professor of 
Economics at the Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies at Waseda University, 
Japan. Before joining the ERIA in 2009, he contributed research to organisations 
including the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI), the World 
Bank, and the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC.  
These three researchers were selected by METI based on their academic 
experience, expertise in economics, and experience working with international 
organisations, which could help the ERIA to build both professional and institutional 
connections. Their strong academic backgrounds and current work as professors in 
established and well-known universities further permit them to pursue professional 
connections with intellectuals, both Japanese and international. Furthermore, their 
positions facilitate the opportunity to meet intellectuals and organisations abroad. 
Nishimura, Kimura, and Urata’s professional contributions to the work of 
IROs can be seen in their engagement with Japan’s governmental agencies and in 
their many research-related activities. For example, Nishimura held positions in 
many Japanese organisations (ERIA, 2018a).43 The interview with an ERIA staff 
 
43 Including Representative of the Asia- Pacific Region of the Japan Overseas Development 
Corporation, Director of the Southeast Asia and Pacific Division of the Trade Policy Bureau, Vice 
Governor for International Affairs of Ehime Prefecture, Director-General of the Business Support 
Department of the Small and Medium Enterprises Agency, Executive Managing Director of the 
Japan- China Economic Association, and President of the Japan- China Northeast Development 
Association. 
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member also revealed that the professional connections between Nishimura and 
other officials are strong because Nishimura used to work with METI and therefore 
has close relationships with METI’s officials.44  
Kimura and Urata are both Professors in Economics and have worked with 
many research organisations, ministries, and international organisations. They 
contributed to the ERIA by utilising their professional connections with Japan’s 
governmental agencies to send staff members on joint research projects.45 Such 
connections have further expanded the ERIA’s research networks, both domestically 
and internationally.  
While individual professional connections are not detailed in published 
documents, reflections from researchers who have worked with particular 
individuals can reflect on their connections and on how certain professionals are 
linked. For example, in the field work for this study, a professor in Thailand 
explained that prior to the ERIA’s establishment, a group of ERIA researchers and 
administrative staff approached the interviewee about support from Thai 
universities.46 This shows that the ERIA has been utilising professional connections 
between ERIA researchers to develop both professional and institutional networks 
ever since its establishment. Two other Thai professors (Interviewees No.16, No.21) 
also shared a similar experience, that Urata and Kimura asked them to join a research 
project primarily because the interviewees had been members of previous research 
projects.47 A researcher from the Institute for Strategic and International Studies 
(ISIS) (Interviewee No.14) in Malaysia also shared that ‘Interviewee No.14’ joined 
a research project headed by Urata. Once the research was complete, the professional 
connection that ‘Interviewee No.14’ developed with Urata helped to expand their 
research networks.48 Meanwhile, a researcher from ISEAS-Yusof Ishak stated that 
Kimura used his connections to set the research trends in Southeast Asia.49 These 
reflections demonstrate that ERIA research networks have formed academic linkages 
between researchers and institutions.  
 
44 Interview, a staff of ERIA, Tokyo, Japan, 22 March 2016. 
45 Interview, a staff of ERIA, Tokyo, Japan, 22 March 2016.  
46 Interview, a staff of ThUni, 19 May 2016. 
47 Interview, a staff of ThUni, 3 May 2016; Interview, a staff of ThUni, 24 May 2016. 
48 Interview, a staff of ISIS Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 26 April 2016.  
49 Interview, a staff of ISEAS-Yusof Ishak, Singapore, 21 April 2016.  
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The concept of regional transport is supported by liberal economic ideas. The 
work of the ERIA on Southeast Asian regional transport is based on the ideas of 
economic liberalisation and trade facilitation. Economists like Nishimura, Kimura, 
and Urata have optimistic views and opinions about economic liberalisation. They 
believe that if the ERIA is able to help Southeast Asia to enjoy the benefits of 
liberalisation and facilitation, the region will gain significant economic 
opportunities.50 During interviews with Nishimura, Kimura, and Urata, one of them 
stated that the organisation must promote the concept of globalisation as ‘something 
good’ to Southeast Asian people, believing that the development of infrastructure, 
the elimination of poverty, and the access to financial assistance will benefit those in 
need.51 The ideas of economic liberalisation and trade facilitation are strongly 
supported by the ERIA’s research themes and trends as set by the three chief 
researchers. This can also be seen in the ERIA’s work, which emphasises the 
importance of trade facilitation and economic activities, as reflected in the 
‘Comprehensive Asia Development Plan’ (CADP) (see section 6.3.1.1 and 6.4.1). 
The way the three chief researchers of the ERIA perceive economic development 
trajectories is shared by economists and scholars throughout Southeast Asia. A Thai 
economist reflected that the staff members of the ERIA, particularly those who 
obtained a doctoral degree in economics, are optimistic and eager to promote the 
concepts of globalisation, free trade, mobilisation, and liberalisation as concepts to 
open channels for regional economic collaboration.52 Such reflections were also 
shared by a researcher of the MIER.53  
Nevertheless, Nishimura, Kimura, and Urata are cautious of the engagement 
of Japanese intellectuals in the ERIA’s work, as the image of the Japanese 
government having influence over the ERIA might lead to dissatisfaction amongst 
Southeast Asian countries.54 This is important because the work of Japanese 
researchers in the ERIA should not favour any certain country. Therefore, the level 
of engagement from Japanese researchers should be limited so that the research does 
 
50 Interview, a staff of ERIA, Tokyo, Japan, 18 March 2016. 
51 Interview, a staff of ERIA, Tokyo, Japan, 18 March 2016. 
52 Interview, a staff of ThUni, Bangkok, 13 May 2016. 
53 Interview, a staff of MIER, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 26 April 2016. 
54 Interview, a staff of ERIA, Tokyo, Japan, 18 March 2016; Interview, a staff of ERIA, Tokyo, 
Japan, 22 March 2016. 
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not seem biased toward Japan. During the field research, one of the three Japanese 
researchers, Interviewee No.5, shared their personal experience stating that if a 
Japanese representative was participating in an ASEAN meeting or conference, this 
often set an awkward and uncomfortable tone.55 Accordingly, in order to ease such 
tension, ‘Interviewee No.5’ decided not to attend the meeting at all. Instead, 
‘Interviewee No.5’ would assign an ERIA staff member, whose nationality is from 
an ASEAN member country, to participate in the meeting on behalf of the ERIA in 
an effort to avoid the perception that the ERIA is only represented by Japan.56 This 
further demonstrates that the ERIA’s Japanese staff members are aware of the impact 
that Japanese personnel holding roles in the ERIA may have, particularly as both the 
Director and the Head of the Research Department are all Japanese. The involvement 
and engagement of Japanese staff members in regional activities, thereby, must be 
politically correct.  
Professional connections help intellectuals to share and discuss ideas through 
their research-related activities. When Japanese researchers join an organisation, 
they help the ERIA to build professional connections with other researchers in the 
region, both by invitation and recommendation. The invitation for researchers from 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand to join research projects is 
encouraged, not only so that the ERIA can access local language resources, but also 
to build professional and institutional connections. Once professional connections 
are established, researchers will often recommend new intellectuals to ERIA-
supported networks and research projects in order to gain more connections 
throughout the region. For example, a university professor in Thailand, whose 
expertise is international and regional transportation and logistics, was invited to join 
a research team made up of people with similar expertise.57 Once the research was 
complete, the results were disseminated through various seminars, workshops, and 
conferences in Bangkok.58  
 
55 Interview, a staff of ERIA, Tokyo, Japan, 18 March 2016. 
56 Interview, a staff of ERIA, Tokyo, Japan, 18 March 2016. 
57 Interview, a staff of ThUni, 9 May 2016. 
58  I will not reveal the information of these activities because by doing so, it will identify the 
interviewee.  
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Whilst the ERIA utilised only invitation and recommendation, the 
researchers of IDE-JETRO contributed their expertise by selection, invitation, 
recommendation, and application. As IDE-JETRO is a research institute, there are 
many in-house researchers whose expertise are economics, development, and area 
studies. Like many other research institutes, IDE-JETRO accommodates both in-
house researchers and visiting researchers from around the world, providing research 
opportunities for intellectuals whose expertise include area studies and development 
studies. A staff member of IDE-JETRO restated the importance of personal 
connections by explaining that when researchers conduct research over a period of 
time, it develops the ‘personal connections’ between researchers, which helps them 
to further expand their connections for future research.59  
 
6.2.1.2 IDE-JETRO 
IDE-JETRO is different from the ERIA as IDE-JETRO has channels that 
allow for interested intellectuals to engage in its research. As explained in Chapter 
5, the first channel for doing so is the ‘Research Fellows’ programme and the second 
channel is the ‘visiting research fellows’ (VRF) programme through IDEAS. Under 
the VRF programme, there are two categories of research, including the ‘IDE-
Supported Fellowship Programme’ and the ‘Self-Supporting Fellow’s Programme’ 
(IDE-JETRO, 2016). Candidates for the VRF programme should have expertise in 
economics, law, and political and social issues that relate to developing countries or 
regions (IDE-JETRO, 2016). These two channels of engagement allow IDE-JETRO 
to utilise researchers from a broad range of disciplines to further contribute to its 
research activities. 
The comprehensiveness of IDE-JETRO’s research is reflected in its 
organisational structure (see Figure 13 in Chapter 5). IDE-JETRO houses many 
researchers in each research group, including people from various academic 
backgrounds with specialities in both economics and development studies. As IDE-
JETRO has broader research themes and provides opportunities for researchers both 
in Japan and abroad, its research has much wider coverage. Furthermore, IDE-
JETRO allows their researchers to build connections through two main methods, 
with individual intellectuals and with institutions (see Chapter 5). 
 
59 Interview, a staff of IDE-JETRO, Chiba, Japan, 9 February 2016.  
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One researcher at IDE-JETRO, Ishida Masami, contributes considerably to 
the development of Southeast Asian transport. Ishida joined IDE in 1993 with 
expertise on the Indonesian economy.60 His interest in the GMS area started in 2000 
when he was assigned by the Institute to conduct research on that particular region. 
He published and edited publications about GMS studies, particularly on the topic of 
regional transport (inter alia, Ishida 2007, 2008, 2011, 2012, 2013a, 2013b). While 
he was conducting research in the GMS area, he made broad connections with 
intellectuals and officials, including various persons at Thai, Cambodian, and 
Vietnamese universities,61 and brought together intellectuals from other countries to 
conduct field research for data collection.62 Moreover, Ishida’s research, 
publications, and analyses provided information about the development of the GMS 
to officials and intellectuals throughout Southeast Asia via the IDE-JETRO online 
system, research seminars, and conferences. Ishida also contributed his professional 
connections to IDE-JETRO. One interviewee – who is a Thai university professor 
(Interviewee No.16), was introduced by Ruth Banomyong, a professor in 
international transport at Thammasat Business School – to join Ishida’s research 
project.63 After that, ‘Interviewee No.16’ gained the opportunity to expand research 
connections into many projects with Ishida.64 ‘Interviewee No.16’ stated that Ishida 
expected to make connections with local researchers in order to access local language 
publications and translate interviews.65 In 2019, IDE-JETRO appointed Ishida as 
Director General for the ERIA Support Office, which is based in IDE-JETRO’s 
headquarters. This reflects that IDE-JETRO recognises that Ishida’s expertise and 
professional connections will strengthen the institutional connections between IDE-
JETRO, the ERIA, and other research and government agencies in Southeast Asia.  
IDE-JETRO professional connections are also initiated by ex-researchers. A 
staff member of IDE-JETRO stated that even when researchers quit or retire from 
 
60 Interview, a staff of IDE-JETRO, Chiba, Japan, 18 February 2016. 
61 Interview, a staff of IDE-JETRO, Chiba, Japan, 18 February 2016. 
62 Interview, a staff of IDE-JETRO, Chiba, Japan, 18 February 2016; Interview, a staff of ThUni, 9 
May 2016; Interview, a staff of ThUni, 3 May 2016. 
63 Interview, a staff of ThUni, 3 May 2016. 
64 Interview, a staff of ThUni, 3 May 2016.  
65 Interview, a staff of ThUni, 3 May 2016. 
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IDE-JETRO, they were sometimes still asked to join research projects. This helps 
IDE-JETRO to maintain professional connections between institutions.66  
 
6.2.1.3 ADBI  
ADBI connects intellectuals through selection, invitation, recommendation, 
and application. ADBI is located in Tokyo, far away from the ADB headquarters in 
Manila, Philippines. ADBI mostly employs in-house researchers whose expertise are 
in economics. Researchers who work at ADBI have various academic backgrounds, 
but focus primarily on economics. In-house researchers work on the institute’s 
designated research themes, both individually and as part of a team with other 
international researchers.  
Although ADBI has a wide range of researchers, the most prominent 
intellectual who leads the institution in establishing connections and research impact 
is the ‘Dean’. When I conducted field research in 2016, the Dean of ADBI was 
Yoshino Naoyuki, a professor of economics at Keio University, Japan.67 He was 
appointed by MOFA to supervise ADBI. Yoshino helped ADBI to connect with other 
research institutes in the region while also representing the organisation in the media. 
Moreover, the director of the administrative department of ADBI is also 
recommended by Japan’s MOFA. The close relationship between the Dean and 
Japan’s government officials builds institutional connections with other Japanese 
ministries. 
Professional connections between intellectuals in IROs are formed through 
different channels and methods. After connections are initially established, 
professional networks with governmental officials and other institutional 
connections are consequently developed. In the next section we will look at 
institutional connections and try to comprehend how IROs and intellectuals 






66 Interview, a staff of IDE-JETRO, Chiba, Japan, 9 February 2016.  
67 Yoshino Naoyuki remains President as of January 2019. 
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 6.2.2 Institutional Connections 
Professional connections provide a platform to develop linkages between 
intellectuals and officials, as well as between intellectuals and other institutions. 
Such connections work within and between institutions. Many intellectuals from the 
ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI also engage in regional institutional platforms, which 
were established in order to develop a regional transport network. There are various 
regional institutional platforms through which professionals and intellectuals can 
work closely together on important issues. Institutional connections can be 
categorised into two platforms: 
 
1. Southeast Asian Platforms: These platforms facilitate the bilateral and 
multilateral relations between ASEAN and its dialogue partners to further 
regional transport development. They include economic and political 
platforms where intellectuals can present their research and propose policy 
recommendations to officials. 
2. IROs Platforms: IROs are ‘intellectual’ platforms through which intellectuals 
can discuss research that supports regional transport development. The 
ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI provide institutional support for research 
activities and report the findings to policymakers. 
 
This section will analyse which institutions are involved in the process of 
constructing norms and how these institutions, as norm entrepreneurs, help IROs to 
create practical knowledge that is embedded with the created norms. It will also 
describe how relations between the Japanese government and intellectuals were 
formed. 
 
6.2.2.1 Southeast Asian Platforms 
Southeast Asian platforms introduce norms into the discussion by receiving 
and utilising the research results of the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI. Section 6.3 
will further detail how such platforms integrate the work of these three IROs into 
their policy and research. 
Many regional platforms support Southeast Asian transport development. 
The ASEAN Secretariat plays a significant role at the regional level, supporting 
dialogue such as the ASEAN Transport Ministers (ATM) Meeting. As Chapter 5 has 
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explained, Japan engaged in the development of Southeast Asian transport through 
the ASEAN-Japan Transport Ministers Meeting before the establishment of MPAC. 
The first meeting was held in Yangon, Myanmar in 2003 and included participants 
from the Ministries of Transport and Ministries of Communications in ASEAN 
member countries, whilst Tsuruho Yousuke, Parliamentary Secretary for MLIT, 
represented Japan.68 The meeting discussed the transport system, shipping, and 
collaboration on human resource development (ASEAN, 2003). Following this 
meeting, it was decided that the ASEAN-Japan Transport Partnership Information 
Centre (AJTP Information Centre) would be established at MLIT in Japan. The 
ATM-Japan meetings focus on five main areas: (1) transport facilitation, (2) air 
transport, (3) maritime transport, (4) land transport, and (5) other areas, such as the 
Transport Policy Officials Training in Japan and the Transport Information Platform 
Project. Through their emphasis on practical issues of regional transport, logistics 
and transport safety, and transport security, many schemes have been initiated to 
address security issues. Some such schemes include the ‘ASEAN-Japan Transport 
Logistics Improvement Plan’, the ‘ASEAN-Japan Ministerial Declaration on 
Transport Security’, and the ‘ASEAN-Japan Regional Road Map for Aviation 
Security’. A significant milestone of these meetings was at the 2008 meeting in the 
Philippines where the participants agreed to initiate the ‘Manila Action Plan for the 
ASEAN-Japan Transport Partnership’ (AJTP) (2009-2013), which aims to advance 
regional economic integration by promoting transport logistics, safety and security, 
environmental regulations, and common infrastructure (AJTP, 2008, p. 1).  
At the 2010 meeting in Brunei it was determined that a ‘Public-Private Join 
Forum’ would be held the following year in response to the increasing importance 
of economic activities and globalisation in the region. At the 10th ATM-Japan 
meeting in Indonesia, MPAC was mentioned for the first time when the Japanese 
government’s engagement and contribution to ASEAN’s MPAC was recognised 
(AJTP, 2012, p. 1). Additionally, Japan’s contributions to the promotion of ‘quality 
transport’ were also welcomed (AJTP, 2012, p. 2). From the examples provided here, 
 
68 In 2019 there were three Parliamentary Secretaries, including Nagayasu Takashi, Fujimoto Yuji, 
and Tsugawa Shougo.  They are associated with the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and 
Tourism (MLIT).  
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we can see that Japan’s governmental agencies engage in ASEAN Connectivity 
schemes in various ways.  
Another main regional platform is the ‘ASEAN Coordinating Committee on 
ASEAN Connectivity’ (ACCC), which was established at the 17th ASEAN Summit 
in 2010 and held its first meeting in April 2011. The ACCC is composed of appointed 
representatives from ASEAN countries and the Permanent Representative to 
ASEAN. The chairman of the ACCC is the same as the chairman of ASEAN. It was 
expected that the ACCC would support and promote the objectives of ASEAN’s 
MPAC, including (1) promote economic growth, (2) narrow development gaps, (3) 
enhance ASEAN integration and community building process, (4) enhance 
competitiveness of ASEAN, (5) promote more profound social and cultural 
understanding and mobility of people, and (6) connect ASEAN member states 
together and with the rest of the world (ASEAN Coordinating Council, 2011, p. 1). 
The ACCC monitors, evaluates, and reviews the implementation of MPAC 
objectives, ensuring that projects and arrangements in different countries are relevant 
to and align with the MPAC.  
Moreover, the ACCC should be able to identify issues and challenges that the 
MPAC might confront. It then makes the appropriate recommendations to the 
ASEAN Summit through the ASEAN Coordinating Council. Furthermore, the 
ACCC is responsible for determining new strategies that will promote and strengthen 
connectivity between ASEAN and other regions (ASEAN Coordinating Council, 
2011, pp. 1-2).  
The ACCC is responsible for writing reports that then are submitted to the 
ASEAN Coordinating Council meeting. The Council will then consult with the 
ASEAN Political-Security Community Council, the ASEAN Economic Community 
Council, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community, to draft recommendations for 
the ASEAN Summit (ASEAN Coordinating Council, 2011, p. 2). Additionally, there 
are other organisations that are sometimes invited to join the activities of the ACCC, 
such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB), World Bank, ERIA, the United Nations 
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), the private 
sector, and representatives of dialogue partners (ASEAN Coordinating Council, 
2011, p. 3). The ACCC works with the ERIA and other regional organisations to 
facilitate the ASEAN Connectivity Symposium, which is another crucial meeting. 
The Symposium was first started in 2011, one year after the implementation of 
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ASEAN’s MPAC in 2010. It is organised by the ACCC, ERIA, ASEAN-Australia 
Development Co-operation Programme (AADCP), ASEAN Secretariat, and the 
country Chairs of ASEAN. The ASEAN Connectivity Symposium is an annual 
platform that aims to bring relevant stakeholders together to discuss issues related to 
Southeast Asian transport. ERIA anticipated that the outcomes of the symposium 
will be reflected in the work of ASEAN’s connectivity scheme. The symposium 
focuses on various issues, such as cross-sector coordination, national implementation 
of regional initiatives, mobilisation of infrastructure finance, and monitoring and 
evaluation. The ACCC’s recommendations are based on the issues of infrastructure 
development, the implementation and enforcement of laws and regulations, and the 
dissemination of specific technical workshops. In this respect, we can see that the 
ERIA engages with officials, providing ERIA researchers with opportunities to 
present their research results, opinions, and policy-recommendations directly to the 
regional platform, which focuses on the development of regional connectivity.  
 As we have seen thus far, the regional platforms were established to help 
Southeast Asian governments address challenges related to regional connectivity. 
Japan’s MLIT and its contributions to the ASEAN Connectivity development 
scheme have facilitated Japan’s engagement in various platforms. These platforms 
have significantly contributed to the development of regional connectivity as they 
provide a space for governments to discuss and plan together. Nonetheless, the 
Japanese government established IROs in order to help facilitate the creation of 
norms and ideas to ‘frame’ the direction of regional development and its trajectories. 
The next section will provide a deeper look into these ‘intellectual platforms’.   
 
  6.2.2.2 IROs Platforms 
The ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI have provided platforms for intellectuals 
and officials to discuss issues and challenges related to regional transport 
development. They provide opportunities to researchers from throughout the region 
to conduct research for their projects or positions from within the organisations. Each 
organisation has a research department that determines the specific themes and issues 
to focus on each year. They also provide opportunities to gain research experience 





The ERIA contributes its expertise through collaboration with other research 
organisations and researchers throughout the region. The ERIA’s studies have filled 
the gap left by the ASEAN Secretariat as the Secretariat has approximately 300 staff 
members in total, which is inadequate not only to operate its routine work covering 
ten countries, but also to operate research-related activities.69 In this respect, 
according to the opinion of the METI official, the ERIA has done its job very well 
and has satisfied those involved in the work of ASEAN and the EAS because it has 
helped METI to obtain information and conduct analyses that support METI’s 
policy-making process.70 While, the ERIA is recognised for its policy-oriented 
research that contributes to the EAS, some researchers in Southeast Asia recognise 
the ERIA as an academic-oriented research organisation rather than a policy-oriented 
one. 
Moreover, the ERIA also has ‘advisors’ who are selected by the METI, which 
reflects the close relationship between the METI and the ERIA. The advisors are 
typically staff members of private Japanese companies who are contracted with the 
ERIA for two years. During the field research in 2016, one ERIA staff member 
(Interviewee No.9) revealed that the advisors were from Sojitz Corporation, Japan 
Railway (JR), EHIME Bank, and Nippon Electric Corporation (NEC Corporation).71  
They were assigned by the METI to advise the ERIA, as well as to provide 
recommendations. Sojitz Corporation was assigned to help with economics and 
trade, JR focused on infrastructure development, EHIME Bank focused on finance, 
and NEC Corporation focused on IT infrastructure. ‘Interviewee No.9’ explained 
that before 2016, the selected companies were Hitachi, Mizuho Bank, and Nippon 
Life Insurance.72 They helped the ERIA to prepare the CADP. This also reflects how 
the Japanese government helps Japanese companies to have a role in the decision-
making process and development planning by providing opportunities for big 
Japanese companies to participate in the ERIA. 
 
69 Interview, a staff of ERIA, Tokyo, Japan, 18 March 2016. 
70 Interview, a staff of METI, Tokyo, Japan, 25 March 2016. 
71 Interview, a staff of ERIA, Jakarta, Indonesia, 5 April 2016.  
72 Interview, a staff of ERIA, Jakarta, Indonesia, 5 April 2016.  
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Furthermore, the ERIA builds connections between institutions through its 
‘Research Institute Network’ (RIN) and ‘Energy Institute Network’. The RIN formed 
institutional connections with various institutes in 15 countries. The norms that RIN 
supports can be seen in its official statements. For example, in the RIN’s first 
statement, which was issued in January 2012, it emphasises the importance of “fair, 
reasonable, and non-discriminatory” as the norms that should be advanced in the 
region (ERIA RIN, 2012a, p. 18). However, although RIN has issued six statements, 
only the first statement explicitly uses the word ‘norm’. The following statements 
did not explicitly use the word ‘norm’. Nevertheless, the ideas of regional economic 
and trade support are still mentioned as follows: 
 
• Facilitation, deregulation, and liberalisation (ERIA RIN, 2012b, p. 2, 2013, 
p. 13, 2014, 2015) 
• Connectivity (ERIA RIN, 2012b, p. 2, 2013, p. 18, 2014, 2015, 2017, p. 3) 
• Infrastructure connection (ERIA RIN, 2015, p. 4) 
• People-to-people (ERIA RIN, 2012b, p. 2) 
• People-oriented, People-Centred (ERIA RIN, 2017, p. 3) 
• Utilisation, protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights (ERIA 
RIN, 2012b, p. 2, 2014). 
 
The norms and ideas of regional connectivity are used widely throughout the 
ERIA’s work. These are further translated into policy recommendations and 
‘cascaded’ through research studies and research-related activities, a process that will 
be discussed more in the latter part of this chapter.  
 
  6.2.2.2.2 IDE-JETRO 
IDE-JETRO provides intellectuals with a space to construct both institutional 
and professional connections. Professional connections are constructed through the 
support of field-research. At the same time, IDE-JETRO also facilitates institutional 
connections through its research networks, comprised of three schemes, including: 
• The Research Networks and Partnership / Joint Organised Events 
(Symposium, Seminars) 
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• The Visiting Research Fellow Programme / Other Programmes of 
Acceptance 
• The Research Fellows Sent Abroad 
 
These schemes are managed by different departments of IDE-JETRO. The 
first scheme is managed by the Institutional Co-operation and Networking Division, 
the second scheme is managed by the International Exchange and Training 
Department, and the third scheme is managed by the Research Personnel Division. 
This demonstrates that IDE-JETRO has mechanisms that can support both 
professional and institutional levels.  
 The norms and ideas related to Southeast Asian transport development can 
be determined from IDE-JETRO’s research seminars and networks. For example, 
the policy recommendation seminar, “Logistics Cost in Lao PDR”, which was jointly 
organised by IDE-JETRO and the National Institute of Economic Research (NIER, 
Lao PDR), presented many ideas and norms that could help the Laos government to 
achieve the regional transport development objectives, such as logistic conditions 
(IDE-JETRO, 2017) and road improvements (Ishida, 2017). At the seminar, the 
norms and ideas regarding road improvements were the main supporting factors that 
could facilitate an increase in economic activities and living standards for the local 
people (IDE-JETRO, 2017, p. 36).  
 
  6.2.2.2.3 ADBI 
 ADBI also has institutional networks, such as the Asian Think Tanks 
Secretariat (hereafter, Think-Asia), which is an initiative of ADBI and the Think 
Tanks and Civil Society Programme (TTCSP). One of the research themes that 
Think-Asia focuses on is infrastructure development. ADBI recognises 
infrastructure development as one of the main priorities for regional co-operation as 
it facilitates regional connectivity. However, unlike the norms that the ERIA and 
IDE-JETRO emphasise, ADBI focuses primarily on financial issues.  
Think-Asia helps its member institutes to conduct a significant amount of 
research that seeks to provide policy recommendations to Southeast Asian 
governments. Think-Asia’s research focuses on some ideas and norms related to 
regional transport development, such as connectivity, transport infrastructure 
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development, sustainable infrastructure, and financing infrastructure 
(Bhattacharyay, et al., 2012; Rillo & Ali, 2017). The most significant regional 
financial issues proposed by Think-Asia evolved into the question of how the region 
could find sufficient financial sources to support such development. Accordingly, 
ADBI collaborates with other Asian think tanks and IROs to conduct research in an 
effort to determine ways that each country, and the region as a whole, can implement 
appropriate solutions. 
ADBI also has institutional connections with various institutes, such as the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Japan Bank for International Co-operation 
(JBIC). ADBI established research connections with ADB and JBIC to further study 
how Southeast Asia should develop its infrastructure and to seek financial support 
for the facilitation of its construction. They released three important publications that 
outline their recommendations for Southeast Asia, including Infrastructure for 
Seamless Asia (ADB & ADBI, 2009), Connecting South Asia and Southeast Asia 
(ADBI, 2015), and Connecting East Asia: A New Framework for Infrastructure 
(ADB & JBIC, 2016). These studies emphasise the importance of PPP, as they argue 
that PPP can support regional infrastructure facilities and that it is a fundamental 
element of infrastructure investment (ADB & ADBI, 2009, p. 159; ADBI, 2015, Ch. 
1). 
 Hitherto, this chapter has introduced norm entrepreneurs and how they 
initiate the ideas and norms related to regional transport development. It then studied 
the relevant actors and the ideas or norms proposed by intellectuals and organisations 
through document analysis and field interviews. The results found that the ideas and 
norms regarding Southeast Asian regional transport development pertain to five main 
issues, as follows:  
 
1. The ideas of infrastructure development are emphasised as the ERIA, IDE-
JETRO, and ADBI focus much of their work on supporting infrastructure 
development, whilst maintaining the notion of sustainable development 
within their framework (Bhattacharyay, et al., 2012; ERIA RIN, 2012b; Rillo 
& Ali, 2017; ERIA, 2010a, 2015a). Additionally, the ERIA, IDE-JETRO and 
ADBI also focus on financial issues, particularly ADBI (ADB & ADB, 2009; 
ADBI, 2015; ADBI & JBIC, 2005; ERIA, 2010a, 2015a; IDE-JETRO, 2017; 
Zen, 2014). In doing so, ADBI emphasises PPP as a sustainable way to 
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facilitate regional development through collaboration between public and 
private sectors (ADB & ADBI, 2009; ADBI, 2015; ADBI & JBIC, 2016). 
2. The spatial and connectivity norms are based on the ideas of the movement 
of goods, services and people, including globalisation, seamlessness, 
connectivity, mobilisation, and common infrastructure (ADB & ADBI, 2009; 
ERIA, 2010a, 2015a; Ishida, 2012). These norms play a significant role in 
the perception of how the movement of goods, services, and people should 
be structured by focusing on the concept of connection without any barriers 
(or ‘seamless’ connection) as facilitated by the power of economic 
globalisation (ADB & ADBI, 2009). The ERIA’s CADP is an example of 
how the ERIA frames regional transport development schemes by 
recommending that the region should link together through the development 
of hard infrastructure, whilst synchronising and improving soft infrastructure 
(ERIA, 2010a, 2015).  
3. The norms of economic activities are also significant elements that help 
regional transport development as these norms establish common practices 
based on how the region should think of its objectives. For example, transport 
development should support economic growth (ERIA, 2015, p. 21), narrow 
the economic and development gaps (ERIA, 2015, p. 1), enhance regional 
integration and liberalisation, increase trade facilitation and competitiveness, 
and open the markets (ASEAN Coordinating Council, 2011). These 
fundamental concepts of the liberal economic market are also seen in the 
ideas presented by the ERIA’s intellectuals who support economic 
globalisation. Nevertheless, Chapter 3 has pointed out that unlike other 
hegemons, while Japan does play a leading intellectual role, it is not trying to 
construct an economic ‘regime’. Rather, the Japanese government is seeking 
a leading role in the region through contribution of its intellectual power. 
Thereby, the work of the MOFA, METI, MOF, JICA, ERIA, IDE-JETRO 
and ADBI help the Japanese government to construct practical knowledge, 
which is focused on practical recommendations rather than the construction 
of economic or political regimes. 
4. The norms of knowledge sharing help to maintain the existing knowledge of 
IROs and cascade it to other agents in the region (ADB & ADBI, 2009, p. 
123; ADBI, 2015, p. 5; ERIA, 2015, p. 69). This further helps the ERIA, IDE-
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JETRO and ADBI to cascade their practical knowledge to other receivers. It 
also establishes the value of knowledge, which justifies the expertise of the 
ERIA, IDE-JETRO and ADBI because it highlights the intellectual power of 
research-based recommendations.  
5. Finally, environmental protection and sustainable development norms are 
also important because, apart from economic development, these norms 
encourage the region to take environmental issues seriously (ADB & ADBI, 
2009, p. 22; ERIA, 2015, p. 60). 
 
The next two sections will elaborate further on how the ERIA, IDE-JETRO 
and ADBI have cascaded their ideas and norms through publications and research-
related activities.  
 
 
6.3 Norms Cascade 
 
As the Japanese government supports the ERIA, IDE-JETRO and ADBI to 
conduct research on ASEAN connectivity, it is important to examine how regional 
organisations receive the practical knowledge that is embedded in the norms related 
to regional transport. Norms cascade is the process by which ideas and norms are 
disseminated through various channels and platforms. Prior to the first MPAC in 
2010, there was no masterplan to guide how Southeast Asian regional transport 
should be. This emphasises the role of IROs in establishing regional transport 
development norms by which regional strategies are formed. 
The ERIA, ADBI and IDE-JETRO cascade the norms of regional transport 
development in similar ways. They utilise mechanisms that allow the norms to be 
presented to other countries. Such mechanisms include: 
 
• Research and Publication: Research and publications are the most important 
methods utilised by IROs to disseminate their ideas  .Research findings, 
arguments, theories, and policy recommendations are proposed in an 
academic fashion, further justifying their credibility. 
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• Training and Capacity-Building Programmes: Two more fundamental and 
influential methods of disseminating ideas are training and capacity-building 
programmes.  Through such programmes, participants obtain significant 
information by engaging in research -related activities, such as seminars, 
conferences, and workshops. 
 
This section will analyse how the research and publications of the ERIA, 
IDE-JETRO and ADBI disseminate the norms of regional transport development. It 
endeavours to identify the norms in the publications by first examining the ideas and 
norms related to regional transport. It also looks at how research and publications are 
disseminated, used, and interpreted. This will help us to understand how the IROs, 
as norm entrepreneurs, construct the practical knowledge that is embedded within 
those norms. 
 
6.3.1 Research and Publication 
Research is the most important factor, as it guides the other relevant 
activities, including publications, seminars, conferences, and capacity-building 
programmes. Research and publications play their role not only in providing policy 
recommendations, but also in outlining the narrative of how the region should be 
developed. Research and publications also influence the research of others, as 
intellectuals around the world conduct research using the Internet as a main resource 
to obtain information such as news, analyses, and academic peer-reviewed journals. 
The Internet significantly supports the current academic world with many free 
resources that are easily accessible. Intellectuals can access full research articles, 
reports, and executive summaries for free and without leaving home. Many 
organisations have started to post their research on their websites, which facilitates 
access on a global level.  
The research conducted by the ERIA, IDE-JETRO and ADBI are also 
embedded with ideas and norms. Chapter 3 pointed out that what the ERIA, IDE-
JETRO and ADBI have constructed and disseminated should be called ‘practical 
knowledge’. This ‘practical knowledge’ is a set of explanations of practical issues 
that serve as a guide to other countries or organisations. In this section, we will 




For the ERIA, the research that has the most significant impact on ASEAN’s 
regional transport development is CADP. As explained in Chapter 5, CADP 
recommends how the region should develop its infrastructure and regulations, 
focusing on basic infrastructure development, regional transport systems, and 
industries. CADP anticipated that coordinated development would improve 
economic development in both ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA, 2015, p. 1). It 
emphasises that the development of regional transport networks in Southeast Asia is 
crucial because they will help to construct and improve the regional production 
network (ERIA, 2015, p. 8). CADP states that if the regional transport system is 
constructed comprehensively, it could help to develop the region’s economies, 
reduce the economic gap, and increase the region’s global competitiveness (ERIA, 
2015, p. 8.). Additionally, if the Southeast Asian transport network can link with 
other regions, such as South Asia, it will undoubtedly boost the region’s economy. 
The regional impacts of CADP will be analysed in Section 6.4.1. 
The ERIA separates its transport-related research themes into two 
subcategories. The first is ‘connectivity’ and the second is ‘infrastructure’. Some 
ideas and norms related to regional connectivity can be seen in various publications, 
such as:  
 
1. Resilience connectivity (Shibasaki et al., 2018) 
2. E-Commerce (Chen, 2017; Kimura & Chen, 2017) 
3. Financing connectivity (Zen & Regan, 2014) 
 
When we compare a larger number of studies, however, it appears there are 
significant differences between the research that focuses on connectivity and that 
which focuses on infrastructure. The former has approximately 20 research studies, 
whilst the latter has around 58 research studies. Additionally, not every study within 
these two themes is related to Southeast Asia; instead, some studies compare 
Southeast Asia to Africa or to South Asia, such as: 
 
1. Asia Africa Growth Corridor: Development Co-operation and Connectivity 
in the Indo-Pacific (Prakash, 2018b) 
2. ASEM Connectivity Inventory (Okano-Heijmans et al., 2018) 
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3. Balancing Investment and Development Assistance in Africa: Growth 
Prospects from Asia-Africa Connectivity (Prakash, 2018a) 
4. Asia Africa Growth Corridor: Partnership for Sustainable and Innovative 
Development (This research is a collaboration between ERIA, IDE-JETRO 
and RIS.)  
 
Although the ERIA has many research themes and while there are more than 
200 studies on ASEAN, the research that receives significant interest from the ERIA 
is CADP. This can easily be seen from the ERIA’s official website, where there is a 
specific banner dedicated to CADP. Additionally, CADP has been constantly 
mentioned by the ERIA in its statements and publications as related to its research 




IDE-JETRO anticipates that its research would help the Japanese government 
to form its foreign policies with other countries and its policies concerning regional 
co-operation. The research conducted by this institute is, therefore, for both academic 
and public purposes.  
Compared to the ERIA’s CADP, IDE-JETRO does not have any particular 
research that is primarily focused on Southeast Asian transport development. Instead, 
IDE-JETRO’s most significant contribution to Southeast Asian transport 
development is its geographical simulation model called ‘IDE/ERIA-GSM’, 
developed by Kumagai Satoru and staff members of the ERIA (Kumagai, 2010; 
Kumagai & Isono, 2011; Kumagai et al., 2013). The model is “designed to predict 
the effects of the regional economic integration, especially the development of 
transport, infrastructure and reduction in border costs” (Kumagai et al., 2008, p. 361). 
The IDE/ERIA-GSM model was utilised by the ASEAN Secretariat to support the 
drafting of the ERIA’s CADP (ERIA, 2015a, pp. 183-184) and to support research 
on physical connectivity and infrastructure development between ASEAN and other 
regions. Such studies include The Comprehensive Asia Development Plan (2010a) 
and ASEAN-India Connectivity: The Comprehensive Asia Development Plan, Phase 
II (Kimura & Umezaki, 2011). 
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IDE-JETRO’s work on ASEAN Connectivity focuses mainly on the GMS 
area. As mentioned in the section about professional connections, Ishida and other 
researchers have contributed greatly to the studies of economic corridors and trade 
and investment in the GMS area. Some examples of IDE-JETRO’s publications that 
focus on the GMS are: 
 
1. GMS Economic Co-operation and Its Impact on CLMV Development 
(Ishida, 2008) 
2. Economic Impacts of the Economic Corridor Development in the Mekong 
Region (Isono, 2010) 
3. Intra- and Inter-City Connectivity in the Mekong Region (Ishida, 2011) 
4. Emerging Economic Corridors in the Mekong Region (Ishida, 2012) 
5. Five Triangle Areas in the Greater Mekong Subregion (Ishida, 2013a) 
 
The focus of these publications is primarily on GMS economic corridors. 
Unlike the ERIA’s research, which is focused on a broader and more comprehensive 
picture of how Southeast Asia should link with other regions by developing its 
infrastructure, IDE-JETRO’s research focuses more on specific and technical issues. 
 
6.3.1.3 ADBI 
While the ERIA pays more attention to building an understanding of regional 
development through CADP, ADBI seems to be more specifically interested in the 
linkages between South and Southeast Asia. This can be seen in the titles of two 
important publications from ADBI, which are: 
 
1. Connecting South Asia and Southeast Asia (ADB, 2015) 
2. Connecting Asia:   Infrastructure for Integrating South and Southeast Asia 
(Plummer, et al., 2016a).  
 
ADBI’s work emphasises that development of hard and soft regional 
transport infrastructure will help both South and Southeast Asia to benefit from the 
resulting economic liberalisation, connectivity, and other regional changes (Plummer 
et al., 2016b, p. 1).  
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    As previously mentioned, South Asia seems to garner noticeable attention 
from both the ERIA and ADBI. The ERIA’s CADP discusses the potential 
opportunities that the ‘extended Mekong’ area could access if it were to expand its 
regional transport networks from Southeast Asia to South Asia. At the same time, 
ADBI’s research also mentions the potential opportunities for the two regions and 
how to link them.  
 
6.3.2 Training and Capacity-Building Programmes 
Apart from the dissemination of research results through publication, 
researchers can also disseminate their research results, ideas, and policy 
recommendations through workshops, seminars, conferences, or capacity-building 
programmes. These are also vital channels that the ERIA, IDE-JETRO and ADBI 
use for practical application of their research results in various countries and 
organisations. Capacity-building programmes provide opportunities for intellectuals 
and officials to meet and discuss issues, further expanding their professional 
connections and building their networks. Professional connections between 
intellectuals and officials are formed both through their jobs and through the linkages 
inherent in various settings. Such connections facilitate the norms cascade because 
they bring people together who will often invite other people from the same field to 
work together.  
 
6.3.2.1 ERIA  
The ERIA conducts many research-related activities, including the provision 
of training and capacity-building programmes. An interviewee from the ERIA 
(Interviewee No.6) recognised the importance of the training and capacity-building 
programmes by explaining that the training topics are generally requested or 
suggested by least developed countries, such as Cambodia, Laos, or Myanmar.73 
‘Interviewee No.6’ states that these programmes help the participants to learn from 
the research results and exposes them to new knowledge. Moreover, these activities 
also help the participants to make and/or broaden their professional connections.74 
 
73 Interview, a staff of ERIA, Tokyo, Japan, 22 March 2016. 
74 Interview, a staff of ERIA, Tokyo, Japan, 22 March 2016. 
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This reflects that capacity-building programmes and workshops help researchers not 
only to cascade ideas, but also to expand connections.  
The ERIA also builds connections between East Asian think tanks, 
particularly through the RIN, as mentioned previously (ERIA, 2019). The RIN helps 
the ERIA to share the research themes and activities of other think tanks. The ERIA 
hopes this will help it to establish a broader understanding of the research issues and 
trends prevalent in Southeast Asia so that the ERIA can ensure that its research 
projects cover those topics.  
 
6.3.2.2  IDE-JETRO 
IDE-JETRO offers training programmes through the ‘IDE Advanced School’ 
(IDEAS). This school is a channel through which IDE-JETRO aims to disseminate 
knowledge of development-related issues, both to Japanese and non-Japanese 
officials and scholars. IDEAS anticipates that participants from abroad will already 
have a base knowledge of development and Japan’s ODA. Meanwhile, IDEAS also 
aims to improve Japanese officials’ knowledge of international development. 
However, the courses that IDEAS offers are quite broad, focusing on international 
trade, investment, finance, development studies, energy, environment, Japanese 
industries, and current issues on development (IDE-JETRO, 2017). In this respect, 
IDEAS’s training programmes do not pay specific attention to regional transport 
development. The reason might be that IDE-JETRO’s research themes focus on 
development studies and economics, and that the institute aims to study a wide range 
of issues related to regional transport development.  
 
6.3.2.3 ADBI 
ADBI’s capacity-building programmes are focused principally on 
disseminating the knowledge acquired from its research findings. The Institute’s 
advisory committee decides the annual research themes, and thereby the topics for 
the capacity building programmes. The main target group for these programmes is 
officials from Asian countries. The Institute expects to teach the knowledge that 
participants from varying countries ‘should know’ and to encourage them to bring 
that knowledge back to their home countries.75 However, in the interview with a staff 
 
75 Interview, a staff of ERIA, Tokyo, Japan, 22 March 2016. 
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member of the ASEAN Secretariat (Interviewee No.11) regarding the effectiveness 
and intellectual contribution of ADBI’s capacity-building programmes, ‘Interviewee 
No.11’ stated that the programmes were not able to help the work of the ASEAN 
Secretariat, as the programmes were aimed to respond to the objectives of the ERIA 
more so than those of the ASEAN Secretariat.76 From this explanation, the argument 
can be made that there are some obstacles in the norms cascade, particularly for 
ADBI. Such obstacles will be explained further in Section 6.3.3. 
As ADBI’s research themes and topics focus on macro-economics, ADBI 
seeks to study macro-issues, or regional issues. Compared to IDE-JETRO’s research 
focus on very specific issues, ADBI instead concentrates on regional financial 
matters, regional connectivity, PPP, financing, and SMEs. When I interviewed a 
researcher from ISEAS (Interviwee No.12) and a Thai university lecturer 
(Interviewee No.18) about their experiences conducting research with ADBI, they 
expressed that ADBI’s research themes are not consistent and have no real long-term 
direction as they are dependent on the Dean’s interests during that given period.77 
However, these opinions should be studied further, as more time is required to 
determine the trends and dynamics of the organisation so that we can understand the 
changing pattern of research trends and themes.  
Apart from research and publications, ADBI’s capacity-building 
programmes also play important role in cascading the norms and ideas of 
international transport development within Southeast Asia. ADBI capacity-building 
programmes offer courses for member country’s officials that relate to their research 
projects. The advisory council chooses the topics of the capacity-building 






76 Interview, a staff of ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, Indonesia, 13 April 2013. 
77 Interview, a staff of ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore, 18 April 2016; a staff of a Thai 
University, Bangkok, 13 May 2016.  
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Table 9: Ranking of ERIA, IDE-JETRO and ADBI ranked by the Think Tanks and Civil Societies Programme (TTCSP) at the University of 
Pennsylvania 
 
ERIA IDE-JETRO ADBI 
2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 
Top Think Tanks World Wide (Non-US)             20 20 21 24   
Top Think Tanks World Wide (US and 
Non-US) 
            29 28     
Top Think Tanks in China, India, Japan, 
and the Republic of Korea 
      19 19 20 20   24 25     
Top Think Tanks in Southeast Asia and the 
Pacific 
17 14                 
Top International Economic Policy Think 
Tanks (Top International Economics Think 
Tanks) 
31 28 30 28 30  19      59 17 17 21 23 17 
Top International Development Think 
Tanks 
101      105      6 6     
Best Think Tanks Network 24            6 6     
Best Transdisciplinary Research Think 
Tank 
52 50           14 14     
Best Government Affiliated Think Tanks             2 2     
Best Managed Think Tanks             16 17     
Best New Idea or Paradigm Developed by 
a Think Tank 
            15 11     
Best Think Tank Conference             12 12     
Source: Accumulated from the TTCSP Global Go To Think Tank Index Reports, 2015, 2014, 2013, 2012, 2011, 2010
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6.3.3 Problems of IROs’ Norms Cascade 
While the general process of the norms cascade has been outlined, there are 
some points that should be addressed from my studies and analyses. Although 
Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm life cycle framework (1998) states that the norms 
cascade process is a mechanism that norm entrepreneurs use to cascade their ideas 
and norms, there are three main problems, as demonstrated in the context of this 
research, that slow down the norms cascade process. These include (1) image, (2) 
location, and (3) economic and social factors.  
 
(1) Image: Although the ERIA gains recognition from the ASEAN 
Secretariat, from an intellectual’s perspective, the work of the ERIA 
might not have a good impact on regional transport development because 
it may not be translated into policy in each country due to the perceptions 
of Southeast Asian researchers and officials. As Chapter 5 has stated, 
intellectuals and officials in both Japan and Southeast Asian countries see 
the ERIA as an organisation that is strongly influenced by Japan. This 
perception is attributed to Japan’s financial support and assignment of 
staff to the ERIA . In contrast to the way most Japanese staff members of 
the ERIA see themselves, a local staff of the ERIA expressed some 
straightforward comments regarding the role of the Japanese government 
and Japanese staff members in the ERIA. Interviewee No.9 showed 
concern about the Japanese officials’ influence on the decision-making 
process in the ERIA  78 . ‘Interviewee No.9’ further reflected that as the 
ERIA was established for ASEAN and East Asia, all member countries 
should be involved in decision-making processes, whether administrative 
matters or research activities 79. 
 
(2) Location: The ERIA is based in Jakarta, which is far from other member 
countries, and there are no other offices or facilitators who could work as 
a liaison between the ERIA and the governments of other countries  .In 
other words, there is a missing link between the governments and the 
 
78 Interview, a staff of ERIA, Jakarta, Indonesia, 5 April 2016.  
79 Interview, a staff of ERIA, Jakarta, Indonesia, 5 April 2016.  
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ERIA . This assertion aligns with an observation from a staff member of 
the University of Indonesia who reflected that the lack of ERIA ‘country 
offices’ in other countries might cause problems for the ERIA, as it will 
be difficult to communicate and collaborate from such a distance.80 
The locations of IDE-JETRO and ADBI are also obstacles as they are 
both located in Japan. Additionally, the meetings, conferences, 
workshops, and capacity-building programmes are generally organised in 
Japan. This limits the opportunities for Southeast Asian researchers and 
officials to participate in such research related activities unless they are 
organised in collaboration with organisations outside of Japan.  
 
(3) Economic and Social Factors: From my observation and research 
experience, there are two more obstacles that slow down the norms 
cascade process: language and financial barriers. Generally, the research 
conducted by the ERIA, IDE-JETRO and ADBI is either in English or 
Japanese. For the ERIA and ADBI, all of their research is in English, 
however IDE-JETRO’s research is published in both English and 
Japanese. This limits the reach of the research and the subsequent 
knowledge it seeks to disseminate if language barriers block the target 
audience from being able to access it. Moreover, if readers are not 
affluent, it is unlikely that they will have access the Internet or can afford 
the English publication, further highlighting the complexity between 
language barriers and financial constraints. With this in mind, those who 
are most likely to be able to access the research are those who can read 
English. It can be assumed that they were able to afford a good education 
and therefore had comparatively better opportunities to study and practice 
English; that they work with government agencies and know about the 
ERIA, IDE-JETRO and ADBI; or that they have had opportunities to visit 





80 Interview, a staff of ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore, 18 April 2016. 
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6.4 Norms Internalisation 
One of the main questions of this study is ‘how are the norms internalised in 
Southeast Asian domestic and regional transport development schemes?’ As shown 
in the previous section, the norms of regional transport development are constructed 
within and cascaded through various IRO mechanisms. This section will analyse how 
the ideas and norms of the ERIA, IDE-JETRO and ADBI are internalised in the 
actual policy outcomes.  
Analysing the internalisation of norms and ideas is difficult because the 
minutes of every official meeting or policy formulation process are not publicly 
accessible. During my field research, I asked various interviewees how they became 
involved in the policy-making process or what they observed from any related 
activities; however, they did not provide detailed information. Thereby, the analysis 
will focus on the norms and ideas that are stated in the policy outcomes instead of 
focusing on the process of how the ideas and norms are proposed or discussed in 
meetings and workshops.  
The Think Tanks and Civil Societies Programme of the University of 
Pennsylvania (TTCSP) ranks the impact of the research conducted by the ERIA, 
IDE-JETRO and ADBI as amongst that of the most active and influential research 
organisations in East Asia. Their research activities on development and other issues 
in Southeast Asia are recognised and valued amongst many scholars and policy-
makers (see Table 9). The TTCSP ranked the think tanks based on various criteria, 
including their overall quality and leadership commitment, the reputation of the staff 
members, the reputation of the research and analyses, the ability to recruit and retain 
elite scholars and analysts, academic performance, the number and reach of its 
publications, the impacts of its policy recommendations, and the reputation with 
policymakers (McGann, 2017). The TTCSP study reflects that think tanks and IROs 
can contribute to the world through their intellectual and policy-related impacts. 
However, these studies did not acknowledge the ‘process’, or, as Finnemore and 
Sikkink termed it, ‘cascade’.  
Chapter 2 explained that to understand the transformation of the regional 
transport system, it is vital to recognise how ideas and norms are internalised. The 
ideas of regional transport proposed by IROs are not that of an economic regime, but 
rather of the practical knowledge that Southeast Asian countries should follow. A 
staff member of MIER (Interviewee No.15) reiterated this by explaining that the 
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ERIA, IDE-JETRO and ADBI are not cascading regimes; instead, they provide a 
‘template’ for other countries or organisations to follow.81  This section will, thereby, 
elaborate on the process of how norms and ideas related to regional transport 
development are cascaded, as well as their impacts. 
 
6.4.1 ERIA 
In the case of the ERIA, the personal and professional connections between 
intellectuals and officials formed through research-related activities have provided 
opportunities for the ERIA to display its research publicly. For example, a staff 
member of the ERIA (Interviewee No.1) highlighted that from the interviewee’s 
experience, ‘Interviewee No.1’ had witnessed METI and MOFA requesting staff 
members of IDE-JETRO  to give information, recommendations, and opinions on 
certain countries or situations.82 Additionally, from the perspective of an ERIA 
researcher (Interviewee No.6), the ERIA contributes knowledge and opinions to the 
policy-making process in Japan.83 The perception, then, of Japan’s intellectual 
contributions is linked to its foreign policy. A researcher from the ISEAS-Yusof 
Ishak Institute (ISEAS) (Interviewee No.12) called the ERIA a mechanism of 
Japan’s ‘soft diplomacy’.84 This opinion was further supported by an ERIA staff 
member (Interviewee No.6) who stated that the ERIA is Japan’s attempt to spread 
its ‘soft power’.85 From their opinions, we can see that intellectuals in Southeast Asia 
are aware of Japan’s engagement in ASEAN Connectivity development. Moreover, 
they acknowledge that the engagement is economically and politically motivated.  
The research and publications of the ERIA also impact the development of 
regional transport. For example, the ERIA published CADP as a flagship publication 
to help the region strategies its development of regional transport networks, 
particularly in mainland Southeast Asia. According to CADP, there is one main area 
and two regional initiatives that the region should focus on, which are (1) ‘the 
extended Mekong’ area; (2) the Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippine – East 
 
81 Interview, a staff of MIER, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 26 April 2016.  
82 Interview, a staff of IDE-JETRO, Chiba, Japan, 9 February 2016.  
83 Interview, a staff of ERIA, Tokyo, Japan, 22 March 2016. 
84 Interview, a staff of ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute (1), Singapore, 18 April 2016. 
85 Interview, a staff of ERIA, Tokyo, Japan, 22 March 2016.  
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ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA); and (3) the Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand 
Growth Triangle (IMT-GT) (ERIA, 2015, pp. 67-82).  
This perception of how the region should be built by focusing on one area 
and two cooperative initiatives is crucial. First is that CADP separates the ‘extended 
Mekong’ in order to focus on the linkages this area can establish with other regions, 
such as South Asia. Moreover, CADP does not pay attention to the GMS Programme 
as it is widely perceived within the region as an organisation that is influenced by the 
Japanese government (Charoensri, 2008, 2010a, 2010b, 2013; Verbiest, 2013; 
Yamamoto, 2006). Furthermore, although CADP suggests that the extended Mekong 
area should link to South Asia, it does not recommend a specific linkage between 
Southeast Asia and the South of China. This may be due to both geographical 
constraints and that the linkage would only benefit China, leaving Japan and South 
Korea without any economic gain from the development. Another factor could be 
that Japan’s economic and political relations with India are more amicable than those 
with China. Thereby, the recommendations in the ERIA’s CADP focus not only on 
linking the region, but also on how Japan could benefit from linking its production 
networks to South Asia. We will examine how IDE-JETRO and ADBI expressed 
interest in South Asia later in this section.  
Meanwhile, the BIMP-EAGA and IMT-GT will support the linkages within 
Southeast Asian maritime production networks. This helps Southeast Asian 
governments consider both how to construct a missing link and how to improve the 
existing networks between maritime and mainland Southeast Asia (ERIA, 2015, pp. 
90-91).  
The ‘extended Mekong’ area receives more widespread attention than does 
the BIMP-EAGA and IMT-GT. The policy recommendations in CADP regarding 
which projects should be initiated in the extended Mekong area is far higher than that 
of the BIMP-EAGA and IMT-GT. Whilst CADP recommended 452 projects in the 
extended Mekong area, the BIMP-EAGA recommended 190 projects and IMT-GT 
recommended only 61 projects (ERIA, 2015, p. 67). This illustrates how important 
the ERIA perceives the region, reflecting further that the ERIA pays more attention 
to mainland Southeast Asia because it has a high number of Japanese production 
factories and because there are existing construction projects and mechanisms that 
can support CADP. The existing construction projects include the East-West 
Economic Corridors (EWEC), the North-South Economic Corridor (NSEC), and the 
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Southern Economic Corridor (SEC), under the supervision of the GMS Programme 
(see Chapter 4 and 5). Moreover, there is high potential within the extended Mekong 
area to link Southeast Asia with South Asia via the ‘Mekong-India Economic 
Corridor’ (MIEC) (ERIA, 2015, p. 75; Nishataneja, 2014) (see Figure 14).  
 
Figure 14: The International Transport System in Mainland Southeast Asia 
 
Source: ERIA (2015, p. 75) 
 
 Upon closer examination, the norms related to regional transport are 
significantly embedded in the CADP. It emphasises the concepts of connectivity 
(ERIA, 2015, pp. 7-30), liberalisation (ERIA, 2015, p. 76), facilitation (ERIA, 2015, 
p. 76), and globalisation (ERIA, 2015, p. 20) as those that can help us to imagine a 
‘free-er’ and more connected region. 
The ASEAN Secretariat’s recognition of the ERIA’s research contributions 
strengthens the legitimacy of their impact on the development of regional transport. 
Before the MPAC was first issued in 2010, the ASEAN Secretariat started to 
recognise the importance of the ERIA as a think tank that provides information and 
policy recommendations. In 2009, the ASEAN Secretariat mentioned that the ERIA 
was expected to begin work with a to-be-established ASEAN High Task Level Task 
Force (HLTF) on ASEAN Connectivity (ERIA, 2009). One year after that, when 




We also appreciated the intellectual contribution of the 
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia 
(ERIA) as well as the Asian Development Bank and 
UNESCAP in supporting the completion of the 
ASEAN Connectivity Master Plan [sic]. (ERIA, 2010b) 
 
Following the introduction of the MPAC to the region, the ERIA initiated its 
intellectual contributions. For example, in 2011 the ERIA submitted a set of 
recommendations to the 19th ASEAN Summit in Bali, Indonesia, in support of 
ASEAN Connectivity (ERIA, 2011). In 2016 the ERIA presented the ‘CADP 2.0’ – 
the second version of the CADP that was first issued in 2010 – in an effort to 
coordinate the existing frameworks, including the ‘Phnom Penh Initiatives for 
Narrowing Development Gap’, the ‘Myanmar Comprehensive Development 
Vision’, and the ASEAN Connectivity Plan (ERIA, 2015b). Another example is from 
2017, when, after two years of CADP 2.0, the ASEAN Secretariat recognised the 
intellectual contribution of the ERIA to the ‘ASEAN Connectivity 2025’ strategy 
(ERIA, 2017). These examples demonstrate how the ASEAN Secretariat appreciates 
the intellectual contribution of the ERIA. In fact, the ERIA has contributed policy 
recommendations for various issues, but their top priority seems to be regional 
transport development, as developed by the CADP.  
The ERIA emphasises that the research they conduct should provide policy 
recommendations that would support the EAC, as the ASEAN Secretariat, 
intellectuals, and member countries’ officials welcome such results. We have seen 
the ASEAN Secretariat’s recognition of the ERIA above. Additionally, regional 
member countries also anticipate that the ERIA will help to facilitate economic 
development and regionalism. For example, during the visit of Ongart Klampaiboon, 
the Thai Minister to the Prime Minister's Office, to the head office of the ERIA in 
2010, he stated that the ERIA’s research would be translated in order to enhance Thai 
economic and social development. He asserted that collaboration between the ERIA 
and TDRI would help Thailand to obtain information about energy, transport, and 
logistics, which are three main research areas of the ERIA. This would help TDRI 
and Thailand to develop its social and economic strategies to further decrease 
development gaps (Asia News Monitor, 2010). This is just one example of how an 
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official from a regional member country anticipates utilizing the intellectual 
contributions of the ERIA. 
Meanwhile, apart from official’s expectations, the recognition of the 
intellectual contribution of the ERIA and CADP to the development of regional 
transport can be witnessed in the utilisation and application of CADP on various 
occasions. The CADP is used because it provides a theoretical framework and 
economic formulation to evaluate the costs and benefits of development. For 
example, the ERIA utilised the CADP to help in the drafting process of the Brunei 
Action Plan (BAP) (2011-2015) – the action plan for transport development in 
Southeast Asia – and the ASEAN Transport Co-operation five-year plan (Umezaki, 
2012, p. 2). Moreover, the High-Level Task Force (HLTF) invited the ERIA to help 
the ASEAN Secretariat draft the ASEAN MPAC in both 2010 and 2025. For the 
MPAC 2010, CADP was used and the resulting recommendations were integrated in 
‘Chapter 2: Achievements of, and Challenges and Impediments to ASEAN 
Connectivity)’ and ‘Chapter 3: Key Strategies for Enhanced ASEAN Connectivity’ 
(Umezaki, 2012, p. 2).  
Furthermore, when the MPAC 2025 was being drafted, CADP 2.0 was 
incorporated into the working process to help ASEAN to see the current regional 
transport and development situations (ASEAN, 2016a, p. 46). This reflects how the 
ERIA has contributed its research results to official regional projects. The norms that 
CADP disseminated through the work of other regional projects include connectivity 
and facilitation of trade and services, focusing on the development of hard 
infrastructure and the improvement of soft infrastructure (ASEAN, 2016a; Umezaki, 
2012).  
Nevertheless, it is difficult to obtain information about the discussions that 
occur in the ASEAN Secretariat meetings and conferences on regional transport 
development. The interviewees did not elaborate on the meetings’ agenda, 
atmosphere, or the issues discussed. However, from the available published 
documents, it can be interpreted that the ERIA has provided CADP to many regional 
meetings on regional transport development.  
A local staff member of the ERIA (Interviewee No.9) expressed concern 
about the Japanese influence in the ERIA. ‘Interviewee No.9’ reflected that the ERIA 
has been under very close supervision and guidance of the METI since its 
inauguration. The METI continuously assigns preferred persons to sit in the 
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administrative positions, furthering the influence of the Japanese government on the 
ERIA.86 This concern shares similar characteristics with comments made by a staff 
member of ISEAS (Interviewee No.12), who sees the ERIA as a tool of the Japanese 
government.87 ‘Interviewee No.12’ stated that the Japanese government assigns and 
supports the committee of the ERIA, hence, whenever the committee wants to 
propose something to EAS, it is very likely that other member countries will follow 
their recommendations as they view Japan as a good example, often due to their 
‘expertise’.88 The perceptions of the influential role Japan plays in the ERIA, in this 
respect, are that the Japanese government is utilising its financial contributions and 
the allocation of Japanese personnel to the ERIA to influence the research that seeks 
to make an impact on Southeast Asian development.  
Having said that, a Thai university lecturer (Interviewee No.16) argued that 
although the ERIA works closely with ASEAN, scholars from ASEAN do not take 
the ERIA seriously because the ERIA’s policy recommendations are unable to be 
implemented.89 ‘Interviewee No.16’ expressed that while the ERIA might contribute 
intellectually to ASEAN, ASEAN itself has no legal authority to implement policies 
within its member states. Thereby, the studies conducted by the ERIA may not be 
significantly influential.90 
Another important aspect of the ERIA’s work is capacity building 
programmes. The capacity building programmes aim to disseminate the knowledge 
gained from the research conducted by the ERIA. The primary participants in the 
programmes are officials from Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam. The ERIA 
anticipates that the participants will view the development of the region from the 
same perspective. However, a staff member of ISEAS (Interviewee No.12) observed 
the programmes and questioned if the participants could understand the content of 
the research. ‘Interviewee No.12’ also questioned if the participants would take the 
knowledge back to their home country, as ‘Interviewee No.12’ believes that they 
 
86 Interview, a staff of ERIA, Jakarta, Indonesia, 5 April 2016. 
87 Interview, a staff of ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute (1), Singapore, 18 April 2016. 
88 Interview, a staff of ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute (1), Singapore, 18 April2016. 
89 Interview, a staff of ThUni, 13 May 2016. 
90 Interview, a staff of ThUni, 13 May 2016. 
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may not apply the research as intended.91 The impact of the capacity-building 
programmes, thus, should be studied further in the future. 
 To conclude, the ERIA’s research results, particularly CADP, have 
significantly contributed to regional transport and infrastructure development. Not 
only are the research results translated into regional development policy, but capacity 
building also helps Japanese and Southeast Asian intellectuals to form both 
professional and institutional connections.   
 
6.4.2 IDE-JETRO 
Unlike the ERIA and ADBI, there is no flagship study on regional transport 
development produced by IDE-JETRO. This is because IDE-JETRO, as previously 
stated, focuses more on technical issues or challenges, and does not emphasise 
comprehensive regional development.92 
Additionally, the impact of IDE-JETRO’s studies on Southeast Asian 
transport development is not as explicit as that of the ERIA. IDE-JETRO’ studies 
pay attention to specific yet practical issues of regional transport development in 
Southeast Asia. As we have seen from the professional network section, the research 
conducted by Ishida Masami – a prominent researcher whose expertise is the GMS 
area – helped to form a network of intellectuals whose interest is mainland Southeast 
Asia. During interviews with intellectuals in Japan and Southeast Asia, some 
(Interviewees No.16, No.10, No.18) reflected that working with IDE-JETRO helped 
them to expand their research and academic networks.93 
Nevertheless, when we consider the number of publications on regional 
transport development, we can see that between 1970 and 2017, IDE-JETRO 
published 27 studies and reports on issues including geography (Fujita & Mori, 
2005), the GMS area (Ishida, 2008, 2011, 2012), border industry (Kudo, 2007), and 
border economies (Ishida, 2013b). These studies focus on the dynamic of regional 
transport, the movement of people across the region, and how this phenomenon 
impacts regional development and integration. Furthermore, these studies are aimed 
 
91 Interview, a staff of ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute (1), Singapore, 18 April 2016. 
92 Interview, a staff of the University of Indonesia, Jakarta, Indonesia, 6 April 2016.  
93 Interview, a staff of ThUni, 3 May 2016; Interview, a staff of the University of Indonesia, Jakarta, 
Indonesia, 6 April 2016; Interview, a staff of ThUni, 13 May 2016. 
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to help JETRO and the Japanese government to obtain information and transform 
trends in the region, rather than providing a regional framework for regional transport 
development.   
IDE-JETRO contributes its expertise to support regional transport 
development in many ways. For example, in 2012 IDE-JETRO and the ERIA 
organised a symposium titled ‘Toward Economic Integration in ASEAN and East 
Asia’ in Tokyo, emphasising the importance of comprehensive production networks 
in the region (ERIA, 2012). The ERIA expected the symposium to enhance the 
understanding of ASEAN Connectivity and the ASEAN Economic Community 
(AEC) for Japanese officials, businessmen, and stakeholders (ERIA, 2012). This 
allows IDE-JETRO to disseminate knowledge to the public whilst working with 
other research institutes in the region.  
Although IDE-JETRO’s researchers do not recognise a significant academic 
contribution to the Japanese government, a staff member of JETRO (Interviewee 
No.2) reflected that IDE-JETRO has contributed to policy formation related to 
Southeast Asian transport development.  ‘Interviewee No.2’ explained that in July 
2015 JETRO conducted research on development in Laos and was asked to provide 
policy recommendations to the Laos government.94 The research was first requested 
by the Laos Prime Minister who asked JETRO to conduct a study that would result 
in policy recommendations to further capital liberalisation (in the service industry), 
and to support local SMEs (JETRO, 2016, p. 18). The research culminated in two 
sets of policy recommendations. The first set was proposed by IDE-JETRO and the 
second set was proposed by JETRO. IDE-JETRO proposed industry-focused policy 
recommendations, including (1) decreasing logistic costs (both in expenditures and 
time) with neighbouring countries and in the facilitating procedures, (2) enhancing 
value chains, (3) closing the gap between laws and operations, and (4) improving the 
business environment to further attract Japanese companies that could potentially 
benefit Laos (JETRO, 2016, p. 18). For the second set of policy recommendations, 
JETRO focused on the overall improvement of the business environment, including 
(1) promoting liberalisation in the service industry, (2) reforming investment 
procedures to increase foreign direct investment (FDI), (3) nurturing Kaizen culture 
 
94 Interview, a staff of IDE-JETRO, Chiba, Japan, 10 February 2016. 
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and the 5S95 while facilitating international mobility of engineers, and (4) utilising 
the cluster effect to strategise industrial locations (JETRO, 2016, p. 18). Here we can 
see that although IDE-JETRO does not have flagship research or publications 
focused on Southeast Asian transport development, IDE-JETRO staff members are 
still involved in making policy recommendations. 
However, the question of how IDE-JETRO’s research has made an impact 
on development is still relevant. During my interviews with two IDE-JETRO 
researchers (Interviewees No.2 and No.3), they did not hesitate to articulate that they 
do refer to IDE-JETRO as a ‘think thank’.96 From their perspectives, a think tank is 
a research organisation that focuses on conducting policy-oriented research. 
Interviewees No.2 and No.3 expected that the research results will be proposed as 
policy recommendations to the policymakers of a particular country, or of an 
international organisation, for future implementation. IDE-JETRO, on the contrary, 
has remained firm in stating that the research they conduct is for ‘academic 
purposes’.97 However, it is unclear what the IDE-JETRO researchers are insinuating 
with this statement, as it is deniable that the process of setting research themes is 
independent or solely for academic purpose, as was stated several times by the 
interviewees from IDE-JETRO.  
Nonetheless, conducting research ‘for academic purposes’ may simply be 
amorphous. Interviewee No.2 explained that upon completion of the research, 
policymakers and scholars – both in Japan and elsewhere in the world – could freely 
utilise, interpret, and translate the research for their own use.98 This implies that the 
researchers chose the research topics and that their objectives for choosing such 
topics may not be for the sake of policy-making, but rather based on the researchers’ 
interests.    
 
95 ‘5S’ refers to ‘sort, straighten, shine, standardise and sustain the discipline.  
96 Interview, a staff of IDE-JETRO, Chiba, Japan, 10 February 2016; Interview, a staff of IDE-
JETRO, Chiba, Japan, 29 March 2016. 
97 Interview, a staff of IDE-JETRO, Chiba, Japan, 10 February 2016; Interview, a staff of IDE-
JETRO, Chiba, Japan, 29 March 2016. 
98 Interview, a staff of IDE-JETRO, Chiba, Japan, 10 February 2016.  
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Moreover, Interviewee No.2 and No.8 from IDE-JETRO do not believe that 
they contribute to the policy-making process of the Japanese government.99 While 
they do believe that their research contributes to the decisions of policymakers to 
some extent, the research itself was not originally intended to support the policy-
making process.100 IDE-JETRO recognises that they cannot measure the impact of 
their research, as a senior staff member of IDE-JETRO (Interviewee No.2) reflected: 
 
Frankly speaking, we cannot measure our impact. So 
instead we try to find another indicator, such as a 
number of seminars, a number of downloads or 
research papers.101 
 
In summary, although IDE-JETRO staff members do not see the impact of 
their contributions to Japan’s policy-making process, their research and publications 
still help JETRO and the Japanese government to obtain information and conduct 
analyses that support the decision-making process. 
 
6.4.3 ADBI 
Similarly, ADBI’s intellectual contributions are less than obvious, as ADBI 
also does not have a flagship study. ADBI’s contributions to the development of 
ASEAN Connectivity face limitations for various reasons, including its location and 
its engagement with Japanese scholars. 
In terms of location, ADBI has only one main office in Tokyo and does not 
have any country offices. An interviewee from ADB (Interviewee No.20) asserted 
that ADBI does not work in close collaboration with ADB, nor does it contribute 
research to ADB, as the research conducted by ADBI is primarily academic and 
cannot be adapted into policy recommendations.102 I would argue that there are two 
reasons for this. The first reason is the location of the headquarters in Tokyo, as an 
 
99 Interview, a staff of IDE-JETRO, Chiba, Japan, 10 February 2016; Interview, a staff of IDE-
JETRO, Chiba, Japan, 29 March 2016.  
100 Interview, a staff of IDE-JETRO, Chiba, Japan, 10 February 2016; Interview, a staff of IDE-
JETRO, Chiba, Japan, 29 March 2016.  
101 Interview, a staff of IDE-JETRO, Chiba, Japan, 10 February 2016. 
102 Interview, a staff of ADB, Bangkok, Thailand, 23 May 2016. 
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interviewee from Singapore (Interviewee No.12) also commented that this obstructs 
opportunities for ADBI to communicate with other member countries.103 Moreover, 
one interviewee (Interviewee No.4) elaborated that the ADBI office is located in the 
Kasumigaseki building, which is shared by many Japanese governmental agencies, 
helping to facilitate communication, but limiting the participation of member 
countries.104 It is important to consider the location of the ADBI office as it could 
provide better access for member countries to communicate their needs and ask 
questions. But, as ADBI does not have any other offices outside of Tokyo, the 
communication between headquarters and member country governments is more 
challenging.  
The second reason is the engagement of Japanese scholars in ADBI’s work, 
as ADBI claims that its management and research activities are not influenced by the 
Japanese government.105 The Japanese government’s contributions to ADBI are 
justified by a senior staff member of ADBI (Interviewee No.4) who explained that 
the Japanese government does not try to influence the work of ADBI, but rather 
benefits from supporting ADBI by building positive rapport in the international 
system.106 Unlike what we have witnessed in the ERIA and IDE-JETRO, Japanese 
scholars are comparatively less engaged in ADBI’s research activities. This means 
that ADBI has fewer opportunities to disseminate its ideas or engage in research-




 This chapter has applied Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm life cycle framework 
to analyse how the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI construct and cascade ideas and 
norms related to regional transport development to Southeast Asia. Furthermore, this 
chapter was also dedicated to analysing the norm internalisation process with specific 
attention to how norms are cascaded through three IROs and how they are 
internalised in the work of the ASEAN Secretariat and other research units. 
 
103 Interview, a staff of ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore, 18 April 2016. 
104 Interview, a staff of ADBI, Tokyo, Japan, 23 February 2016. 
105 Interview, a staff of ADBI, Tokyo, Japan, 23 February 2016. 
106 Interview, a staff of ADBI, Tokyo, Japan, 23 February 2016. 
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 The norm entrepreneurs, including staff members of the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, 
ADBI, MOFA, METI, JICA, and JETRO, utilise their professional and institutional 
connections to make academic linkages, conduct research, and organise research-
related activities. The publications, research results, dissemination methods, and 
capacity-building programmes were used as platforms to cascade the relevant ideas 
and norms.  
 We have seen that the ideas and norms related to regional transport 
development as constructed by the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI are composed of 
(1) ideas of infrastructure development, (2) spatial and connectivity norms, (3) norms 
of economic activities, (4) norms of knowledge sharing, and (5) ideas and norms of 
environmental protection and sustainable development. These ideas and norms were 
introduced to ASEAN regional initiatives and transport development programmes. 
Judging by the policy outcomes, it can also be said that the ideas and norms were 
embedded into regional transport development schemes as such schemes included 
the IRO-contributed ideas and norms in their official statements.  
 In the following chapter, I will summarise the research results of this thesis 
and explain how the norm life cycle framwork has helped us to understand the role 
of Japan as a RIH in Southeast Asia. Moreover, after having examined the role of the 
ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI, I will propose how the definition and characteristics 




















7.1 Review of the Research Result 
This thesis began its journey asking three main questions: what are the 
motives of the Japanese government to support the development of international 
transport infrastructure in Southeast Asia; how has Japan, as ‘regional intellectual 
hegemon’ (RIH), constructed and cascaded the norms of regional development via 
research conducted by ‘international research organisations’ (IROs), which are the 
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA), the Institute of 
Developing Economies of Japan External Trade Organisation (IDE-JETRO), and the 
Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI); and how are the norms internalised in 
domestic and regional transport development schemes in Southeast Asia? It also asks 
three sub-research questions: how has the Japanese government created mechanisms 
to support Southeast Asian regional transport development schemes; what are the 
ideas and norms of regional transport development that ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and 
ADBI constructed and why; and how were the ideas and norms of regional transport 
development constructed and cascaded through professional and institutional 
connections? 
 In this chapter, I will recapitulate my arguments and the implications of this 
thesis to the study of Japan-Southeast Asia relations, the role of international research 
organisation ( IROs)  in Southeast Asia, and Japan’ s role as a Regional Intellectual 
Hegemon ( RIH)  in regional transport development.  After that, I will point out the 
research contributions of this thesis.  Finally, I will identify the limitations of the 
study and propose some recommendations for future research.  
 
7.1.1 Japan and Regional Transport in Southeast Asia 
For the first thesis question, I argued in Chapter 4 that there are three 
significant factors that motivate the Japanese government to support the development 
of international transport infrastructure in Southeast Asia. These three factors are the 
regional and international systems after 1945, the relocation of Japanese 
manufacturers in the mid-80s, and the location of Southeast Asia. The US-Japan 
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relations that formed after 1945, as well as the Plaza Accord of the mid-80s, triggered 
many conditions that led Japanese manufacturers to relocate to Southeast Asia. The 
relocation mainly targeted Thailand due to its location in the heart of mainland 
Southeast Asia. As this relationship developed, the Japanese government started to 
support many regional transport development schemes whilst the Thai government 
began to adjust its National Economic and Social Development Plan (NESDP) to 
better support and facilitate Japanese investors. 
From the 1980s onwards, Southeast Asian regional transport development 
received a significant amount of support from the Japanese government. The 
collaboration between Japan and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to initiate the 
Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Economic Co-operation Programme in 1992 was 
the starting point of Japan’s engagement in the development of economic corridors. 
Chapter 4 shows that amongst three economic corridors, including the East-West 
Economic Corridor (EWEC), Southern Economic Corridor (SEC), and North-South 
Economic Corridor (NSEC), the EWEC and SEC receive the most significant 
interest from the Japanese government as they can facilitate ships from the Indian 
Ocean to sail to Japan without encountering pirates in the Straits of Malacca. These 
particular corridors also help Thailand-based Japanese manufacturers to transport 
their products and goods to deep-seaports in Myanmar, Vietnam, and Cambodia. 
This helps Japan to establish comprehensive regional production networks in 
mainland Southeast Asia. 
 
7.1.2 Japan as a Regional Intellectual Hegemon (RIH) 
Chapters 5 and 6 answered the second and third thesis questions and sub-
research questions. Chapter 5 paid attention to the details of Japan’s engagement in 
Southeast Asian transport development, particularly the ASEAN Master Plan of 
ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC). Chapter 5 also pointed out the mechanisms that the 
Japanese government initiated to support ASEAN connectivity, including the 
Mission of Japan to ASEAN and the Japanese Task Force on ASEAN Connectivity. 
I further explained the backgrounds of the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI, as well as 
how they are involved in ASEAN connectivity. 
In Chapter 6, I used Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm life cycle framework 
(1998) to analyse how the Japanese government agencies worked together to 
construct the knowledge of regional transport development in Southeast Asia. This 
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framework was chosen because it provides us with a systematic way to identify norm 
entrepreneurs in the norm emergence process and to analyse how the norms are 
cascaded whilst looking at the norm internalisation process. The framework also 
goes beyond realist and liberal approaches, and does not take the power of ideas and 
norms for granted. Chapters 3, 5, and 6 elaborated the three stages of the norm life 
cycle framework and how the framework incorporates both documentary research 
and in-depth interviews. Japan is a RIH in Southeast Asia because it uses financial 
strength to support the work of IROs in the construction and cascading of ideas and 
norms in the region.  
There are many norm entrepreneurs in norm emergence process. The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) initiates collaboration between other Japanese 
ministries to facilitate co-operative regional transport projects. For example, the 
MOFA works with the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI), the 
Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and 
Tourism (MLIT), Japan International Co-operation Agency (JICA), and Japan 
External Trade Organisation (JETRO) to support ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI in 
their research on Southeast Asian transport development schemes. Chapter 6 shows 
that the ideas and norms presented in the research results and analyses provided by 
the three IROs have been internalised into ASEAN’s transport development scheme. 
Prior to meeting with staff members of the MOFA and METI, I conducted 
in-depth interviews with staff members of IDE-JETRO and ADBI. These interviews 
provided me with an overview of the relationships their organisations have with the 
MOFA and METI. The interviews not only illuminated the institutional connections 
that IDE-JETRO and ADBI have with MOFA and METI, but also the professional 
connections between officials and intellectuals. After meeting with the MOFA and 
METI, the interviews with staff members of JICA and JETRO helped me to see the 
linkages between Japan’s ODA policy and the Japanese business community’s 
expectations regarding the allocation of ODA to support economic relations between 
Japan and Southeast Asia.  
Interviews with ERIA staff members in Tokyo also showed that the 
professional connections between Japanese officials and intellectuals have helped 
the MOFA and METI to work with Japanese and Southeast Asian officials and the 
ASEAN Secretariat. They established formal and informal relationships between 
actors and institutions, which have helped the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI to 
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conduct research with Southeast Asian researchers and to cascade ideas and norms 
through publications, meetings, conferences, workshops, and capacity-building 
programmes. For example, the president or head of the research department in each 
IRO collaborates with other organisations. Furthermore, Chapter 3 shows that the 
heads of IROs are essential because they control the IROs’ research agenda and 
direction. They can help IROs to form professional or institutional connections 
between countries or other organisations. Another example is of research 
connections, which are established by collaborative research, such as ERIA’s 
Research Institute Network (RIN), the research fellowship that IDE-JETRO offers. 
After conducting field research in Japan, I travelled to Indonesia, Singapore, 
Malaysia, and Thailand (between April and June 2016) to collect data from officials, 
researchers, and NGOs. This research visit helped me to collect and triangulate the 
information that I obtained in Japan whilst gathering additional opinions from 
officials and researchers in Southeast Asia. What I learned from the research visit 
was not only new insights into the information and opinions I had already collected, 
but also the notions of how researchers who utilise ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI’s 
publications and analyses view the influential role of Japanese intellectuals. We have 
seen in Chapter 6 that the perception of Japanese intellectuals is both optimistic and 
pessimistic. These researchers, however, see the contributions of Japanese 
intellectuals differently. Some Southeast Asian researchers and officials see Japan’s 
intellectual contributions as dubious because of the economic interests that are 
embedded in policy recommendations. On the other hand, some Southeast Asian 
researchers and officials are aware of the influence but find it acceptable because 
both Japan and Southeast Asia receive benefits. In other words, it is a win-win 
situation. They reflected that, at least, the research, publications, and research-related 
activities have helped them to develop a better understanding of regional transport 
development. 
Chapters 5 and 6 set out to answer the thesis’s third research question, 
showing that professional connections play an important role in the foreign policy-
making process. As Chapter 2 pointed out, although the research conducted by 
intellectuals and think tanks are essential elements in the foreign policy-making 
process, existing literature has not deeply explored their level of involvement. For 
example, Yoshimatsu (2012) mentioned ERIA’s intellectual contributions toward 
East Asian development, however, Yoshimatsu did not study the role of intellectuals 
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in-depth. And while Severino (2014) mentioned the contributions of both the ERIA 
and JETRO, he did not examine IDE-JETRO. Thereby, I have expanded upon their 
observations by analysing how the IROs’ institutional and professional connections 
have helped Southeast Asian governments to develop common regional transport 
development schemes. We can expand our understanding of foreign policy-making 
further by looking deeper into professional and personal relations.  
After applying Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm life cycle framework (1998), 
I showed in Chapter 6 that norm entrepreneurs in Japan, namely the ERIA, IDE-
JETRO, and ADBI, have constructed five major ideas and norms, including (1) ideas 
of infrastructure development, (2) spatial and connectivity norms, (3) norms of 
economic activities, (4) norms of knowledge sharing, and (5) ideas and norms of 
environmental protection and sustainable development. These ideas and norms are 
stated in various publications, research, meetings, conferences, and other research-
related activities. They are also cascaded and internalised in the work of Southeast 
Asian governments, and that of the ASEAN Secretariat, which can be seen through 
interviews, official documents, and regional transport development schemes. 
  
7.1.3 The Role of IROs in Regional Politics 
 Another issue that this thesis explored is the role of IROs in Southeast Asia. 
As I mentioned in Chapters 2 and 3, although the existing literature on Japan’ s 
foreign policy- making process acknowledges the engagement of think tanks, or the 
epistemic community, those studies have not elaborated the role of think tanks, or 
other research entities, in Japan’s foreign policy-making process.  
 The existing literature focused on the study of IROs helped me to answer the 
second and third thesis questions, which were analysed in Chapters 5 and 6. I found 
that the ERIA, IDE- JETRO, and ADBI’ s research focuses on different themes and 
issues.  From the viewpoint of the ‘ readers’  or ‘ users’ , the ERIA’ s research and 
publications focus on regional infrastructure development, regional integration, 
energy, SMEs and, most importantly, a broad picture of how the region should build 
networks and construct hard infrastructure to support economic development and 
regional integration.  Chapters 5 and 6 elaborated and analysed the ERIA’ s 
Comprehensive Asian Development Plan ( CADP) , which focuses on regional 
connectivity and provides policy recommendations to ASEAN in order to physically 
and institutionally link Southeast Asia with South Asia and beyond. CADP also aims 
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to support economic development and to increase competitiveness in the region 
(ERIA, 2010, 2015). In contrast, IDE-JETRO’s research on Southeast Asia focuses 
on specific challenges in trade and development, emphasising small practical issues 
and problems of international transport development, such as special economic zones 
and border management. ADBI’s research and publications focus mainly on Public-
Private Partnership (PPP), financing, macro-economics, and overviews of the region, 
whilst stressing the technical issues of regional integration.  
 However, these studies do not pay sufficient attention to how Southeast Asia 
can utilise the potential benefits of linking to South Asia.  Although the ERIA, IDE-
JETRO, and ADBI’ s research pays attention to different issues, they endeavour to 
collaborate in order to be more effective.  For example, Chapters 5 and 6 show that 
IDE-JETRO’s IDE/ERIA-GSM was utilised and applied in ERIA’s CADP (ERIA, 
2015a, pp. 183-184). Section 6.5 also shows that CADP has impacted how the region 
sees the development of international transport systems, which reflects that the ERIA 
and IDE- JETRO have both professional and institutional connections as the 
‘ IDE/ ERIA- GSM’  was intellectually developed in collaboration between the two 
organisations.  Moreover, both the ERIA and IDE- JETRO hold many conferences 
and meetings in Tokyo to discuss Southeast Asian regional integration and ASEAN 
Connectivity, including the 2018 roundtable on connectivity and innovation (ERIA, 
2018b).  
Amongst the three IROs, the ERIA holds the most influential power in the 
field of Southeast Asian regional transport development due to the CADP, followed 
by IDE-JETRO and ADBI, respectively. Moreover, the ERIA has comparatively 
closer connections with the ASEAN Secretariat in order to present its research and 
policy recommendations to policymakers. This is because the ERIA’s headquarters 
are located near the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta, providing ERIA’s intellectuals 
with more opportunities to present, discuss, or share their ideas with the Secretariat.   
Furthermore, I argued in Chapter 3 that IROs are different from think tanks. 
The findings demonstrate that the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI do not try to 
construct political or economic regimes. Instead, they conduct research to solve 
problems that the region is confronting. They produce practical, technical solutions 
for governmental use rather than theoretical, philosophical knowledge for academia. 
The ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI propose theories or models, such as ‘IDE/ERIA-
GSM’ (Kumagai, 2010; Kumagai & Isono, 2011; Kumagai et al., 2013), to 
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governments as mechanisms to address the problems they are facing. Whilst the 
research conducted addresses both the economy and politics, it does not focus on 
activities that could be considered as political projects of the hegemon. Instead, they 
offer solutions using systematic explanations and methods. Their political and 
economic agendas may not be as apparent as the role of think tanks in the 
international system.  
Chapter 6 shows that the ideas and norms proposed by the ERIA, IDE-
JETRO, and ADBI emphasise how Southeast Asia should focus on facilitating and 
supporting regional transport networks. Moreover, the economic and political 
regimes were not discussed by Japanese government officials and intellectuals in the 
documentary research or the interviews. They elaborated on many projects that they 
recognised as essential projects or as elements that can support regional transport 
development, but did not mention any economic and political ideas. I, thereby, refer 
to the elements they are trying to communicate or cascade to other actors as ‘practical 
knowledge’. 
Practical knowledge is neither knowledge nor a regime. Rather, it is 
something in between. When we look at the existing definitions of knowledge and 
regimes, practical knowledge is different. Authorities typically construct knowledge 
in either one country, one political context, or one societal domain. Knowledge is 
developed through scientific observation and experiment. The historical background 
of specific sets of knowledge helps to attribute authority and legitimacy to the 
explanations they provide about the relevant issue (Kim, 2014; Stone, 1996, pp. 113-
115). Practical knowledge, on the other hand, does not try to propose economic or 
political regimes. Rather, it aims to propose practical recommendations that other 
actors in the region should follow without mentioning economic or political ideas. 
While their research interests and practical knowledge differ, as argued in 
Chapter 3 (section 3.2.2), the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI work simultaneously 
to support Southeast Asian transport development and therefore their ideas and 
constructed norms are similar. Chapter 6 shows that personal connections between 
intellectuals facilitate opportunities and platforms to share and exchange ideas and 
norms. The intellectuals who work for the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI help the 
Japanese government to form foreign policy in two ways. First, they provide their 
expertise through research and advice (see Chapter 5). These intellectuals are often 
invited or assigned to positions that can lead the direction of the organisation’s 
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research agenda and activities in collaboration with the Japanese and Southeast Asian 
governments, as well as the ASEAN Secretariat. Thereby, they contribute to research 
and activities that support the strengthening of East Asian regionalism (see Chapter 
6). Second, the government also assigns these intellectuals to positions that work 
with the Japanese government, other countries, research institutes, and international 
organisations. For example, many university professors have been appointed as the 
heads of research departments to help IROs frame their research agendas. This also 
helps the IROs to access, build, and strengthen their academic and research 
collaborations with institutions and governmental organisations in Southeast Asia 
(see Chapters 5 and 6).  
 
7.1.4 RIH and Southeast Asian Regional Transport System Development 
After answering all of the main questions, I arrived at my conclusion about 
Japan’s role in Southeast Asian regional transport development, which is that the 
Japanese government uses its economic power through ODA to support the work of 
IROs in Japan and Southeast Asia in order to help Japan become a ‘regional 
intellectual hegemon’ (RIH) in Southeast Asia. The norms-embedded practical 
knowledge constructed by the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI helps Japan to play a 
leading role within Southeast Asia because Japan can utilise its own ODA to manage 
Southeast Asian development schemes through Japanese government-supported 
IROs.  
I show in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 that the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI have 
high expectations regarding the role of infrastructure in the eradication of poverty 
(ADB, 2010; ADB & ADBI, 2009; Brooks, 2010; Brooks & Hummels, 2009; Brooks 
& Menon, 2008; ESCAP, 2014). Japan’s definition of development further 
emphasises the importance of infrastructure, as Söderberg (2012, p. 6) states that 
Japan sees development from the perspective of emphasising industrialisation. The 
Japanese government focuses on large-scale infrastructure development as a 
mechanism to support sustainable economic development, influenced by its 
promotion of infrastructure development to eliminate poverty (Hatakeyama, 2008, 
p. 347; Rix, 1993a, pp. 15-16; Watanabe, 2006, p. 18). Moreover, such development 
will facilitate and support the recipients to help themselves by utilising sufficient 
infrastructure. It will also help people in recipient countries to develop their 
capacities by accessing better public services (e.g. schools and hospitals). People’s 
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quality of life will improve with increased access to supportive environments, such 
as decent and comprehensive transport networks (e.g. roads, railways, bridges, 
ports), electricity, and clean water (MOFA, 2003; Söderberg, 2002). Accordingly, 
the Japanese government consistently allocates ODA to the development of 
infrastructure in Southeast Asia.  
 Japan’ s emphasis on large infrastructure development led to Japan’ s major 
contributions to the development of Southeast Asian transport infrastructure.  The 
ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI are IROs that help Japan to construct ideas and norms 
about regional transport and infrastructure development, and further, to cascade these 
ideas and norms through their professional and institutional connections.  After the 
Japanese government allocated ODA to the ERIA, IDE- JETRO, and ADBI to 
conduct research and disseminate the results across various platforms, the impacts of 
their recommendations were measured by the CADP.  
One of the questions, however, that I was asked by my informants was: how 
have the policy recommendations proposed by the ERIA, IDE- JETRO, and ADBI 
impacted regional integration, poverty elimination, or infrastructure development? 
And how can we measure that? These questions are indeed relevant and important. 
The research findings demonstrate that the ideas and norms of regional transport 
development were constructed, emphasised, and cascaded through publications, 
research, meetings, conferences, and professional and institutional connections. The 
ideas and norms were also cascaded through workshops, capacity- building 
programmes, and other research- related activities.  However, this thesis does not 
attempt to measure impact through a quantitative approach.  When the informants 
were asked in return about how their organisations measure research impact, most of 
them said they do not have a method of measurement as well.  Accordingly, one of 
the ways to observe impact is to look at how ideas and norms are stated in policy-
focused outcome documents.  This, at least, reflects how ideas and norms are 









7.2 Research Contribution 
 In this thesis, I touch upon many theoretical issues and debates that relate to 
the understanding of how Japan aims to shape and direct the ideas and norms of 
regional transport development in Southeast Asia, and how such engagements and 
contributions have helped Japan to gain ‘RIH’ status.  
Chapter 2 shows that there are four main groups of literature. The first group 
includes the literature that explains how Japan’ s foreign policy- making process is 
different from other IR approaches. It points out how social constructivists argue that 
structural realism and neo- liberalism institutionalism take national interests for 
granted and do not focus on how the national interests are constructed (Wendt, 1999, 
p.  5) .  Meanwhile, structural realism and liberalism institutionalism do not pay 
attention to the role of intellectuals and think tanks in foreign policy, nor how these 
intellectuals help to construct and disseminate ideas and norms to other actors in the 
system.  The pluralistic approach that integrates the role of intellectuals and think 
tanks into Japan’ s foreign policy study expand the understanding of how Japan’ s 
foreign policy is formulated and integrated with and through ideas and norms. 
This thesis, therefore, makes use of Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm life cycle 
framework ( 1998)  to analyse how intellectuals help Japan to work with the ERIA, 
IDE- JETRO, and ADBI –  the Japanese- government funded IROs –  in order to 
construct ideas and norms.  I develop the IRO concept to further understand the 
contributions of the ERIA, IDE- JETRO, and ADBI to regional transport 
development schemes in Southeast Asia.  
As shown in Chapter 6, I observed that although IROs attempt to disseminate 
constructed ideas and norms to other actors in the region, there is language barrier 
that constrains the receivers’  understanding.  The existing literature that uses the 
norm life cycle framework generally does not take this language barrier into account 
as many case studies are domestic, or it is taken for granted that there is no language 
barrier between the norm entrepreneurs and norm receivers.  This observation was 
made when I conducted interviews in Southeast Asia, and thereby, could be another 
point for future research in terms of how language barriers constrain the norm 
cascade process and could be studied using a quantitative approach. For example, it 
could be measured using questionnaires focused on how norm receivers (e.g. seminar 
or workshop participants)  receive the norms that are cascaded.  This also opens the 
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floor for future research to develop theoretical debates on how to measure the impact 
that norm entrepreneurs have.   
 The second group of literature includes that of norms and development 
norms.  Chapter 2 points out that existing literature applies social constructivism to 
comprehend how ideas and norms are constructed, cascaded, and internalised to 
other actors, and further emphasises that existing literature has not paid attention to 
the role of people or institutions in the norm construction process.  In this thesis, I 
explain how Japanese intellectuals who work in Japanese universities and have 
professional connections with government agencies help the ERIA, IDE- JETRO, 
and ADBI to shape the ideas of Southeast Asian transport development by 
integrating Japan’ s national interests.  Chapter 6 shows that the contributions of 
intellectuals through both professional and institutional connections have created 
channels through which intellectuals can link with other intellectuals in the region. 
Such channels have opened spaces to conduct research, discuss ideas, and construct 
and disseminate the ideas of regional transport development to other actors.  This 
thesis shows that in order to understand how ideas and norms are constructed, as 
social constructivists argue, studies that focus on how the intellectuals construct the 
ideas and create connections can also help us to understand the norm construction 
and cascade processes.  
The third group of literature focuses on Japan’ s role as a norm entrepreneur 
in the international system.  I point out that existing literature applies the social 
constructivist idea of a ‘norm entrepreneur’ in many case studies, including Japan’s 
contributions to international security and international development (Sato & Hirata, 
2008a). Nonetheless, such literature does not elaborate in-depth about the ideas and 
norms constructed by intellectuals. Therefore, this thesis was developed based on the 
ideas of the exiting literature and contributes to the study of how intellectuals help 
to construct ideas and norms through the use of international transport development 
in Southeast Asia as a case study. For example, I found that intellectuals also play an 
important role in Japan’ s foreign policy by bridging theorists and practitioners 
together.  They help to shape foreign policy and, at the same time, work with other 
actors to disseminate the ideas that serve Japan’ s national interests and goals in the 
international system.  Chapter 6 outlines the roles of intellectuals in the research-
related activities of the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI, arguing that the contributions 
they have made to research and organisational themes include the internalised norms 
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and ideas of regional transport development, as these intellectuals maintain close 
relations with Japan’ s governmental agencies.  In sum, this thesis extends the 
boundaries of the study of Japan-Southeast Asia relations by integrating the concept 
of ‘ norm entrepreneur’ .  I hope that the application of the ‘ norm entrepreneur’ 
concept will pave the way for future research on Japan-Southeast Asia relations, and 
that it can also be applied to other countries’  relations, such as that between China 
and Southeast Asia.  
The last group of literature focuses on the role of think tanks and development 
norms.  I show in Chapter 2 that the existing literature on think tanks explains their 
characteristics and influence on international relations by applying the same 
literature that was produced to analyse Western think tanks in the 1990s ( Carnoy, 
1984; Domhoff, 1983; Newsom, 1996; Pautz, 2011; Stone, 1996) .  However, the 
current phenomenon of how think tanks are institutionalised and how they operate 
their research activities has changed since that time. I pointed out previously that the 
characteristics and roles of the ERIA, IDE- JETRO, and ADBI do not match the 
traditional concept of think tanks. Rather, as they have unique characteristics, I have 
accordingly proposed that such characteristics should be reconsidered.  I developed 
ideas to look at the characteristics of ‘ think tanks’  through the concept of ‘ IROs’ , 
which explains my observations about research organisations in the context of 
international politics.  
In sum, I developed this thesis based on the literature that explains Japan-
Southeast Asia relations and the studies that are focused on the influence of ideas 
and norms in international relations.  This thesis contributes to the understanding of 
Japan- Southeast Asia relations by proposing that one way to understand how Japan 
engages in regional transport development in Southeast Asia is through IROs, and 
that we can apply social constructivism to comprehend the role of intellectuals, as 
well as their professional and institutional connections. These connections, in return, 
attribute the status of ‘RIH’ to Japan. This thesis, then, arguably opens a new space 
for discussion in IR scholarship to understand and explore more about the roles of 
intellectuals and IROs in IR.  The contributions of this thesis can be studied further, 
particularly the issue of how Japan uses its intellectual power to influence 





7.3 Research Limitation and Future Development of the Research 
 This thesis is the first to study Japan’s intellectual contributions to Southeast 
Asian regional transport development. It applies the norm life cycle framework to 
analyse how the ideas and norms of regional transport have been constructed, 
cascaded, and internalised.  
My understanding and analysis of the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI’s 
professional and institutional connections was significantly limited by the language 
barrier. Although I have basic proficiency in Japanese, it was not enough for me to 
access Japan’s official documents, which may have helped me to develop a broader 
understanding of how the Japanese intellectuals in the ERIA and IDE-JETRO have 
disseminated their opinions in Japanese society. While English could be used to 
understand the ideas presented in the ERIA’s publications and research work, some 
research-related activities were organised in collaboration with IDE-JETRO and 
MOFA in Tokyo. Therefore, in-depth study of the debates between Japanese officials 
and intellectuals in meeting minutes, public interviews, published op-eds, and 
articles can be investigated in the future.  
While the MLIT’ s contributions to the work of the MOFA and JICA were 
mentioned in Chapter 4, it was not elaborated how its staff members have contributed 
intellectually to Southeast Asian transport infrastructure construction projects. 
Studies of Japan-Southeast Asia relations tend to focus on the MOFA and METI, but 
the MLIT has yet to be studied in- depth; accordingly, future research on the MLIT 
would contribute meaningfully to the field of IR. 
I also would like to state that I confronted some difficulties in conducting the 
field research. First, I arrived in Tokyo on 1 February 2016, but could not make a 
significant number of interviews in February because it was the end of the Japanese 
fiscal year and the expected interviewees that I approached were busy with 
administrative matters. Although I emailed and called the interviewees in advance, 
the process of accepting my interview request took quite some time. I even 
approached the METI reception desk and talked to a receptionist directly, but it still 
took almost two weeks for them respond. Thus, most of the interviews in Japan were 
conducted within the last two weeks of March 2016. Accordingly, the delayed timing 
of the interviews did not permit me to have a broader opportunity to talk to people 
in Japan.   
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Second, most of the Japanese interviewees’ email addresses were not posted 
on the internet. The only way to contact the expected interviewees was, thus, via 
institutional contact addresses (i.e. ‘contact us’ or ‘general queries’) or online forms. 
When using these channels, I did not know if the webmasters would take my request 
seriously and forward it to the relevant staff members or not. This is, however, 
understandable, as there are many staff members in the various ministries and 
information about staff members should not be posted online. In contrast, Southeast 
Asian intellectuals’ email addresses could be found on the internet or in journal 
articles. This meant that there were more opportunities to conduct interviews with 
Southeast Asian intellectuals. The limitation in obtaining the MOFA, METI, and 
JICA staff members’ email addresses meant that I could not select the interviewees 
myself and thereby, had to conduct interviews with designated officials.  
Third, the ‘snowball effect’ methodology did not work in Japan. Although I 
asked some Japanese researchers and professors to introduce me to MOFA and 
METI staff members, they hesitated to give me their email addresses. In contrast, 
researchers and professors in Southeast Asia were more willing to introduce me to 
other relevant persons by giving me their email addresses or contact numbers so that 
I could extend my connections.  
Fourth, a common attitude that I found was that my research was going to 
destroy the reputations of the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and ADBI. Before I went to Japan, 
I emailed one of IDE-JETRO’s researchers whom I have known for many years to 
talk about my research. This researcher introduced me to another London-based 
researcher whose expertise is South Asia. I, thereby, travelled to London to seek an 
opportunity to be linked personally with someone from IDE-JETRO. Upon arriving 
in London and discussing my thesis, the researcher explicitly rejected my argument 
and asserted that my thesis was going to defame IDE-JETRO. I also confronted this 
attitude again when I interviewed an IDE-JETRO researcher in Japan. After the 
interview was conducted, the researcher emailed me that night to state that my 
research would destroy IDE-JETRO’s reputation. The researcher further asserted 
that IDE-JETRO’s researchers have a significant amount of research experience 
whilst I am just a young scholar. This attitude was also found in my interviews with 
staff members of the ERIA and ADBI, however, they seemed to be more open about 
my thesis. They stated that if my thesis research was conducted in a scientific way 
they would accept the result. This attitude sometimes made for a negative impression 
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before the interviews were even conducted. I, hence, had to ensure that the thesis’s 
objectives were not intended to harm the relevant organisations’ reputations.  
Fifth, unexpectedly, the consent form made some interviewees feel 
uncomfortable. Many Japanese interviewees refused to sign the consent form. I had 
to explain to them and ensure that their identities would not be revealed in the thesis. 
Sometimes, these uncomfortable moments made the interviews start off with an 
awkward ambience.  
Finally, recording the interviews made some interviewees hesitant and 
reluctant to respond. Some interviewees did not allow me to use a recorder because 
they wanted to reflect their personal opinions about their organisations. Although I 
had to take extensive notes during such interviews, the interviewees were more 
relaxed. 
Future studies can contribute further by expanding the case study.  While I 
have studied regional transport development in the GMS area, I have not yet studied 
Japan’ s contributions to Southeast Asian maritime transport development, which 
also helps ASEAN to complete its regional production network in the Southeast 
Asian archipelago.  However, as Chapter 4 pointed out, economic corridors 
throughout the GMS have received significant interest from the Japanese 
government and the three studied IROs. Chapter 5 also demonstrated that the ERIA’s 
CADP emphasises the development of land transport in the region, whilst IDE-
JETRO focuses on the technical issues of cross- border transport and ADBI focuses 
on financial issues.  Therefore, I did not study, for example, how the ERIA, IDE-
JETRO, and ADBI work with the MOFA, METI, and JICA to construct ideas about 
maritime transport development in light of China’s maritime silk road. 
 This study can also be used to analyse how co- operation between Japan and 
other regions is linked by Japan’ s ultimate economic and political objectives.  This 
thesis shows Japan’ s contributions to the GMS area, but has not explained how 
Japan’ s relations with South Asia, or Japan’ s foreign policy on the Free and Open 
Indo- Pacific ( FOIP)  strategy, are linked.  Therefore, further studies about such 
relations might lead to a more significant and comprehensive understanding of 
Japan’s strategies within the international system.  
The study of professional connections is another area that would benefit from 
future research.  Although this thesis stresses the importance of professional 
connections between Japanese intellectuals in the ERIA and IDE- JETRO, an in-
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depth investigation of how these intellectuals contributed their ideas to meetings and 
conferences could be conducted in the future.  This could be done by analysing 
meeting minutes or by conducting in-depth interviews with the intellectuals.  
 Finally, future research can compare the roles of Chinese and Japanese think 
tanks or IROs in the development of Southeast Asian regionalism and regional 
transport.  The Chinese government has been consistently promoting the idea of the 
Belt Road Initiative ( BRI) , but there is a limited number of studies focused on how 
Chinese think tanks contribute to the work of the Chinese government. Additionally, 
as this thesis argues that the characteristics and work of the ERIA, IDE-JETRO, and 
ADBI are different from those of ‘conventional’ think tanks, we can look to Chinese 
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